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"in this state of uncertainty in which a young, 
almost indeed an embryo, science finds itself, 
one should be chary of attempting to apply its 
findings practically. There is now a serious 
danger that psychology will fall into discredit, 
partly owing to the zeal of its votaries for the 
unconscious and infantile aspects of the mind, 
but still more owing to premature attempts to 
utilize its supposed discoveries practically 
while the basis upon which they rest is uncer- 
tain and insecure."--W. H. R. Rivers.
Dr. Rivers made these observations in beginning a 
practical application of psychology to politics, in view of 
his having accepted an invitation to become a candidate for 
the representation of the University of London in the House of 
Commons. Although that was twelve years ago, and in that pe- 
riod no little progress has been made in the field of social 
psychology, the attempt which has been made in this essay to 
apply practically to preaching the findings of social psycho- 
logy has led to a deeper appreciation of the significance of 
Dr. Rivers 1 judgments than I was capable of when this study 
was begun. Nevertheless, perhaps the most valuable correc- 
tives that psychology can receive in its theoretical develop- 
ment will come from the attempts which are made to apply it 
practically.
This essay is presented as a work in the field of 
homiletics. It might be described, otherwise than by the 
title it bears, as an introduction to homiletics approached
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from the standpoint of social psychology.
Although it is recognized that the distinction be- 
tween general, or individual, psychology and social psycholo- 
gy is not clear, it has been my purpose to keep the scope of 
this study within the field of social psychology, leaving out 
of consideration much valuable material in the field of gener- 
al psychology which has bearings on homiletics. Moreover, its 
scope does not include any more of the field of social psycho- 
logy than that which pertains to the religious audience situa- 
tion. Nor have I undertaken to discuss all the subjects usu- 
ally dealt with in a thorough text-book on homiletics, but 
rather to discuss only those subjects on which the group, or 
social, psychology of the religious audience has some direct 
bearing*
Accordingly, the task has been conceived to be one 
of surveying carefully representative works in both the field 
of social psychology and that of homiletics; of making a crit- 
ical exposition of the principles of social psychology which 
are especially significant to the religious audience situation; 
and of indicating the bearing of those principles on the tech- 
nique of preparing and delivering sermons.
At first, the plan was to divide the work into two 
parts, the first being an exposition of the psychology of the 
religious audience, and the second being a practical applica- 
tion to homiletics of the psychological principles expounded 
in the first part. An effort to follow this plan, however,
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revealed certain difficulties of organization which made it 
seem advisable to follow the plan of indicating the practical 
applications in their more natural context, and it is my hope 
that in following this plan, the work is more unified and the 
significance of the applications more apparent.
The work was undertaken with the thought in mind 
that possibly such a study might yield some conclusions which 
would prove to be the bases for the modification of some of 
the generally accepted principles of homiletics, or even for 
the advancement of some new principle, or principles. No such 
results have been accomplished. Rather, the conclusion might 
be stated negatively that I have found nothing in the study 
of the religious audience from the standpoint of social psy- 
chology which suggests any radically novel changes in the tech- 
nique of preparing and delivering sermons. What the masters of 
the pulpit in days gone by have learned by trial-and-error meth- 
ods and written down in their text-books and lectures as induc- 
tive generalizations based on broad experience and careful ob- 
servation will, for the most part, stand up in the face of the 
most searching criticism.
Thus to state the conclusion negatively, however, is 
not to imply that social psychology has no contribution to make 
to homiletics. Comprehensively stated, it has at least two 
valuable contributions to make. First, it reveals more clear- 
ly the mental processes according to which men react to social 
stimuli, and it thus builds up, as it were, a foundation struc-
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ture to lend support and ret-son to some of the time-honoured 
principles of preaching which formerly had to be accepted more 
or less on authority, and applied without perhaps an adequate 
appreciation of the processes by which they worked. In other 
words, social psychology is to homiletics what most of the 
sciences are to the arts most closely related to them. Second- 
ly, social psychology suggests certain emphases in preaching 
which need to be given more consideration than might be given 
on the basis of only the empirical generalizations of homilet- 
ical authorities of the past. That is to say, there are cer- 
tain social factors in operation in contemporary life which 
somewhat modify the reactions of people to techniques of preach- 
ing which, under other social conditions, were quite effective, 
and they indicate certain emphases which need to be made in 
preaching, if the minister is to be "all things to all men".
With regard to mechanical details, although more fa- 
miliar with American spelling, I have endeavoured to employ 
British spelling, using as my authority A Modern Dictionary of 
the English Language, second edition, published by Macmillan 
and Company, London, 1911. The bibliography has been classi- 
fied, the authors in each classification being arranged alpha- 
betically. All works referred to in the footnotes are of the 
edition indicated by the date in the bibliography. Books list- 
ed in the bibliography, but not quoted or specifically referred 
to in the thesis, are those which have been found most helpful 
in giving a general background for the study, or in furnishing
a basis for critical judgment in the selection and presentation 
of material,
I wish to express my thanks to my advisors, Profess- 
or W. P. Paterson and Principal T. Hywell Hughes, for their 
helpful counsel; to the Board of Directors of the Louisville 
Presbyterian Seminary for granting me leave of absence from 
that institution in order that this study might be completed; 
to my colleague, Dean Lewis J. Sherrill, for many stimulating 
conversations and constructive suggestions; and to Mrs. Warner 
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"Our fathers felt that sermons had best 
be theological. The present generation of 
preachers feels that sermons had best be lo­ 
gical—especially as a defence mechanism a- 
gainst emotion. To them a good sermon is like 
a legal brief: it must come out on all fours. 
The truth probably is that sermons should not 
be theological, nor logical, but psychological. 
To be sure, these three are not necessarily ex­ 
clusive. All that is required is that people 
shall receive intelligent insight spiritually 
from our preaching."--Joseph Fort Newton.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION: THE SOGIO-PSYGHOLOGIGAL 
APPROACH TO HOMILETICS.
Until very recent years, homiletics did not oc­ 
cupy a very important place in the curricula of most theo­ 
logical institutions. Despite the recognized facts that 
the preparation and delivery of sermons occupied a major 
part of the time of a minister, and that his qualification 
to serve in the ministry was, to a considerable degree, 
determined by his skill in preaching effective sermons, 
the proportionate amount of time devoted to the training 
of theological students in the art of preaching was very 
small. There were few institutions in which one professor 
devoted his full time to work in the field of homiletics. 
As often as not, homiletics, pastoral work, the conduct of 
public worship, and church administration were all grouped 
in one course of study called "practical theology 11 . The 
ability to preach effectively was spoken of as a "gift", 
and while it was admitted that the "gift" could be some­ 
what improved by means of academic training, not much at­ 
tention, comparatively, was given to such training. It 
seemed almost to be assumed that a man either had the "gift" 
or he did not have it. If he hsd it, development would 
come in the course of time by its "exercise". If he had it 
not, nothing could be done about it.
In his Sprunt lectures on preaching, Dr. James 
Black gives expression to a similar judgment when he says:
"But generally .... a young man, when 'fin­ 
ished', is sent out to a luckless congregation 
with everything in the art of speech to learn, 
generally by crude experiment on a long-suffer­ 
ing people. I am afraid the fault lies with 
our College curriculum. We do not treat the 
training in the art of speech with sufficient 
respect and courtesy. ... A stray hour now 
and then .... is not enough for a class 
of speech-training."1
Moreover, the training which was given was, for 
the most part, determined in its character and emphases by 
the principles of exegesis, logic, and rhetoric. Preaching, 
like education, was predominantly material-centred. The 
Bible and systematic theology were the major sources of the 
material of preaching, although contemporary experience, gen­ 
eral history, and "secular" literature were freely drawn u- 
pon for illustrative material with which to make clear, vi­ 
vid, or convincing, the doctrines of the Bible and of sys­ 
tematic theology. The primary concern was, however, that 
justice should be done to the subject, or to the text, rath­ 
er than to the audience. And the extent to which such jus­ 
tice was done was measured largely in terms of the rules of 
exegesis, logic, and rhetoric.
It must be recognized, of course, that to a con­ 
siderable extent the rules of exegesis, logic, and rhetoric 
are generalizations which have regard for the mental func­ 
tions of man. They have not been formulated in an arbitrary
1 The Mystery of Preaching, p. 40.
manner without any regard for practical psychology. Espec­ 
ially in the field of rhetoric, it must be acknowledged that 
the better works have given no little attention to the care­ 
ful consideration of the ways in which men react to verbal 
stimuli, whether written or oral. And the extent to which 
some of the older authors, in their empirical generaliza­ 
tions, have anticipated the most recent conclusions of ex­ 
perimental psychology is amazing. This is particularly true 
of Aristotle, as the following example, selected from a num­ 
ber of similar ones, shows.
Jersild has made an experimental analysis of the 
effect of different techniques used in public speaking, be­ 
fore ten groups totaling about 250 individuals. He deliver­ 
ed carefully memorized material which he could vary system­ 
atically a number of times in the presentation. The variables 
whose effect was studied were spaced repetitions, initial po­ 
sition, verbal comments to direct attention (such as "Now get 
this", or "Did you notice that?"), short pause, recency, rais­ 
ing the voice, banging the table, and gestures of other kinds. 
In testing the retention of the material immediately after 
the presentation, he simply computed the total out of a pos­ 
sible 70 statements which were retained,and studied them in 
relation to the several factors indicated above. His data 
show that even such absurd devices as the use of the expres­ 
sion, "Now get this", were by no means unimportant.
1 Murphy and Murphy, Experimental Social Psychology, pp. 676-677. ————— ————————
Jersild's conclusions were anticipated, however, 
by Aristotle, who, in discussing attention, says:
"For the art of exciting attention is one that 
belongs equally to all parts of a speech, if 
it is needed, and perhaps especially to the o- 
ther parts; for people are apt to become inat­ 
tentive at any other part rather than at the 
beginnTn^T ~ T . Hence, whenever thereTs oc- 
casion,it is proper to employ such phrases as 
'Pray give me your attention. It concerns you 
every whit ss much as my sell' 1 , or 'A strange 
thing, such as never you have heard, I'll toll 
you 1 , or T AThing so marvellous 1 . This is like 
Prodicus's rule, whenever his audience was drow­ 
sy, 'of slipping in a taste of the Fifty Drachm 
speech 1 ."1
Furthermore, one cannot gloss over the fact that 
Demosthenes and Cicero were great orators, and Jerome Sa­ 
vonarola and John Bunyan were great preachers, without the 
benefits of twentieth century psychology. But such consid­ 
erations in no way justify the conclusion that oratory is 
merely a "gift", that speakers are born, not made. As ear­ 
ly a writer on homiletics as John Chrysostom has contended 
quite vigorously that "speaking is not a natural, but an ac­ 
quired power". 2 Nor do such considerations invalidate the 
contention that speaking should be audience-centred, rather 
than material-centred, and that in the preparation and de­ 
livery of sermons the rules of logic and rhetoric should be 
employed or modified in light of the best psychological know- 
ledge accessible to-day.
If a text is to be used in preaching, the soundest
1 Rhetoric of Aristotle, Tr. by Welldon, pp. 280-281. 
Italics mine.
2 On the Priesthood, Tr. by Marsh, p. 165.
principles of exegesis should be employed in order to ascer­ 
tain its meaning. If reasoning is involved in the thought 
processes of the sermon, it should abide by the rules of lo­ 
gic. And, as a species of rhetoric, 1 homiletics can ill af­ 
ford to disregard the principles of oratory which have been 
tested by time and have been found to be sound. But even so, 
there is still room for homiletics to apply to the task of 
preaching the findings of contemporary psychology.
In recent years, a number of valuable works have 
been published on pastoral psychology, 2 and in view of the 
intimate relations between the minister's work as pastor and 
as preacher, such works should be very helpful to him. And 
sinpe President Walter Dill Scott published The Psychology of 
Public Speaking, many works in that field have emphasized the 
psychological approach to the subject.^ But apparently very 
little work has been done specifically on the psychology of 
preaching. E. Parry has written a little book on Sermon Psy­ 
chology, but in it he has not gone very thoroughly into the 
subject either from the standpoint of homiletics or psycholo­ 
gy. Recent Psychology and Evangelistic Preaching, by W. L. 
Northridge, is a helpful brief study of that subject from the 
standpoint of psychoanalysis. And while Mr. William Macpher-
1 Kidder protests against this statement of the relation 
between rhetoric and homiletics. Treatise on Homiletics, p. 
20. But the position of Vinet, Christlieb, and others seems 
to be more sound.
2 Stolz, Pastoral Psychology; Mackenzie, Souls in the Mak­ 
ing; Weatherhead, Psychology in the Service of the ^ouT^Woi^ 
cester and McGomb, Body, Mind, and Spirit; MlTl¥rT The New 
Psychology and the Preacher, for example. —— ——
3 O'Neill and Weaver, The Elements of Speech; Williamson 
Speaking in Public; PhelpsT"SpeaJ£ing ln"Tublic,""for example/
son's Psychology of Persuasion is a general work, there is 
much sound material in it which is readily applied to preach­ 
ing. But the one major work on homiletics from a psychologi­ 
cal standpoint is Professor Gardner's Psychology and Preach­ 
ing, a "book which for several years has been used in some 
American theological seminaries as a text-book for courses 
in homiletics from a psychological standpoint.
Both Scott and Gardner take some notice of the au­ 
dience as a group, and give some attention to the distinctly 
social factors in human behaviour. But for the most part, 
it is valid to say that the books which have approached pub­ 
lic speaking in general, or preaching in particular, from an 
avowed psychological standpoint, have treated man primarily 
as an individual, and only incidentally as a social being in 
a social situation. Yet the audience situation is pre-emi­ 
nently a social situation. Hence, while preaching seeks to 
influence the individual as such, it must do so by means of 
a social situation. It seems obvious, therefore, that the 
approach to the task from the standpoint of individual, or 
general, psychology should at least be supplemented by an 
approach from the standpoint of social psychology.
It has become proverbial that "the proper study of 
mankind is man". And, while certain groups of modern psycho­ 
logists have proceeded on the assumption that the proper study 
of mankind is rats and cats, most psychology has proceeded on 
the basis of the proverb. That is, the effort has been made
to study individuals as such, and then, since society is 
composed of individuals, to interpret society in terms of 
the individual.
Much has undoubtedly been learned by such a pro­ 
cedure, and psychology is greatly indebted even to those who 
have based many of their conclusions with regard to the re­ 
actions of man largely on the study of the reactions of the 
lower animals. But, while that is so, the isolated indivi­ 
dual is, in reality, a fiction. All that makes him an indi­ 
vidual is the product of his reactions to society. That there 
are psychologically significant differences in human beings 
at birth which play a part in determining the product of their 
reactions to society is not denied. But there is very little 
ground for supposing that the child of even the most intelli­ 
gent and cultured parents, if kept isolated from human so­ 
ciety from birth, would ever develop the characteristics by 
whij h we distinguish an individual person. On the other 
hand, individual characteristics are explicable on the basis 
of the interaction of society and the individual.
It seems reasonable, therefore, to contend that 
the proverb should also be considered in its converse form. 
The proper study of man is mankind. Even when one individual 
is speaking to only one other individual, the reaction of 
that second individual can hardly be predicted and controlled 
on the basis of a knowledge of the psychology of the indi­ 
vidual in isolation from his social relations. And when one
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is speaking to a whole group of individuals, the signifi­ 
cance of social relationships is greatly increased. If the 
group is suddenly transformed into a psychological crowd, 
the reactions of the individual to the stimuli presented to 
him in the crowd may be entirely different from his reactions 
to the same stimuli when presented apart from the crowd. 
And what is true of the individual in a psychological crowd 
is also true of him in human groups which would not be con­ 
sidered psychological crowds, though not to the same degree.
Since the preacher delivers his sermons, not to 
isolated individuals, but to groups, it is desirable that in 
the preparation and delivery of sermons he should know and 
apply the principles of group psychology. L. L. Bernard 
has said of the function of social psychology that it is 
"to tell us how we can control the behaviour of individuals 
in the group or in any social si tuation, and how the indivi­ 
dual can control the behaviour of the group."^ In connection 
with our study, however, it should be noted that the preach­ 
er is concerned, not merely with knowing how he can control 
the behaviour of the individuals in the group, but also how 
he can control them so that the result will be developing 
Christian personality. In other words, while the preacher 
is concerned with the technique by which an individual may 
be influenced to become a member of the church, for example, 
that objective alone, when accomplished by certain techniques 
of control, may even defeat the more fundamental objective 
1 introduction to Social Psychology, p. 45.
of cultivating a Christian personality in the individual. 
This fact presents one of the most serious objections which 
can be made to the work of certain evangelists of the "Billy" 
Sunday type. Their objective seems to be to get as many 
people as possible, at the close of the sermon, to "hit the 
sawdust trail" and come forward to shake hands with the evan­ 
gelist, thereby signifying that they "accept Christ as their 
Saviour". That objective is often achieved on a very large 
scale by such evangelists. Their technique, however, re­ 
quires critical evaluation from the standpoint of homiletics, 
for it is by no means certain that, in the case of a large 
proportion of the individuals involved in "mass conversion", 
the action taken under such circumstances is likely to con­ 
tribute to the more fundamental objective of developing Chris­ 
tian personality. The Christian homilete is interested, not 
in control by any method, but in control by methods which are 
productive of Christian character.
In the succeeding chapters, then, we shall endea­ 
vour to discover such methods of control and to indicate 
their bearing on homiletical theory and practice. In the be­ 
ginning, we have to make a psychological analysis of the typ­ 
ical religious audience, which is the material for our study, 
and to identify such a group in terms of the classifications 
of certain recognized authorities on social ps ychology. Then 
we shall consider the foundations of social behaviour, follow­ 
ing with detailed discussions of the social processes of sug-
10 
gestion, imitation, sympathy, and group thinking.
Thus far, we shall be following that form of the 
proverb: "The proper study of mankind is man", but man as a 
social being in a social situation. In the last two chap­ 
ters, we shall follow the converse form of the proverb: "The 
proper study of man is mankind"; that is, we shall consider 
the group, rather than the individual, as a unit.
Throughout the discussion, there will be before us 
the question: "of what significance to Christian preaching are 
these principles and processes of social psychology? 11
We have indicated already the scarcity of the lit­ 
erature which deals directly with our problem. Of the lit­ 
erature in the two major fields involved--social psychology 
and homiletics--however, there is such a vast amount that the 
chief problem has been one of weighing and selecting. The 
classified bibliography, together with the references in the 
footnotes, affords an adequate indication of the judgments 
we have made in the selection of material.
"There are a hundred other things along 
this line that can be helpfully taught and 
learned. There is, for instance, some know­ 
ledge of the psychology of an audience. It 
is not enough to know how to treat our sub­ 
ject, if we do not know how to treat our 
people. As I have listened to great speakers, 
distinctive speakers, it is not only how they 
handle their subjects that marks them off 
from others, but how they handle their audi­ 
ence and themselves.*--James Black.
CHAPTER II.
THE RELIGIOUS AUDIENCE PROM THE STANDPOINT 
OP GROUP PSYCHOLOGY.
In order that the type of group with which this pa­ 
per is dealing primarily may be clearly identified, so as to 
set the scope of the treatment within the field of social psy­ 
chology, and to the end that the further course of development 
of the subject may be indicated, it is desirable at this point 
to present an analytical picture of the group to be studied, 
to locate that group in relation to the classifications of 
certain recognized authorities in the field of social psychol­ 
ogy, and to distinguish between the group and the psychological 
crowd.
Descriptive Analysis of a Typical Religious
Audience.
The group to be studied may be designated, in brief, 
as a typical religious audience. While the number of neople 
may have some bearing on the psychological aspects of such an 
audience, it does not appear to be of sufficient significance 
to warrant the arbitrary designation of any number as the 
typical size. Accordingly, the audience may be thought of as 
composed of almost any number of people who could be thought 
of as a group, whether it be ten or ten thousand, so long as 
they are within hearing, and preferably also within sight, of 
the speaker.
Such a typical religious audience contains certain 
common audience elements which ought to be recognized, it is
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for example, an aggregation of various types of people. There 
are young people with the various dominant interests which 
have been found to prevail in most individuals at the different 
stages in the development of personality between early child­ 
hood and maturity. There are the younger adults, many of whom 
are just embarking upon such enterprises as marriage, home- 
making, parenthood, a profession, or a business venture. There 
are middle-aged people, some of whom have developed a multipli­ 
city of interests and have found life, on the whole, decidedly 
satisfying, others whose lives have been decidedly warped by 
a seemingly unmerited number of disappointing experiences, and 
still others who seem to be unenthusiastically contented to 
plod along on a level plane of monotonous routine. There are 
old people, some of them still vigorous and interested in the 
things of to-day and tomorrow, others wistfully recalling "the 
good old days" and seeking in memory to find an escape from 
the loneliness and perplexity of the evening-time of life. 
There are both sexes, and among them are the married, the un­ 
married, and the widowed. There are many degrees of culture 
represented. There may be representatives of more than one 
race or nationality. Some in the audience may have a rural 
and agricultural background. Others will have established ur­ 
ban and industrial attitudes and habits. Various kinds and 
degrees of formal education may be manifest, from the illiter­ 
ate to those possessing the highest degrees of the foremost 
universities. In short, the typical religious audience is 
quite heterogeneous (in the broader sense of that term) in its
13
membership. Thus, while in some particular religious audience 
enough may be found in common among its members to justify the 
consideration of it as being homogeneous in several respects, 
this heterogeneity must be recognized in a psychological study 
of the kind of group which is the subject of this paper.
Moreover, account must be taken of the fact that the 
individuals composing this group are, for the time being, in a 
particular kind of localized social context. Normally, in an 
audience, there is a relatively strong sense of group isolation. 
This sense of group isolation is perhaps at a minimum in the 
case of an out-of-doors audience on a street or in a park. In 
that case, there na y be a fringe of the audience in which the 
individual feels himself to be no more identified with the au­ 
dience than with the passing throng, or with some smaller 
group which happens to be within hearing of the speaker. But 
much more often, of course, the audience is in a hall or audi­ 
torium, physically inclosed as a group and conscious of its 
temporary isolation. Furthermore, the members of the audience 
are usually seated in a fairly uniform position, so that there 
is a strong tendency towards a uniform direction of attention. 
And it is evident that this sense of group isolation and this 
uniformity of position tend to insure in most of the members 
of the audience a constant awareness of at least a two-fold 
localized social relationship. The first is the relationship 
between the individual member of the audience and the speaker. 
Presumably, in becoming a part of the audience this relation­ 
ship has been anticipated. And his physical position is such 
that, both in seeing and in hearing, he is made very much aware
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of his social relationship as a listener to the speaker. Along 
with this listener-speaker relationship is also the awareness 
of a second social relationship—that between the individual 
and the other members of the audience. Sometimes, if the tes­ 
timony of individuals about their own experience in such a mat­ 
ter can be trusted, the first of these relationships occupies 
the whole field of consciousness, so that the presence, atti­ 
tudes, and actions of the other members of the audience are not 
a part of the individuals awareness. 1 But that is a compara­ 
tively rare circumstance. More often each individual is quite 
conscious of a relationship between himself and other members 
of the audience. And, as we shall see later, this fact is of 
considerable importance to the reactions of an individual in an 
audience situation.
But not only are the members of an audience in this 
two-fold localized social relationship, it must also be remem­ 
bered that they are in an inseparable larger social context. 
That is to say, they sustain certain family relationships as 
husbands, wives, parents, or children. There are vocational
1 Dr. Morton Prince, in a lecture on the conservation in 
memory of forgotten experiences of normal life, relates a num­ 
ber of cases in which, both under experimental conditions and 
under accidental circumstances, experiences of either visual 
or auditory stimuli, of which the subjects were not conscious­ 
ly aware at the time of the experience, and which the subjects 
could not recall voluntarily under normal circumstances, were 
reproduced in memory by means of automatic writing or hypnotism, 
(The Unconscious, pp. 52-56.) If such details as Dr. Prince 
describes are subconsciously perceived and conserved, even 
though they may not permit of normal recall, it does not seem 
unreasonable to suppose that, to some extent, such perceptions 
may influence the members of an audience who are consciously 
aware of only one of the two social relationships indicated 
above.
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relationships as employers, employe's, customers, clients, or 
competitors. There are recreational relationships as team­ 
mates, rivals, or companions. There are relationships as citi­ 
zens, such as that of tax-payer, voter, candidate, or office­ 
holder. Thus is indicated briefly some of the complex laby­ 
rinth of relationships which constitute the larger social con­ 
text in which the member of an audience should be viewed. And, 
while it is not to be supposed that all these relationships 
are a part of the individual's consciousness as a member of an 
audience during any considerable period of time, neither do we 
get an adequate picture of the audience if such relationships 
are excluded from consideration, or ignored.
But in addition to those common audience elements, 
there are certain distinctly religious elements which are in­ 
cluded in the picture of a typical religious audience. On the 
basis of their relation to a church, the members of a religious 
audience may be grouped in one or another of three classes. 
First, there are the members of the local congregation, who 
are also, of course, members of a particular sect or denomina­ 
tion. Secondly, there are members of other local congregations 
of the same, or of a different, denomination, and in the same, 
or in different, communities. And thirdly, it is probable that 
there are some who are members of no church or religious body 
at all.
Moreover, there are many varieties within these class­ 
es. Some are relatively mature, while others are relatively 
immature, not only in their ages, but also in their religious 
training and experience. Professor W. P. Paterson has aptly
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described three of these varieties as "the human being as such, 
to whom religion has been something, the convert, to whom it 
has been much, and the saint, to whom it has been everything" .-*• 
Between those who have "kept these things" from their youth 
up and those who are relative strangers to the beliefs and 
practices of any religion are all degrees of religious maturity. 
And in addition to varieties in religious maturity, there are 
also the more and the less institutionalized members of the 
church. Some will be very familiar with the history, and strong­ 
ly convinced of the distinctive doctrines of a particular de­ 
nomination. Prom time to time, they will have been members of 
the various church courts. They will possess detailed knowledge 
about, and intense enthusiasm for, the history, organization, 
and program of the denomination as a whole. On the other hand, 
there will be those who can scarcely pronounce the name of 
their denomination, and who know practically nothing about its 
distinctive characteristics. And a similar situation will ex­ 
ist with respect to the local congregation. There will be 
those who belong to practically every organization within the 
congregation--the Sunday School, the choir, the Young People's 
Society, an official board, the men's brotherhood or the women's 
auxiliary, holding offices or committee assignments, it may be, 
in several of them, and attending most of the services or meet­ 
ings held in the church over a long period of years. At the 
other extreme will be those "occasional church members" who 
have little knowledge of, or interest in, the program and organ- 
1 Paterson, W. P., The Nature of Religion, pp. 37-38.
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igation of the local congregation, but who attend a morning 
service of worship now and then. Besides these varieties 
among the members of the religious audience who may be classi­ 
fied as church members, there will be found among those who 
are members of no church whatever those who are in varying de­ 
grees hostile, indifferent, or sympathetic in their attitude 
towards religion.
This, then, in broad outline, is a picture of the 
group the psychology of which we are seeking to discover, in 
order that application may be made of its bearing on the prep­ 
aration and delivery of sermons. We must now ask: What kind 
of group is such a religious audience from the standpoint of 
social psychology?
Classification of Such an Audience Prom the 
Standpoint of Social Psychology.
With regard to this question one is inclined to agree 
heartily with Professor William McDougall that "it seems im­ 
possible to discover any single principle of classification" .•"• 
However, the classifications of two recognized authorities in 
the field of social psychology, with somewhat different points 
of view, will prove helpful in orienting the religious audi­ 
ence as a social group.
The first is that of Professor L. L. Bernard, who 
presents a two-fold classification: direct contact groups and 
indirect contact groups. In the first class the members of the 
group are in a "face-to-face" situation, while in the second they 
are not, and "stimuli come to them from the common source only 
1 The Group Mind, p. 122.
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by means of carriers, such as newspapers, telegraph, radio, 
and the like". 1 Direct contact groups are then listed in the 
general order of the decreasing ratio of their permanency and 
of the rationality of their behaviour, as follows: 2
A. Relatively rational types:
1. Genetic groups (primary groups in simplest form): 
a.The family.
b.The neighbourhood proper. 
c.The play group.







4. Discussion groups and classes for instruction.
5. Audiences. 
B. Relatively non-rational types:
1. Informal clubs, social sets, etc.
2. Ceremonials.
3. Rallies and demonstrations.
4. Involuntary crowds.
5. Mob s.
In connection with this classification it should be 
noted that, while deliberative assemblies are classified as 
third among the relatively rational groups, in his description 
of deliberative assemblies Dr. Bernard says, "The highest de­ 
gree of rationality of organization in direct contact groups 
is to be found in the deliberative assembly".3 This latter 
position is certainly what one would expect as a judgment of 
the relative rationality of the deliberative assembly, and very 
probably this ambiguity is due to the attempt to classify 
groups in the decreasing ratio of their permanency and of the
1 Bernard, L. L., Introduction to Social Psychology Chapter XXVIII, p. 438. ————— ————————
2 Ibid., Chapters XXVIII and XXIX.
3 TBIZ., p. 442
19
rationality of their behaviour. In other words, it is the 
supposed greater permanency of genetic groups and such pur­ 
posive associations as clubs, labour unions, and the like, 
which has led Dr. Bernard to place them higher in the scale
than deliberative assemblies.
Also it should be noted that the group which has been 
described in broad outline in this paper is at once, as a gen­ 
eral rule, both an audience and a religious society, or a sub­ 
division of a religious society. Thus, when a particular rel­ 
igious audience is relatively unorganized, impermanent, and 
heterogeneous in its constituent factors (as in the case of 
street preaching), it falls under some low sub-division of the 
fifth of Bernard 1 s relatively rational types. On the other 
hand, when a particular religious audience is highly organized, 
and relatively permanent and homogeneous in its constitution 
(as in the case of an old congregation of a single denomination, 
and composed largely of cultured and spiritually mature mem­ 
bers), it rises very much higher in Bernard's table--surely as 
high as religious societies. 1 Thus, in terms of this classifi­ 
cation, we are dealing with a direct contact group which falls
1 This judgment seems to be in general accord also with 
Professor James Drever f s classification on the basis of the 
mental levels which are normal to the group: (1) Those at the 
perceptual level--the "crowd type", having a Mhere-and-now con­ 
sciousness"; (2) Those at the ideational level — the "club type", 
having some common aim, sentiment, or ideal; and (3) Those at 
the rational level—the "community type", having continuity of 
mental life and the possibility of common purposes and ends of 
a very comprehensive and complex character. The higher types 
of social groups are said to come into existence under f01 r con­ 
ditions: (a) Continuity of existence, (b) A measure of group 
self-consclousiB ss, (c) Interaction with other groups, and (d) 
Group organization. An Introduction to the Psychology of Fdn-
• _ f*. « fff —» M UM »»^W*» •*MMHV«MM»^»MMVM»i»_*»BH^BM^HI»BMMW W^BB^B ^»»^^M» ^ _____ C^l •/ ^"^ * -LjVX. V4tcation, pp. 215-217. — —— ———————- —
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among the relatively permanent and relatively rational types. 
In its lowest extreme form, as a normal group, 1 it borders on 
the relatively non-rational type. In its higher forms, it ri­ 
ses to a position very near the top of this classification of 
social groups. It will serve our purpose for the time being, 
however, to think of the typical religious audience as being 
at some mid-point between these two extremes.
Another classification of social groups which is of 
value in orienting the religious audience is that of McDougall, 
who deliberately omits "such fortuitous and ephemeral groups" 
as persons seated in one compartment on a railway journey and
C)
the passengers on a ship, and presents the following:
A. Natural groups:
1. Those rooted in kinship, as the family.
2. Those determined by geographical conditions,
as an island population. 
B. Artificial groups:
1. Purposive--groups brought together primarily 
by the existence of a common purpose in the 
minds of all their members,
a. Social clubs.
b. Commercial companies.
c. Associations for furthering public ends,
2. Traditional—groups in which traditions are 
predominant, such as 
a. Hindu castes, 
b. Free Masons.
3. Mixed--groups in which there is a high degree 
of mixture both of the traditional and of the 
purposive, such as 
a. Christian church, 
b. Ancient universities and colleges.
This classification is obviously more suggestive than 
exact. The author of it, for example, frankly admits that it 
is difficult, if not impossible, to find a purely traditional 
group. It directs attention, however, to two characteristics
1 The significance of this qualification is made clea^ 
the latter part of this chapter. clear
2 The Group Mind, pp. 123-1^4.
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of the religious audience not indicated in Bernard 1 s classi­ 
fication. The first is that it is an artificial social group. 
Of more significance, however, is the second—that it is a mix­ 
ture both of the traditional and of the purposive.
Thus, without entering upon a lengthy critical dis­ 
cussion of these classifications as such, we may identify the 
typical religious audience, from the point of view of social 
psychology, as an artificial, direct contact group, which is 
relatively rational and permanent, and which is a mixture both 
of the traditional and the purposive.
There are times, however,--usually in the more intense 
forms of religious revivals--when the religious audience does 
not fit into this classification. An excellent example in point 
is the Cane Ridge camp-meeting of August, 1801, in Bourbon 
County, Kentucky. G. B. Cutten presents a vivid description 
of this meeting as follows:
"Especially at night, with the camp-fires blaz­ 
ing around the auditorium cut out of the dense woods, 
the breeze echoing back the shrieks and other noises 
from the impenetrable forest, and several men preach­ 
ing at different parts of the grounds at the same 
time, the effects were greatly increased. Large num­ 
bers fell and would lie breathless and motionless for 
hours, or would shriek or groan at intervals. As 
many as one in every six present at some meetings fell. 
At times these were carried to the meeting-house and 
laid down so that the floor was nearly covered. Some 
were motionless, f some talked but could not move. 
Some beat the floor with their heels. Some, shrieking 
in agony, bounded about like a live fish out of water. 
Many lay down and rolled over and over for hours at a 
time. Others rushed wildly over the stumps and bench­ 
es, and then plunged, shouting, 'Lostl Lost!' into the 
forest 1 . It was a common sight to see men leap, sob, 
shout, laugh, or swoon, and when a meeting seemed dull, 
one attack would immediately increase the spirituality. 
The 'jerks' seized saint and sinner alike, it was no 
respecter of persons. Those affected shook, twitched,
jumped like frogs, or bounded like fish, and the 
scoffer was as likely to "be stricken as the convert. 
These reflex movements first appeared, but when the 
cerebral hemispheres became involved, then uncon­ 
sciousness was the result. Then the 'barkers 1 were 
seen. Groups of men and women, on all fours, snarling, 
and growling, and snapping their teeth, barked at the 
foot of a tree. This they called 'treeing the devil 1 . 
The 'holy laugh 1 became a part of the worship; both in 
chorus and in series the congregation burst out into 
loud and uncontrollable laughter. All kinds of preach­ 
ers and exhorters developed; in one instance a little 
girl of seven years was allowed to preach until she 
was so exhausted that she could not utter another 
word. ff l
Such behaviour clearly Indicates that this particular 
religious audience belongs elsewhere than where we have classi­ 
fied the typical religious audience. It would fit much better 
down near the bottom of the non-rational groups of Bernard's 
classification, in company with mobs and crowds.
This fact gives rise to the need for distinguishing, 
if possible, between the "group" and the "crowd". By some 
writers in the field of social psychology no such distinction 
is clearly made, though some difference appears to be assumed. 
By others some distinction is made, but is not adhered to con­ 
sistently. The result is much confusion. Sir Martin Conway, 
for example, includes the mob, a public meeting, a theatre 
audience, a congregation, the race, the empire, the nation, 
the county, the city or town, a political party, a class, a 
profession, an ecclesiastical body, a club or society, an edu­ 
cational organization such as a university or college, a regi­ 
ment of soldiers, and other aggregations of people within the
n
category of crowds. The nearest that he comes to a descrip-
1 Psychological Phenomena of Christianity, pp. 180-181.
2 The CrqwoT in Peace and War, ~~"~
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tion of the crowd which distinguishes it from other groups is 
when he says that "a multitude of people walking in the street, 
each about his own business, may form a dense mass of humani­ 
ty, but they are not a crowd until something occurs to arrest 
their common attention and inspire in them a common emotion". 1 
Although much of his book deals with real psychological crowds, 
the work suffers considerably from the inclusiveness of his use 
of the term crowd.
No attempt is made by W. Trotter2 to define the 
crowd, since he is concerned primarily with exhibiting the sig­ 
nificance of the gregarious instinct in social behaviour gener­ 
ally.
Professor Bernard does not define the crowd, but 
he is careful throughout his book not to confuse the crowd with
•z.
more rational types of groups.
% 
A
Professor William McDougall , likewise, does not un­ 
dertake a concise definition, but in an admirable treatment 
of the subject, he presents the conditions under which a crowd 
is formed, gives a detailed description of the intellectual 
and emotional characteristics of the crowd, and is then consist­ 
ently careful in his use of the term.
Dr. E. D. Martin indicates briefly his conception of 
the crowd as follows: "in this discussion the word »crowd' must 
be understood to mean the peculiar mental condition which some­ 
times occurs when people think and act together, either imme­ 
diately, where the members of the group are present and in
1 The Crowd in Peace and War, p. 8.
2 Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War.
3 introduction To~Spciar"Tsycnoiogy7 ipjST 458-463.
4 The Group MinoT Chapter II.
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close contact, or remotely, as when they affect one another in 
a certain way through the medium of an organization, a party 
or sect, the press, etc."-'- This "peculiar mental condition" 
is later described as "a phenomenon which should best be class­ 
ed with dreams, delusions, and the various forms of automatic 
behaviour....The crowd-self...is analogous in many respects to 
'compulsion neurosis 1 , 'somnambulism 1 , or 'paranoiac episode 1 ."**
G. Le Bon identifies the crowd as follows: "Under 
certain given circumstances, and only under those circumstances, 
an agglomeration of men presents new characteristics very dif­ 
ferent from those of the individuals composing it. The senti­ 
ments and ideas of all the persons in the gathering take one 
and the same direction, and their conscious personality vanishes. 
A collective mind is formed, doubtless transitory, but present­ 
ing very clearly defined characteristics. The gathering has 
thus become what, in the absence of a better expression, I 
will call an organized crowd, or, if the term is considered
•z
preferable, a psychological crowd." But before Le Son's work 
is finished he has applied the term crowd to the masses in gen­ 
eral and to various social classes and vocational groups which 
should not be considered psychological crowds at all.
With these definitions and descriptions before us, 
it at least seems evident that in the true psychological crowd 
one is dealing with an abnormal phenomenon of social behaviour. 
And just as there is a distinction in general psychology between
1 The Behaviour of Crowds, p. 6.
2 ISTd,, pp. JL9-2fr.
3 The Crowd, p. 26.
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"normal psychology" and "abnormal psychology", so it appears 
that there ought to be a similar distinction between "normal 
social psychology" and "abnormal social psychology". At any 
rate, it is with this conviction that the following definitions 
are proposed as a working basis on which to distinguish, in 
this paper, between the group and the crowd.
A group is an aggregation of individuals whose be-
t
haviour is organized around a common interest, whether the in­ 
terest and organization be permanent or temporary, and whether 
the reactions of the individuals be similar or different. 
When such a group is in a face-to-face situation, as in an au­ 
dience, it may be termed a direct contact group. When it is 
not in a face-to-face situation, but is nevertheless respond­ 
ing at approximately the same time to the same, or very simi­ 
lar stimuli, it may be termed an indirect contact group. 
Examples of such a group would be the readers of one news­ 
paper, or the listeners-in of one wireless program.
A crowd is a direct contact group in an abnormal men­ 
tal condition, in which the behaviour of the group displays a 
lack of rational inhibitions in a degree which is similar to 
that displayed by the individual in a hypnotic state. Crowd 
psychology in relation to the religious audience will be con­ 
sidered more fully in a later chapter.
Thus far we have described analytically what has been 
conceived to be a typical religious audience. That audience 
has been oriented in terms of certain recognized classifica­ 
tions of social groups. Furthermore, it has been distinguish-
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ed from the psychological crowd as being a normal group, al­ 
though it is recognized that the religious audience, like 
almost any normal group, may, under appropriate conditions, 
become a psychological crowd. It is in view of that fact, 
among others, that a chapter is given to the psychology of 
revivalism.
Application to Preaching.
Probably the most significant bearing on homiletics 
of such an analysis of the religious audience as we have made 
in this chapter is also the most obvious one—that in the se­ 
lection and treatment of subjects the psychological character 
of the particular audience should be a governing factor.
This has been recognized by writers on rhetoric and 
homiletics from very early times. It seems clearly to be im­ 
plied, for example, by Aristotle, when he says, "There are 
three kinds of Rhetoric, corresponding to the three kinds of 
audience to which speeches are naturally addressed. * For a 
speech is composed of three elements, viz. the speaker, the 
subject of the speech, and the persons addressedj and the end, 
or object, of the speech is determined by the last, viz. by 
the audience."* Professor Van Oosterzee devotes a whole chap­ 
ter to the elaboration of the thesis that "the truly Biblical 
and Christian sermon first attaines its end, when its subject- 
matter is in harmony not only with the general wants of the 
congregation, but also with its particular wants, yea even_ 
1 The Rhetoric of Aristotle, Trans. by Welldon, p. 22.
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so far as possible—with the momentary wants of that congre­ 
gation for which it is specially designed and delivered." 
And Dr. James Black, in his Sprunt Lectures on Preaching, 
speaks of the sense of the audience as "the most regulative 
thing in the sermon".^
But simply to say that the psychological character 
of the audience should be a governing factor in the choice 
and treatment of subjects is to say what is not, in itself, 
of very much practical help to the preacher. A more thought­ 
ful consideration of the psychological analysis of the reli­ 
gious audience, however, yields two principles which the 
minister may apply to his preaching.
First, the principle of variety should be observed, 
both within a single sermon and in the sermons that are preach­ 
ed over a period of time* Without violating the fundamental 
principle of unity in discourse, it is often possible for the 
preacher to direct what he says in different parts of the 
sermon to different groups and relationships in his audience. 
And for varieties of subjects and treatment there is practically
•z
no end. But unless the minister keeps in mind the psycholog­ 
ical characteristics of his congregation, there is the constant 
danger that he may fall into the habit of preaching just one 
type of sermon, or, what is worse, preaching sermons as if a
1 Practical Theology, p. 221.
2 Mystery of Preaching, p. 37.
3 Unusually suggestive material on this subject is to be 
found in the following works: Coffin, H. S., What to Preach; 
Black, J., Op. cit«, Ch. V; Stidger, W. L., Preaching Out of the 
Overflow, GET VIII; Oxnara, G. B., The Varieties of PrVsentTay— Preaching. ————— ——
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religious audience were an aggregation of individuals who 
were all exactly alike.
But variety is not the only principle to be observed 
in view of the psychological character of the audience. In­ 
dividual and group differences must be taken account of, but 
underneath those differences is the common humanity of man­ 
kind- -what someone has called "the man in men11 —to whom the 
preacher may always address his sermons. This psychological 
aspect of the audience has been most aptly described by Prof­ 
essor Van Oosterzee as follows:
"There are general wants of every con­ 
gregation, the same in all ages. We address men, 
sinners, mortals, professors of the Gospel, who 
come and seek in the house of the Lord....light 
and power, consolation and hope, for themselves 
in their inner and outward life. The same im­ 
pure and unresting hearts beat before us in the 
imposing cathedral as in the lowly country chap­ 
el; everywhere and under manifold garb Pharisee 
and publican go up at the same time to pray. It 
must for this reason be our endeavour to become 
1 all things to all men, that we may by all means 
save some 1 ."1
So that, while the heterogeneity of the religious audience 
may be most impressive, and while it makes its demands upon 
the preacher in the preparation and delivery of his sermons, 
of no less significance to homiletics is the essential homo­ 
geneity of mankind as such.
1 Op. cit., p. 221.
"To secure these (offensive and defensive) 
advantages of homogeneity, it is evident that 
the member of the herd must possess sensitive­ 
ness to the behaviour of their fellows."
«•£#*•)*
"The successful shepherd thinks like his 
sheep, and can lead his flock only if he keeps 
no more than the shortest distance in advance. 
He must remain, in fact, recognizable as one of 
the flock, magnified, no doubt, louder, coars­ 
er, above all with more urgent wants and ways 
of expression than the common sheep, but in es­ 
sence to their feeling of the same flesh with 
them. In the human herd the necessity of the 
leader bearing unmistakable marks of identifi­ 
cation is equally essential."--W. Trotter.
CHAPTER III.
THE FOUNDATION OP COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOUR: 
GREGARIOUSNESS
Social psychology, as a science, is in a state of 
confusion equal to, if indeed not greater than, the confusion 
of general psychology. It speaks with many tongues. It builds 
on various foundations. Le Bon, avowedly restricting himself 
to the consideration of psychological crowds, but actually in­ 
cluding all kinds of groups and masses, builds his structure
on the unconscious, together with a collective mind and a mys-
2terious contagion. E. D. Martin follows Le Bon in the im­ 
portance assigned to the unconscious, but leaves aside conta­ 
gion and the collective mind. To G. Tarde^ imitation explains 
practically everything of importance with regard to the devel­ 
opment of society. To W. Trotter4 all collective behaviour is 
to be ascribed to the operation of the instinct of the herd. 
McDougall5 speaks largely the language of instincts with their
c.
accompanying emotions. P. H. Allport, along with others of 
the behaviouristic school, exalts the conditioned response.
rj
And Wheeler, as a disciple of the Gestalt psychology, builds 
on social configurations and organismic laws.
It is usually dangerous to attempt to classify men 
of science in various schools or groups, and no such classifi-
1 The Crowd.
2 Tn"e Behaviour of Crowds.
3 Laws""of ImltlatTon, also Social Laws.
4 The Instincts of the HercTTh Peace and War.
5 Social Psychology, also The Group Mind.
6 Social Psychology.
7 The Science of Psychology.
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cation of contemporary men and their writings is likely to 
prove even approximately accurate for any great length of 
time, for it is an ideal of science to keep an open mind and 
to desert positions formerly held as soon as the development 
of the science seems to have shown them to be invalid. But, 
in spite of this danger, it is well, for the sake of perspec­ 
tive and to aid in critical judgment, for one who is attempt­ 
ing a practical application of a science to take a telescopic 
look at that science in its historical development before pro­ 
ceeding to set forth what he has made his own critical judg­ 
ments as to the foundations of collective behaviour.
For this purpose, Professor Bernard's brief histor­ 
ical sketch of the development of social psychology may be pre­ 
sented in a condensed form. He groups representative author­ 
ities in three classes.
Three Historical Approaches to Social 
Psychology.
First, there are those writers who treat psycho-so­ 
cial phenomena objectively and in the mass. To this treat­ 
ment Ross gives the name "planes and currents viewpoint". It 
is concerned primarily with fads, fashions, crazes, conven­ 
tions, customs, traditions, mores, folkways, and the like. Its 
beginning may be assigned to the appearance of Walter Bagehot's 
Physics and Politics, in 1872. Many problems which belong to 
social psychology were also discussed by William Godwin, in his
1 Introduction to Social Psychology, pp. 25-37. In the fol­ 
lowing three paragraphs Bernard*s account has been followed, his 
judgment being accepted in the classification of those men on 
whose works this writer does not feel qualified to pass judgment.
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Enquiry Concerning Political Justice. Gabriel Tarde follow­ 
ed a similar method in his Les Lois de limitation, ^Oppo­ 
sition Universelle, La Logique Soclale, and Social Laws. Ross 
is grouped as the chief American follower of Tarde, although 
it is noted that he has made many departures from the positions 
of the French writer. In this same general group belong such 
other American writers as E. S. Bogardus, J. M. Baldwin, T. B. 
Veblen, G. A. Ellwood, W. G. Sumner, and Walter Lippmann. A- 
mong the better known European writers of the "planes and cur­ 
rents" type are C. Duprat, Scipio Sighele, Gustave Le Bon, and
t
Graham Wallas. This group has rendered a valuable service in 
making such phenomena as custom, tradition, convention, fashions, 
and public opinion stand out as objective facts, but the phe­ 
nomena dealt with are abstract and conceptual, and are so vast 
and elusive that much hasty generalization has often been made 
on the basis of random observations, with the result that this 
type of social psychology has fallen into disrepute in some 
quarters.
The other two types of social psychology are concern­ 
ed with the same fundamental problem; namely, how character or 
personality is built up in the individual. The first is the 
instinctivist school, which contends that "character or behav­ 
iour patterns are Integrated from within on the basis of native 
processes or instincts, which dominate the process of character 
building". The history of this school goes back at least to 
such writers on ethics as Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Price, Hume, 
1 Bernard, L. L., Introduction to Social Psychology, p. 25.
Adam Smith, and Kant, and to such early psychologists as Hel- 
vetius and Hartley, and the Scottish metaphysical psycholo­ 
gists, Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart. Most of the Utilita­ 
rians, like J. S. Mill, Spencer, and Leslie Stephen, as well 
as the psychologist Bain, also emphasized innate tendencies 
and impulses. But Professor William McDougall ! s Introduction 
to Social Psychology, published in 1908, is probably the out­ 
standing book representing the general position of this group. 
W. Trotter, James Drever, R. H. Thouless, P. C. Bartlett, and 
Graham Wallas, the latter of whom was mentioned in connection 
with the first group also, are British writers of prominence 
in the field of social psychology who stress the importance 
of instincts in character development. This school has made 
contributions to social psychology which are of inestimable 
value.
The third type of social psychology may be desig­ 
nated as the environmentalist school. It "accounts for the 
integration of behaviour patterns under the influence of en­ 
vironmental pressures, especially of those from the psycho- 
social environment".1 The existence of instincts, or of other 
inherited behaviour patterns, is not denied by some of the 
less radical proponents of this school, but it is denied that 
the process of character formation is dominated by Instincts. 
The beginning of this school is traced to the ethicists and 
psychologists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
"Locke, and in less degree, Hume and Helvetius prepared the 
1 Ibid., p. 25.
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way in the study of acquired character traits for the rather 
systematic treatise of Godwin previously referred to." 1 Adam 
Smith's Theory of the Moral Sentiments and William James 1 Great 
Men, Great Thoughts, and the Environment are also regarded as 
valuable contributions to this phase of social psychology. 
Among the first writers of prominence in America to work ex­ 
tensively in this direction were J. M. Baldwin and C. H. Cooley. 
Others in that country are P. H. Allport, John Dewey, G. H. 
Mead, W. I. Thomas, and 3. D. Martin. "Wallas and Ellwood, al­ 
though less characteristic of this school, should be mentioned
Pin this connection." The "conditioned response" occupies, in
the writings of most of this school, a place of importance com­ 
parable to that occupied by "instincts", "drives", or "urges" 
in the writings of the instinctivist school.
Of course few, if any, of these men are so standard­ 
ized in their thinking and writing that they fit accurately and 
wholly in some one class. Some of them might be regarded as 
synthetic types, and that fact has been indicated in the case 
of some of these writers who have been listed in connection 
with more than one group. And in such a synthetic group might 
be placed R. H. Wheeler, and other writers who have been in­ 
fluenced by the Gestalt psychology, and who emphasize the im­ 
portance of both the environment and the Insights of the in­ 
dividual, but embrace neither the concept of the conditioned 
response nor that of the instinct.
1 Ibid., p. 29.
2 Ibid., p. 30.
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A Common Factor in All These Approaches.
Must one adopt the terminology and the point of view 
of some one of these schools as over against the others? Or, 
is there some common factor which, for the purpose of a study 
of this kind, may be regarded as the foundation of collective 
behaviour?
In light of the study which has been made of repre­ 
sentative works in all these schools of social psychology, the 
writer is convinced that there is one underlying characteris­ 
tic of man which is in evidence in some degree in practically 
all the social behaviour of the individual, but which is of 
special significance in the interpretation of human behaviour, 
overt or covert, in the group. That characteristic is the gre- 
gariousness of man.
Its simplest manifestation is the almost universal 
desire of human beings, as well as many species of the lower 
animals, to be in the company of others. This statement has 
been qualified because there are some cases of individuals who 
consistently seek to avoid the company of others. But that very 
fact has a two-fold bearing on the significance of gregarious- 
ness in social psychology. In the first place, such behaviour 
is generally regarded as abnormal, and that fact of itself is 
some indication of the widespread recognition of the importance 
of gregariousness, even in its simplest form. In the second 
place, such behaviour as represents an exception to the uni­ 
versality of gregariousness In its simplest form is in itself 
a manifestation of hyper-sensitiveness to the human, or social
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element in man's environment. The hermit is not reacting in 
the normal way to social stimuli, but the significant thing is 
that he is reacting to them, and he is doing so in such a way 
as to lend further emphasis to the importance of social fac­ 
tors in man's environment. And, as will be shown later, the 
scope of gregariousness, as that term is used in this paper, 
is much broader than that of the conception which merely in­ 
cludes the desire of human beings to be in the company of other
human beings.
Gregariousness as Habit.
Gregariousness has usually been given one or the 
other of two classifications in psychology. By most writers 
of the environmentalist school it is conceived to be a habit, 
or a group of habits. That is to say, it is a learned, or ac­ 
quired, tendency, not an innate tendency. The child is born 
into a group—the family. His earliest wants are satisfied by 
the members of this group. He quickly learns that the members 
of the family group are sensitive to his wants and needs. And 
the child, in turn, becomes very sensitive to the attitudes and 
actions of the other members of the family. As the child be­ 
comes older, the range of this social sensitiveness is extended 
to include the other groups which are commonly designated as 
"primary groups"--the play group, and the neighborhood group; 
and gradually it is further extended to the innumerable deriva­ 
tive groups with which he becomes associated in life. Thus are 
established in the life of the individual many social habits of 
sensitiveness to the various groups with which he comes in con-
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tact--habits which, when grouped together, are included within 
the scope of the term gregariousness.
Gregariousness as Instinct.
Among contemporary psychologists, Professor F. C. 
Bartlett has made a careful analysis of gregariousness as an 
instinctive tendency which is a most valuable contribution to 
social psychology. Starting with McDougall's description of 
the gregarious instinct as "a mere uneasiness in isolation, 
and satisfaction in being one of a herd", he calls attention to 
the significant fact that there are two outstanding features of 
gregariousness in this description, "the one negative--'a mere 
uneasiness in isolation 1 --the other positive-- 1 satisfaction in 
being one of a herd'." Both are admitted to be socially deter­ 
mined, but the positive feature is held to be of more signifi­ 
cance to social psychology because it demands the actual pres­ 
ence of the group. Moreover, when this positive feature is 
more definitely characterized, it is found to be "based upon a 
high degree of readiness to be influenced by other members of
o
the herd or group", a disposition which is held to belong to 
the general innate tendencies, rather than to the specific in­ 
stincts. Then, turning to two others of McDougall's primary in­ 
stincts which assuredly must be considered to be social--the 
tendency to self-assertion and to self-submissiveness (for which 
Efcrtlwtt prefers the terms assertiveness and submissiveness) 
Bartlett points out the further significant fact that "readiness
1 Psychology and Primitive Culture, p. 54.
2 Tbid., p. 3ST~
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to respond to social influences does not always involve the re­ 
lationships of assertiveness and submissiveness". There is al­ 
so the response, one to another, of equals, which he calls "prim­ 
itive comradeship", and which, in his judgment, has as much 
right to be considered instinctive as have assertiveness and 
submi s s i vene s s.
Bartlett's analysis appears to be entirely sound, and
when two other innate social tendencies--that towards "selective
pconservation", and "the social form of the instinct of con­ 
's 
struction" --are added to the three already noted above, the
five yield themselves readily to Dr. R. H. Thouless 1 grouping 
under the head of "instincts belonging to the Gregarious Sys­ 
tem". It should be noted that this is by no means held to be 
an exhaustive list of the gregarious tendencies, for there are 
socialised forms of many of the specific instincts. But these, 
at least, form the nucleus of the gregarious system, and their 
interaction with the other instinctive tendencies is of primary 
importance in determining the particular mode of behaviour which 
will be manifested in a group.
Such, in briefest outline, is the most thorough ana­ 
lysis of gregariousness as instinct which the writer has found,
1 Ibid., p. 36.
2 lETcT., p. 42.
3 TE>IcT., p. 43.
4 Social Psychology, p. 157. In fairness to Professor 
Bartlett»s use of terms, it should be noted that he prefers 
to use the restricted definition of gregariousness, which he 
applies only to the tendency to seek company. This he care­ 
fully distinguishes from the innate social relationship ten­ 
dencies which Thouless has classified under his heading: "in­ 
stincts belonging to the Gregarious System". (Cf. Bartlett's 
Psychology and Primitive Culture, p. 37.) This difference of 
terminology does not appear to affect the use of the term gre­ 
garious in this paper.
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Gregariousness as Used in This Paper.
In order to set forth clearly the broad meaning of 
gregariousness as it is used in this paper, a simple example 
may be used. The sex instinct, or drive, is admitted by all 
the schools of psychology to be of primary significance in the 
motivation of behaviour. But such behaviour may be modified 
and directed by the gregariousness of the individual; that is, 
by his sensitiveness to the presence or absence (physical or 
imaginative), the approval, disapproval, or other intermediate 
attitude, of another individual or group. For example, take 
the behaviour of a lover, A, in the presence of his beloved, B. 
The response of A, motivated primarily by the sex instinct and 
modified by the attitude of B and by the mores of A, would be, 
let us say, to embrace B. Even in that case, the attitude of 
B and the mores of A would constitute modifying forces which 
are included in the meaning of gregariousness as used in this 
paper. But suppose that A and B meet in a drawing room in the 
presence of G, the members of B's family, who look with disap­ 
proval upon the association of A and B. This attitude on the 
part of C is most likely to modify the response of an embrace 
into a formal handshake, or some other form of greeting estab­ 
lished by social custom. This modification, too, would be at­ 
tributed to gregariousness as the term is being used.
In a similar way one might go through a whole cata­ 
logue of types of instinctive behaviour and show the far-reach­ 
ing influence on such behaviour of the presence or absence 
and the attitude of other individuals or groups, whether ex-
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pressed in person by means of gestures, spoken words, and other 
forms of direct communication, or whether mediated through writ­ 
ten communication, customs, fashions, mores, folkways, and the 
like. This is really the factor which is dominantly signifi­ 
cant in Tarde's concept of imitation. It is the factor which 
underlies most of the social significance of the "herd instinct" 
as interpreted by Trotter. As will be indicated in later chap­ 
ters, it is often the determining factor in those mental pro­ 
cesses called suggestion and sympathy, wli ch play such impor­ 
tant roles in group life. The "complex" of psychoanalysis is 
usually the product of this sensitiveness of man to the atti­ 
tude of others, in its relation to the operation of the sex in­ 
stinct. And in the "individual psychology" of Alfred Adler, 
it is this same factor which operates in the individual to 
produce a feeling of inferiority or of superiority, which in 
turn moulds the personality of that individual.
Thus, if gregariousness be described simply as the 
innate tendency of man, and certain species of lower animals, 
to herd together and to find a peculiar satisfaction in such 
a social relationship (or uneasiness in its absence), then ad­ 
mittedly the interaction of other instincts with that one,
1 Of. Thouless, R. H., Social Psychology, pp. 155-156: "The 
gregarious system of instincts comprises, however, not merely 
the innate tendency of men to live together in groups, but also 
all the tendencies which are called out by a social environment. 
The sensitiveness, for example, to other peoples' feelings, 
which we call sympathy, the sensitiveness to other persons' 
opinions, which we call suggestibility, and the readiness to 
follow other persons' courses of action, which we call imitation, 
are all social reactions... .It is his possession of -,he"se—————' 
peculiarly social ways of reacting that justifies us in speak­ 
ing of man as a gregarious animal and in attributing to him a 
gregarious system of instincts."
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and certain modifications of them by learning, must be thrown 
together in one classification in order to attain the meaning 
which, in this paper, is attributed to that factor which is 
conceived to be the foundation of group behaviour. Similarly, 
if habits, or conditioned responses, be assigned to the place 
of primary importance among the mechanisms of human behaviour, 
and instincts be practically disregarded, then gregariousness 
must be thought of as a sort of synthesis of all those habits, 
overt and covert, in which the sensitiveness of man to the 
human element in his environment is evident. Such a synthesis 
of habits or instincts, or of both, is the factor which is 
considered as the foundation of social behaviour, and which, 
for want of a more appropriate term, is called gregariousness.
Practical Bearings on Preaching.
This gregariousness of man lends itself Immediately 
to at least three applications to the minister as a preacher. 
In the first place, it lends vitality to the ultimate aim of 
preaching which is otherwise sometimes quite vague. The ob­ 
jectives of the minister in his pulpit work have been various­ 
ly stated in works on homiletics, but more frequently and em­ 
phatically have they been stated in terms of relationships 
other than that of the preacher to the congregation considered 
as a group, in relation to the material of preaching, the aim 
has been said to be that of expounding and applying the Word 
of God. In relation to the congregation, conceived as 
an aggregation of two classes of individuals—the converted
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and the unconverted, the objective of the preacher has been 
described as a two-fold one: to convert the unconverted, and 
to sanctify the converted. In terms of the three aspects of 
mental functions--the cognitive, the affective, and the cona- 
tive, the aim has been stated as a three-fold one: to make 
intellectually clear, emotionally vivid, and volitionally 
strong the meanings of the Christian gospel, so that men may 
be persuaded to an ever-enlarging allegiance to God in Christ. 
These statements of homiletical aims are surely valid and im­ 
portant within the limitations of the points of view from 
which they have been formulated, for in the last analysis the 
group is composed of individuals who must be dealt with as 
such. But the more ultimate aim of preaching, and the aim to 
which the psychology of the group directs especial attention, 
is the establishment among men of an ideal group relationship 
which is characterized by a fellowship that is fraternal, as 
between the several members of the group, and filial, as be­ 
tween the group and God--a group relationship which, in the 
New Testament, is commonly called the Kingdom of God. What­ 
ever else the Kingdom of God may be, it certainly is a group 
relationship. The minister's aim in preaching involves the 
adding of numbers to the group, and the progressive building 
up of the Christian characters of those within the group, but 
it also looks beyond those more immediate objectives to the 
dynamic impact of the Christian group upon other groups, in­ 
stitutions, customs, and fashions among men throughout the
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world. It was this objective which Dr. Charles E. Jefferson 
had in mind when, in his Yale lectures on preaching, he said, 
"The preacher* s first work is the building of a brotherhood." 1 
And, recalling our picture of the religious audience, and the 
larger social context from which its members are inseparable, 
the words of a Warrack Lecturer become something more than 
mere rhetoric. Having observed that the preacher must deal 
with individuals one by one, Dr. James Reid says,
"But we have other work to do also. It 
is to reach the mind of a group — large or small — 
and leaven it. Prom the pulpit we may have an op­ 
portunity of getting into touch with the thinking 
mind of a community. We may leaven them by the 
truth, raising the whole standard of their life, 
teaching new values. Our influence may soak in 
almost unconsciously — till men find themselves 
reading their newspapers with a different out­ 
look- -sometimes, it may be, changing their news­ 
paper si We may find them taking a new stand in 
a municipal election, beginning to think in terms 
of people instead of rates, taking a new line a- 
bout international problems, thinking differently 
about war, growing a conscience about how their 
money is made and what they are doing with it 
when it is made. These results are definite and 
direct fruits of the gospel." 2
Moreover, the gregariousness of man is one of the 
most valuable allies the preacher has in human nature to as­ 
sist him in the accomplishment of the aims of preaching. 
Both in the theory and in the practice of preaching, the sel­ 
fish and individualistic tendencies in man have been given 
full recognition. But not always has equally explicit recog­ 
nition been given to the possibilities inherent in a dual 
alliance between the preacher and the gregarious tendencies 
in man. Much negative preaching would give way to a more ef-
Building of the Church, p. 65. 
2 In Quest of Reality, p. 21.
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fective positive type of preaching, if such an alliance were 
deliberately made and sermons constructed and delivered ac­ 
cordingly. This is not to deny that negative preaching has 
its proper place. Nor does it overlook the obvious fact that 
a large part of the force of negative preaching derives from 
the sensitiveness of the individual to the attitudes and o- 
pinions of the group. But surely here is a sound psychologi­ 
cal basis for the preaching of sermons which accelerate and 
guide the operation of certain desirable tendencies in man 
which are peculiarly sensitive in the group situation, as well 
as for the preaching of sermons which are calculated to in­ 
hibit certain undesirable tendencies to which members of the 
congregation may be yielding.
A third bearing of gregarlousness on preaching is 
its tendency to produce the priestly, rather than the prophet­ 
ic, type of ministry, in which case the traditional elements 
in religion are emphasized more than the purposive elements. 
Dr, H. C. Miller contends that in all human affairs, but par­ 
ticularly in religion, "the distinction corresponding to the 
prophetic type and the priest type tends to manifest itself",^ 
and continuing his picture of the contrast between the two 
"types, he says,
M The prophet tends to be an auto-sug- 
gestionist, while the priest is generally a het- 
ero-suggestionlst....The prophet suggests to him­ 
self the adequacy of his new vision; the priest 
accepts the suggestion of his environment that'' 
the existing order cannot be improved on........
1 The New Psychology and the Preacher, p. 93.
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The priest abides by a loyalty that may be of out­ 
standing nobility; the prophet accepts a dynamic 
that loyalties cannot confine. To the priest his 
creed is sanctified by its past; to the prophet 
his vision is guaranteed by its spontaneity. The 
priest consciously or unconsciously is a pragma- 
tist; he condemns the new idea because he has no 
evidence that it will work; to the prophet prag­ 
matic values do not exist. The priest is concern­ 
ed to maintain the identification between himself 
and his herd--present and past; but the prophet 
is the servant of posterity—its verdict alone 
carries weight with him; what if his contempora­ 
ries slay him—they cannot exterminate his mes­ 
sage. ul
Along with this contrast by Dr. Miller may be placed 
the remarkable statement (one is inclined to say "confession") 
of a world-famous minister to Dr. A. J. Gossip, who, as a very 
young minister, asked his famous and successful companion 
whether he could tell Dr. Gossip the secret of successful 
preaching.
"Certainly I canl" he answered. "The 
whole art of successful preaching lies in this. 
Be careful to tell people only what they know 
already: or rather", and he put the tip of the 
forefinger of one hand almost at the very end of 
the nail of the forefinger of the other, "or ra­ 
ther that, and just this much more. But", added 
he, shifting the finger an infinitesimal bit, "if 
you go as far as that ahead of them, you lose them 
to a certainty."^
This incident clearly reveals the extreme to which 
a minister may go in his gregariousness. Because of his sen­ 
sitiveness to the opinions and the praises of the group, he 
never really attains the position of a leader of the group* 
he is merely the spokesman of the group, echoing in his ser­ 
mons the generally accepted beliefs and the time-honoured cus-
1 Op. pit*, pp. 94-96.
2 In G5rTst*s Stead, pp. 118-119.
toms which make for stability, standardization, and possibly 
stagnation.
"Recognized systems of belief accepted 
by all the members of the social group in 
which an individual lives tend to be accept­ 
ed without criticism by that individual." 
--R. H. Thouless.
CHAPTER IV. 
SUGGESTION IN THE RELIGIOUS AUDIENCE.
Suggestion occupies a place of sufficient prominence 
in most descriptions of group phenomena, as well as of individ­ 
ual behaviour in non-group situations, that even if one reject­ 
ed the conception as having no bearing on group psychology, the 
reasons for such rejection would need to be set forth. By the 
New Nancy School, for example, suggestion is represented as the 
master key which unlocks the door to the secret of most human 
conduct. On the other hand, suggestion is rejected by a suffi­ 
cient number of psychologists as being a concept which is of 
little or no value in the interpretation of group phenomena, 
that one is hardly justified in assuming that its place in 
group psychology is absolutely secure. Moreover, there is lit­ 
tle uniformity in the usage of the term. It therefore calls 
for careful examination and critical evaluation in this study.
Definitions of Suggestion.
Definitions of suggestion differ chiefly in three res­ 
pects. They differ, first, in the emphasis placed upon the im­ 
mediate origin of the suggestion—whether within the mind of 
the one in whom the suggestion operates, or without. This dif­ 
ference of emphasis leads M. Coue, for example, to say, "Sug­ 
gestion does not actually exist by itself. It does not exist, 
and cannot exist, except on the distinct condition, sine qua 
non, that it transforms itself in the other person's mind into 
autosuggestion: and this word we define as 'implanting an idea
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in one's self through one's self'." 1 A second difference is in 
the extent to which the definitions include a particular theory 
of the mechanism by which suggestion operates. But the differ­ 
ence which is of most significance to this paper is the extent 
to which definitions distinguish, or fail to distinguish, between 
suggestion, imitation, and sympathy. Thouless, for example, de­ 
liberately broadens the scope of his definition of suggestion to 
include feelings, states, or courses of action, in addition to 
propositions.^ McDougall, on the other hand, restricts the 
scope of suggestion to "a process of communication resulting in 
the acceptance with conviction of the communicated proposition 
in the absence of logically adequate grounds for its acceptance" .
It must be granted that the "realization of a communi­ 
cated proposition" may manifest itself in the form either of a 
belief not immediately acted upon, or of a feeling, or of an 
immediate course of action, or of all three. And it may very 
well be, as many authorities contend, that the mechanism by 
which suggestion, imitation, and sympathy operate is fundamen­ 
tally the same* But it seems desirable, for the sake of analy­ 
sis, to distinguish as far as possible between the spread, in 
a group, of beliefs, emotions, and overt actions, even though 
it is very improbable that in actual behaviour they are really 
separated one from another. This distinction will be made by 
the use of the respective terms "suggestion", "imitation", and 
"sympathy". McDougall' s definition of suggestion, given above
1 Self Mastery Through Conscious Autosuggestion, p. 21.
2 Introduction to the Psychology of Religion, p". 19.
3 Social Psychology, p. 97. ——————
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is therefore the one which will be used in this paper.
Although suggestibility is one of the outstanding 
characteristics of the psychological crowd, it is by no means 
peculiar to the crowd, or even to the group. The individual, 
apart from the actual group situation, is also suggestible. 
But it has been found that there are individual differences 
in the degree of suggestibility, and also differences in the 
same individual under various conditions. Some of these con­ 
ditions of suggestibility have been carefully worked out by 
experiments, and there is fairly general agreement as to the 
interpretation of the results.
Internal Conditions of Suggestibility. 
For convenience, the conditions of suggestibility 
may be listed as internal and external. The principal inter­ 
nal conditions are seven, as follows: (1) Abnormal states of 
the brain, such as the relative dissociation in hypnosis, hys­ 
teria, normal sleep, intoxication, and fatigue. This condition 
was considered of such significance to Dr. Boris Sidis that he 
expressed as a general law of suggestibility that "suggestibi­ 
lity varies as the amount of disaggregation, and inversely as 
the unification of consciousness". (2) Attention may be re­ 
garded as a sine qua non of suggestibility. G. Baudouin pre­ 
sents as the first of his laws of suggestion the "Law of Con­ 
centrated Attention: The idea which tends to realize itself 
is always an idea on which spontaneous attention is concentra­ 
ted, or an idea which has been forced on the attention after 
1 Psychology of Suggestion, p. 90.
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the manner of an obsession". 1 (3) Attitude. It is diffi­ 
cult to find a single word or phrase which adequately summa­ 
rizes those attitudes which are conducive to suggestibility, 
for the appropriate attitude varies somewhat with the nature 
of the suggestion made. For example, an attitude of self- 
abasement renders the individual susceptible to direct sug­ 
gestion, while an attitude of self-esteem renders the indi­ 
vidual susceptible, not to direct suggestion, but to indirect 
suggestion. Again, an attitude of aversion toward an object 
renders the individual suggestible towards ideas which are in 
harmony with that aversion. This is clearly evident in the 
readiness with which people will believe the most absurd gos­ 
sip about a person who is disliked by them. And once a gen­ 
eral attitude of aversion or hatred has been created in a na­ 
tion which is at war, or on the verge of war, almost any state­ 
ment, however unreasonable, which reflects on the despised na­ 
tion, is accepted as very truth. In a political campaign, one 
of the most deadly weapons which may be used against a candi­ 
date for office is the suggestion that his election will serve 
to advance the cause of some organization or movement towards 
which there is a strong aversion among the voters. Such a wea­ 
pon was used effectively against Mr. Alfred E. Smith, a Roman 
Catholic candidate for President of the United States in 1928. 
Many anti-Catholic voters were led to believe that if he were 
elected, the Pope would straightway move the Vatican from Rome 
to Washington, D. C. But on the other hand, suggestions which 
1 Suggestion and Autosuggestion, p. 114.
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are in harmony with a prevailing attitude of friendliness, ad­ 
miration, or esteem, are accepted with equal readiness. With 
such examples before us to indicate the relation between par­ 
ticular attitudes and particular suggestions, it will suffice 
to say that, in general, attitudes of expectancy, of unful­ 
filled desires, and of readiness to cooperate with the agent 
of the suggestion are favourable conditions of suggestibility.
(4) Temperament. In general, people of a sanguine temperament 
are more suggestible than those of the phlegmatic type. This 
fact may have some bearing on the relative suggestibility of 
various races, or of various organizations which, either by 
the very nature of the organization, or by chance, are composed 
of individuals who are more or less of the same temperament.
(5) Habit. Depending upon their relation to the suggested 
idea, habits may increase or decrease suggestibility, as in the 
case of attitudes. Bernard states the relation more techni­ 
cally as follows: "The positive condition is ... the existence 
of a strongly conditioned association between stimuli and res­ 
ponse mechanisms. The negative internal condition is the ab­ 
sence of any conflicting or inhibiting psychic processes or 
competing stimulus-response mechanisms." Although he objects
to the use of the term suggestion, Professor H. A. Overstreet
Pdevotes an illuminating chapter in one of his books to an ex­ 
position of the ways in which groups may be influenced by sug­ 
gestions which are in harmony with dominant habit-systems 
among those groups. (6) Emotional excitement. Baudouin states
1 Op. cit., p. 304.
2 Influencing Human Behaviour, Chap. XII.
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this condition in the form of a law which he calls the "Law
of Auxiliary Emotion: When, for one reason or another, an 
idea is enveloped in a powerful emotion, there is more like­ 
lihood that this idea will be suggestively realized". 1 The 
importance of this condition is most evident in the case of 
hallucinations. (7) Deficiency in knowledge related to the 
topic in regard to which the suggestion is made, or imperfect 
organization of one's knowledge. It is this condition which 
largely accounts for the increased suggestibility of children 
as compared with adults. It has also been contended by many 
psychologists that there is a difference of suggestibility 
between the sexes, women being more suggestible than men. 
Doubtless this is the psychological foundation of the con­ 
temptuous generalization frequently made in cynical writings 
or conversation, that the church is an organization which ap­ 
peals primarily to women, children, and effeminate men. How­ 
ever, there is some ground for questioning, first, whether the 
quantitative difference in suggestibility between the sexes is 
as great as has been alleged, and secondly, whether the dif­ 
ference that does exist should be ascribed to sex itself, or 
to the different mental attitudes and habits which are pri­ 
marily the product of the divergent functions performed by 
men and women in the social scheme of things. Conclusive ex­ 
perimental evidence on the question we have not discovered, 
but experiments conducted by w. Brown are reported, and the 
results interpreted, by Murphy and Murphy as follows:




"Sex differences exist, if by this state­ 
ment one means that after massing all the data to­ 
gether, suggestibility scores are more apt to be 
high in women than in men. Out of the 26 tests, 15 
reveal a clear difference, and in twelve of these 
thirteen cases the average woman is more suggestible 
than the average man. In three other tests there 
are slight but fairly reliable differences, the wo­ 
men again being more suggestible. Qualitative con­ 
sideration of this statement is, however, probably 
more to the point. Women are more suggestible in 
tests involving imagined sensation, in the series of 
progressive changes, in the distortion of memory, 
and in the estimation of magnitudes. Tests with il­ 
lusions give no clear difference, while tests on aes­ 
thetic judgments give contradictory or indecisive re­ 
sults. 'Wherever written directions are used which 
give rise to false anticipations, or which contain 
statements concerning the usual course of most per­ 
sons, these directions will prove more misleading to 
women students than to men 1 . 1
There is nothing in these experiments to indicate clearly that 
differences in suggestibility between the sexes are to be as­ 
cribed to sex itself. Rather, it seems more likely that any 
differences which do exist are due to differences in habit, 
training, amount and organization of knowledge. In connection 
with deficiency of knowledge as a condition of suggestibility, 
it should also be noted that when such deficiency is reduced 
to the level of feeblemindedness, the suggestibility of the 
individual is restricted largely to very simple ideas which 
are "in line with their fundamental drives".
External Conditions of Suggestibility. 
The principal external conditions of suggestibility 
are four: (1) Restriction of voluntary movements. Sidis lists 
this as an important condition even in the case of an operator 
working with subjects under laboratory conditions.3 in general,
1 Op. cit., p. 160.
2 Bernard, L. L., Op. cit., p. 306.
3 Op. cit.. r». 47.
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such a condition is conducive to suggestibility in that it 
helps to prevent the distraction of attention and the dissi­ 
pation of energy in directions other than that of the suggestion, 
(2) Monotony and rhythm. This is part of the usual technique 
in inducing a state of hypnotism, and seems to help bring about 
a condition of temporary dissociation of the psychic processes 
which is favourable to suggestion. (3) Repetition. It is this 
condition which Professor Knight Dunlap has in mind in the 
statement of the first rule for propagandists: "if you have an
idea to put over, keep presenting it incessantly. Keep talk-
ii ling (or printing) systematically and persistently."-1- This rule
is observed in the use of slogans in political campaigns and 
in commercial advertisements. (4) Prestige. Decidedly the 
most important of all the external conditions of suggestibility 
is the prestige of the source, or agent, from which the sugges­ 
tion-stimulus comes. In the audience situation, it may be des­ 
cribed as a condition of rapport between the speaker and the 
audience. The speaker may possess the natural prestige of a 
strong, magnetic personality, or the acquired prestige of repu­ 
tation, title, wealth, uniform, authority, achievement, or po­ 
sition. Not infrequently, of course, he possesses both natu­ 
ral and acquired prestige. Murphy and Murphy report a number 
of experiments by Aveling, Hargreaves, and Estabrooks in which 
the factor of prestige in suggestibility has been isolated and 
its prime significance undoubtedly established.^ 
1 Social Psychology, p. 256.
2 Op. ci't., pp. 145-155.
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Kinds of Suggestion.
The kinds of suggestion may be classified either on 
the basis of the source of the suggestion-stimulus or on the 
basis of the form of the suggestion-stimulus in its relation 
to the suggestion-response. On the first basis we may dis­ 
tinguish between auto-suggestion, in which the stimulus is 
presented by the individual to himself, and hetero-suggestion, 
in which the stimulus is presented by some person, or other 
agent, without the individual subject. As was indicated in 
the beginning of this chapter, M. Coue contends that there is 
really no suggestion except auto-suggestion. But in view of 
the scarcity of absolute originality, and in light of man's 
dependence on language, or other social symbols, for ideas, 
quite as plausible a case might be made out for the position 
that there is no suggestion except hetero-suggestion. Such 
an argument, however, would be quibbling to no purpose. The 
distinction between auto-suggestion and hetero-suggestion is 
simply a useful means of indicating whether the immediate ori­ 
gin of the suggestion-stimulus is within the subject or with­ 
out.
On the basis of the form of the suggestion-stimulus 
in relation to the suggestion-response, suggestion may be said 
to be either direct or indirect. In direct suggestion the idea 
to be realized is clearly indicated, as in a declarative state­ 
ment, or a command; whereas, in indirect suggestion the idea 
to be realized is only hinted at, or left to be inferred. 
The minister may be successful in the use of direct suggestion
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when the conditions of suggestibility are favourable to an un­ 
usual degree, but normally his most useful technique is the 
more difficult and more artful one of indirect suggestion.
Conditions Favourable to Suggestibility 
in the Religious Audience.
At this point it is pertinent to consider to what 
extent the conditions existing in a religious audience are 
favourable to suggestibility. Among the most important is the 
prestige of the leader, since he is the agent of most of the 
suggestion-stimuli presented to the audience. And of course 
this prestige will vary with different leaders and different 
audiences. In churches generally known to have high education­ 
al standards for the ministry, the preacher acquires a certain 
amount of prestige just by virtue of the fact that he has sat­ 
isfied those educational requirements. In the more authori­ 
tative of the churches, the minister ! s prestige is relative­ 
ly greater because he is an authorized spokesman of that or­ 
ganization. If he holds, or has held, certain high offices 
in the courts of the church, the minister's prestige is there­ 
by increased to a degree which is sometimes amazing. If by 
the writing of books, or by other means, he has established 
a reputation for thorough scholarship, that reputation gives 
him acquired prestige. In his pastoral contacts with his 
people, in the deference and recognition given him by non- 
ecclesiastical organizations, in the higher honorary or aca­ 
demic degrees which may be conferred upon him, and even in 
some athletic prowess which he may possess, the minister 
achieves a degree of prestige which renders his audience rel-
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atlvely more suggestible. So that, while there are certain con­ 
ditions existing in most religious audiences to-day which great­ 
ly reduce the prestige of the ministry, as will be indicated 
presently, relatively the minister, as the leader of the reli­ 
gious audience, possesses considerable prestige, and to that 
extent his religious audience may be considered generally to 
be the more suggestible.
A second condition favourable to suggestibility in 
the religious audience situation is the general deficiency in 
knowledge pertaining to religion and ethics, or else poor or­ 
ganization of that knowledge—or both. Of course, this condi­ 
tion, again, will vary greatly. Those members of the religious 
audience who have received considerable religious training in 
the home, the public schools, and the Sunday School will have 
a greater amount of such knowledge, and in all probability it 
will be better organized and integrated with knowledge in other 
fields than will be the case with those members who have not 
had such training. It is probably this fact which is largely 
responsible for the judgment that religious audiences in Scot­ 
land are more critical and less suggestible than are such au­ 
diences in America, where there is practically no religious 
training in the public schools and state universities, and 
where only a small proportion of the children are reached by 
the Sunday Schools.
Moreover, in contrast with the give and take of a 
discussion group situation, the leader of a religious audience 
has a virtual monopoly on the attention of the group--or at
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least he has a favourable opportunity to acquire such a mono­ 
poly. The people are usually seated, not in a haphazard way, 
but uniformly, so that they can see and hear the leader. He, 
in turn, is usually on a raised platform, and in a position 
most effectively to gain and hold the attention of the audi­ 
ence. Quietness on their part is obligatory. Interruptions, 
such as the heckling frequently encountered by a political 
speaker, are not permitted. Questions which may arise in the 
minds of the thoughtful must go unasked until after the ser­ 
vice is over. There are few bodily movements on the part of 
the audience, except as they are directed by the leader, and 
then they serve rather to unify and direct attention than to 
divert it. Moreover, for the most part, the audience has come 
voluntarily for the specific purpose, among others, of hearing 
what the minister has to say in his sermon. In other words, the 
audience is predisposed to give its attention, and distractions 
are reduced to a minimum, so that, insofar as attention is a 
condition of suggestibility, it is present in the religious 
audience to a very high degree.
Attitudes favourable to suggestibility are created, 
or certainly may be created, by the skilful use of the rhythm 
and the emotion-stirring qualities of the music, as well as 
by the ideas expressed in the words of the psalms or hymns 
which are sung. The symbols used in the ritual, such physical 
symbols as carved or moulded crosses, pictures, and the like; 
the architecture of the building, the colours in stained glass 
windows, and the artificial lighting--all may be so employed 
as to create attitudes which are conducive to suggestibility.
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Professor R. H. Thouless has aptly summarized the 
extent to which conditions favourable to suggestibility are 
present in the religious audience situation, as follows:
"Suggestion clearly plays a very large 
part in religious teaching. I am convinced too 
that the unintended production of the hypnoidal 
state is present in religious services to a much 
greater extent than is ordinarily recognized by 
writers on the psychology of religion. Let us 
consider the various methods of increasing sug­ 
gestibility and see how far they are found in re­ 
ligion. The prestige of the preacher is increas­ 
ed by the wearing of distinctive clothes. The 
suggestibility of the hearer is increased by find­ 
ing himself one of a crowd. 1 This effect is 
heightened in such a service as that of the Sal­ 
vation Army by the ejaculations with which the 
congregation show their sympathy with what is be­ 
ing said by the preacher. The following things 
may be present which are liable to induce the 
hypnoidal state: a monotonous voice in the read­ 
ing of the service, the rhythmical sound of the 
music, and the points of light produced by light­ 
ed candles. I do not wish to be so far misunder­ 
stood as to be supposed to mean that these things 
are deliberately introduced into services in or­ 
der to induce the hypnoidal state. But that is 
their tendency in fact, and it is possible that 
it is to this tendency that they owe their value 
as adjuncts to the religious service. W2
Conditions Unfavourable to Suggestibility 
in the Religious Audience.
However, it is well also to note that there are pre­ 
sent in the religious audience certain conditions which are un­ 
favourable to suggestibility. There are at least four such 
conditions which exist quite generally, and which are especial­ 
ly significant for the religious audience of the times in which 
we are now living.
1 The term "crowd" is not here used in the restricted sense 
in which we are using it, but if the word "group" were substi­ 
tuted, the point would remain of the same significance.
2 Introduction to the Psychology of Religion, p. 24.
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The first is the more universal education of the mass­ 
es. With tax-supported schools which are accessible both in the 
urban centres of population and in the rural districts, and with 
laws which, on the one hand, prohibit child labor, and on the 
other, make attendance at school compulsory, illiteracy is de­ 
creasing rapidly. An idea of the broadening scope of public 
education in America, for example, is presented in the report 
of President Hoover»s research committee on social trends.
11 In 1900 there were 284,683 students 
in American universities, colleges, and teacher 
training institutions. In 1930, although the 
population of the country had increased only 62 
percent, the attendance on institutions of high­ 
er education had increased to 1,178,318, that is, 
by 314 percent. In 1900 there were 630,048 pu­ 
pils in secondary schools. The number of such 
pupils in 1930 was 4,740,580. In 1930 one of ev­ 
ery seven persons of college age was in college 
and one of every two persons of secondary school 
age was in secondary school."^
And the scope of the curricula of both types of institutions 
has been broadened while the number of students was increas­ 
ing. In 1900 the number of subjects of instruction offered
in public secondary schools was 18. *In 1928 that number had
o
increased to 47. A corresponding extension of the scope of
curricula has taken place also in the colleges and universi­ 
ties. The following examples are chosen at random from a 
table showing the extension in ten independent colleges and
the liberal arts colleges of ten representative universities
3 in the United States:
1 Recent Social Trends in the United States, p. 329.
2 Ibid., p. 330.

























Such an increase in the number of people receiving formal edu­ 
cation, together with the increase in number of subjects in 
the curricula of educational institutions, surely means that 
a larger percent of the population has a wider range of know­ 
ledge than was the case thirty years ago. And, what is per­ 
haps even more significant, improvements in the methods of 
teaching have been very definitely in a direction which is 
best calculated to develop in students a more critical, sci­ 
entific attitude than that which was the product of older 
memoriter methods of teaching and learning—an attitude which 
seems almost certain to decrease in some measure the degree 
of general suggestibility.
A second condition is the widespread free discus­ 
sion of religious and moral issues in books, magazines, news­ 
papers, public forums, and over the wireless. The members of 
a religious audience are no longer isolated as a group and stat­ 
ically homogeneous in their beliefs and opinions. Increased 
facilities of communication have made the world smaller and the 
neighbourhood larger. In increasing numbers, ideas, habits, 
customs, beliefs, and mores have crossed the border lines of 
various groups. The result has been a comparison of differ-
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ences, a weighing of values, and a raising of questions which 
are not left at home when the individual attends a religious 
service. Rather, they become effective inhibitions to sug­ 
gestion-stimuli, and are a significant part of a true psycho­ 
logical picture of a religious audience.
Still another condition which tends to reduce the 
suggestibility of the audience to which the minister usually 
speaks is the critical attitude towards the authority of both 
the Bible and the Church which is increasingly prevalent to­ 
day. In former times, ideas or beliefs presented to religi­ 
ous audiences with the obvious sanction of the Church or the 
Bible, or both, were likely to be accepted by most of the mem­ 
bers of the audience quite uncritically. The "text" of the 
sermon was assumed to be the Word of God. The preacher's task 
was simply to explain and apply the meaning of the text. Its 
truth was taken for granted--at least by those who were good 
church members, and church members nearly always compose a 
large majority of a religious audience. But in more recent 
years, the methods and results of the higher criticism of the 
Bible have been disseminated through the universities, books, 
magazines, and newspapers, until they have even reached the 
mythical man in the street. Through these and other facilities 
of communication he has learned that there is a widely-accept­ 
ed doctrine of evolution which somewhat modifies Biblical an­ 
thropology. He has read, if nowhere else than in a magazine 
supplement to the Sunday newspaper, some of the modern psycho­ 
logical explanations of human conduct, and if they do not seem
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to be in accord with the traditionally interpreted teachings 
of the Bible and the Church, so much the worse for the Bible 
and the Church. In other words, what is accepted to-day by 
the majority of people as a pronouncement of science comes to 
many with a prestige of authority which was formerly possess­ 
ed by the pronouncements of the Church or of the Bible. These 
observations are borne out by the statistical analysis of 
trends in attitudes towards religion and science as they are 
reflected in books and magazines published during the past 
thirty years in the United States. The result is a much more 
critical attitude towards the doctrines of the Church and the 
teachings of the Bible, which means, in terms of psychology, 
that the members of a religious audience are much less sug­ 
gestible with respect to sermons than they were in former 
times.
A fourth condition is the change of theory and prac­ 
tice in the field of religious education. In a very general 
way, it may be described as a change from the transmissive 
theory to the creative theory, together with the altered tech­ 
niques implied in the change. Under the former theory there 
existed a body of "saving knowledge". The individual possess­ 
ed a mind which was conceived functionally to be a sort of 
tabula rasa upon which this knowledge might be impressed, or 
it was thought of as a jug into which this knowledge might be 
poured little at a time. In any case, the function of the 
teacher was that of transmitting this body of knowledge to
1 Ibid., pp. 397-414; 441; 1010-1014. For testimony that 
a similar trend has been observed in Great Britain, see Draw­ 
bridge, C. L., Open Air Meetings, pp. 35-37.
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the rising generation. The method used was of the essence of 
suggestion, and it tended to continue conditions of suggestibi­ 
lity. In more recent times, however, the focus of the curricu­ 
lum of religious education has been shifted from materials as 
a centre to the pupil as a centre. The method is not so of­ 
ten that of memoriter recitation, but rather of free and crit­ 
ical discussion. The "lesson" may begin with a life situation 
involving certain choices. These choices are analysed, dis­ 
cussed, and evaluated under the guidance of the teacher as a 
group leader. The religious precepts, experiences, and dog­ 
mas of the past may be examined in the process, to be sure, 
but only as a means to the individual's discovery of knowledge 
in experience. Professor T. G. Scares has stated the aim and 
method of religious education as follows: "Religious education 
has for its aim the development of persons devoted to the high­ 
est social well-being, which they identify as the will of God; 
religious education has for its method the progressive direct­ 
ion of youth toward the development of skill in deliberative 
determination of conduct with reference to its social conse­ 
quences. "^ A similar emphasis is evident in Professor G. A. 
Coe's definition of Christian education as "the systematic, 
critical examination and reconstruction of relations between 
persons, guided by Jesus' assumption that persons are of in­ 
finite worth, and by the hypothesis of the existence of God, 
the Great Valuer of Persons." 2 The point of significance for 
this paper in both these statements is the emphasis of modern
1 Religious Education, p. 236.
2 What is Christian Education?, p. 296.
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religious education on the attitude of critical investigation, 
of weighing values, and of deliberating upon alternative 
choices. Of course, it must be frankly recognized that mod­ 
ern theories of religious education, with their accompanying 
techniques, have hardly had time to be put into use on a suf­ 
ficiently widespread basis as to have modified already, to 
any great extent, the conditions of suggestibility of reli­ 
gious audiences. But they seem certain to do so progressive­ 
ly in the future, and they therefore furnish a cue to a con­ 
temporary trend, at least, which is worth noting in its bear­ 
ing on the suggestibility of the religious audience. They 
warrant the warning that the minister of to-day who assumes 
that the young people of his congregation are ready to accept 
uncritically whatever religious teachings he may choose to 
present to them from the pulpit, is in danger of finding him­ 
self among those who are wondering why the church is losing 
its hold upon the young people.
Since we are now dealing with a normal group, we 
may omit, for the time being, a consideration of the extent 
to which a degree of mental dissociation approaching a state 
of hypnosis may exist in the religious audience. That will 
be considered in a later chapter from the point of view of 
abnormal group psychology. But with that omission, the most 
significant of the conditions of suggestibility which may ex­ 
ist in the religious audience are the prestige of the leader 
and an attitude of uncritical submissiveness on the part of 
the audience. Perhaps these are not really two separate con-
65
ditions, but only the objective and subjective aspects of one 
condition, which might be described as a condition of sugges­ 
tibility rapport between the audience and the leader. Yet 
when the four conditions listed above as being unfavourable 
to suggestibility are considered, it becomes evident that 
their combined effect is focussed at just that point. They 
tend to decrease the prestige of the minister as the leader 
and agent of suggestion, or they tend to increase the criti­ 
cal attitude of the audience, or both. This conclusion is 
valid only as a very general one, and will doubtless have 
some notable exceptions, but it seems unquestionably to be in­ 
dicative of a contemporary social trend which is of some con­ 
cern to the minister as a preacher.
The Bearing on Homiletics.
What use, then, shall the minister make of sugges­ 
tion in his preaching? It is a mental process which is some­ 
times employed with little ethical discrimination in commer­ 
cial advertising. Governments use the technique of mass sug­ 
gestion to arouse and maintain the fighting morale of armies 
and civilian populations during wars, frequently deceiving 
the people with shameful falsehoods. Various organizations 
use it to disseminate propaganda of every conceivable kind. 
It is associated with demagogues in their leadership of mobs 
in socially destructive activities. These, and other uses 
and associations of suggestion, tend to lead one to the con­ 
clusion that suggestion should have no place whatever in the
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art of preaching the sacred truths of religion.
But the question is not so easily answered as that. 
For one reason, whether the minister wills it or not, to some 
degree the process of suggestion is operative in the religious 
audience during the preaching of a sermon. That is to say, in­ 
evitably some ideas are going to be accepted and realized un­ 
critically by some members of the group. Wittingly or unwit­ 
tingly, in the very nature of the case, the minister becomes the 
agent of suggestion-stimuli.
Moreover, for such to be the case does not necessari­ 
ly imply anything that is abnormal. As was indicated earlier 
in this chapter, there are some abnormal conditions under which 
suggestibility is heightened in the individual. But because 
suggestion sometimes occurs under abnormal conditions, it is 
not therefore necessary to assume that suggestion always Im­ 
plies the abnormal. Whenever any presentation harmonizes pos­ 
itively with the consciousness of the individual, or even when 
the relation is one of negative agreement, it is the normal 
and natural thing for that presentation to be accepted with­ 
out any process that might be called critical.^ It simply 
fails to raise any questions, or to conflict with any tenden­ 
cies in the organism which are strong enough to stimulate 
criticism.
Again, while by definition a suggestion-stimulus is 
accepted uncritically at a given time, the agent of the sug-
1 Of. Gardner, C. S., Psychology and Preaching, pp. 138-139.
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gestion, or the situation or condition giving rise to it, 
may have been considered critically beforehand, so that the 
factor of prestige (which we have seen to be so often the de­ 
termining factor in suggestion, especially in the speech sit­ 
uation) has been considered critically. A child, for example, 
may accept uncritically a statement made to him by his parent. 
But the very attitude in the child which, in this case, is 
a primary condition of suggestibility, has been built up by 
a critical process which amply justifies the child in his con­ 
fidence in the general trustworthiness of the parent* This 
attitude has become habitual, and the critical consideration 
of each separate "proposition", or statement, made by the pa­ 
rent would be absurd. Now, surely such a process as we have 
described is quite a normal one. And, looked at in its lar­ 
ger setting, it could hardly be said to be entirely a non- 
rational process. Yet, when viewed in the immediate circum­ 
stances, it measures up to all the requirements of the defi­ 
nition of suggestion.
There is a close parallel between the minister in 
his preaching relation to a congregation and that parent 
in relation to the child. The minister, over a period of time, 
wins a large part of his prestige with the congregation by 
proving h imself to be trustworthy in his relations with them. 
There may be some respects in which the prestige he acquires 
is spurious and misleading to those to whom he ministers. But 
especially in protestant bodies is it true that probably the
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members of the normal religious audience are very little 
more suggestible in relation to the minister as a specialist 
than are patients to their physician, or students to their 
professor. In other words, within certain limits, suggestion 
has its proper functions in many relationships of life, and 
it is unreasonable to assume, as does Professor Lumley, in 
his book on The Menace of Propaganda, that the minister has 
no moral right whatever to employ the technique of suggestion 
in his preaching. On this subject, we agree quite heartily 
with Professor Thouless when he writes:
"A good deal of nonsense is talked by 
people who seem to think that it is a reproach 
peculiar to the teaching of religion that it is 
very largely a non-rational process—suggestion 
under conditions of heightened suggestibility. 
That is true of most teaching. Even in rational 
demonstration, it seems probable that the con­ 
viction with which a proposition is received owes 
a great deal to suggestion over and above the in­ 
fluence of the perceived rigidity of the proof. 
Perhaps the conditions of teaching furthest re­ 
moved from these of the pulpit are to be found 
in the university class-room, where one wishes 
to train the students to think for themselves, 
and the lecturer endeavours not to present con­ 
clusions but to state alternatives and to give 
due weight to facts on both sides. But even here, 
it will be found that so far as he is communicat­ 
ing his opinions to his class, he is using sug­ 
gestion. He is not generally engaged in proving 
his opinions, but in affirming them in a confi­ 
dent tone. If he thinks that the class will 
have difficulty in accepting what he says, he 
does not multiply proofs; he affirms it again in 
a more confident tone. tf l
We may summarize briefly the bearing of suggestion 
on homiletics, then, as follows:
1 Introduction tc> the Psychology of Religion, pp. 25-26.
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First, it is highly desirable that the minister 
shall have some understanding of the process of suggestion, 
so that he may be in a position to recognize, and in some de­ 
gree control, the conditions of suggestibility, distinguish­ 
ing between that which is normal and that which is abnormal. 1
Secondly, in view of the more critical attitude 
towards religion which we find to prevail to-day, especially 
among certain groups, it is necessary that the minister in 
preaching to such groups depend less on the technique of dog­ 
matic affirmation and frequent repetition—the fundamental 
technique of direct suggestion, and more on the technique of 
Indirect suggestion.
Thirdly, since some degree of suggestibility is 
normal and almost inevitable in the religious audience situa­ 
tion, it behoves the preacher to recognize the tremendous 
responsibility that is his as a teacher of religion. As Dr. 
Thouless has put it, "The more a teacher depends on sugges­ 
tion, and the less he utilises the reasoning power of his
followers, the graver is his moral responsibility for seeing
2that what he teaches is true". Not a little of the reli­ 
gious faith of many of his congregation is so related to 
their confidence in his sincerity, his scholarship, his care­ 
ful weighing of values, and his general integrity of character, 
that for him to shatter that confidence is not only for him
1 The dangers of abnormal suggestibility are indicated in 
the chapter on the abnormal religious audience.
2 Introduction to the Psychology of Religion, p.26.
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to impair his own effectiveness as an agent of religious 
suggestion-stimuli, but also, in many cases, to render people 
contra-suggestible to religious ideas in general. 1 When 
used with ethical discretion, normal suggestion may be used 
by the minister as a means of planting religious beliefs and 
of building moral and religious sentiments and ideals which 
are of inestimable value. Or, in the hands of a Rasputin, 
suggestion may be used to wreck character and overthrow the 
organization of a whole social structure. It may be dyna­ 
mite or leaven—depending upon the minister who uses it.
1 This point is made in some form or another in most text­ 
books on homiletics. Of., for example, Van Oosterzee, Practi­ 
cal Theology, pp. 41-44; Broadus, Preparation and Delivery of 
Sermons, pp. 5-6; Christlleb, Homiletic, pp. 131^134; VinetT" 
Homilefics, pp. 203-208; Brooks, Lectures on Preaching, pp. 
35-71.Sowever, we have not seen it specilTcally related to 
the function of the minister as a chief agent of suggestion, 
which seems to be the most reasonable interpretation.
"Language, which symbolizes the accumulated 
achievements of civilization, is the chief in­ 
strument of vicarious personality development 
through protective imitation and consequently 
the chief aid to social progress."--L. L. Ber­ 
nard.
CHAPTER V. 
IMITATION IN THE RELIGIOUS AUDIENCE
Probably there is no concept in social psychology to 
which more varied meanings are attached, and to which more va­ 
rious degrees of importance are assigned, than to the concept 
of imitation. By most of the earlier social psychologists of 
the "planes and currents" school it was given a very inclusive 
meaning and was exalted to a place of foremost importance in 
the explanation of the interactions of individuals in the group 
In the judgment of Gabriel Tarde, "the career of imitations is, 
on the whole, the only thing which is of interest to history". 
He even went so far as to define society as "a group of beings 
who are apt to imitate one another, or who, without actual imi­ 
tation, are alike in their possession of common traits which 
are ancient copies of the same model". In the importance at­ 
tached to imitation, Tarde was followed, to a great extent, 
by J. M. Baldwin, E. A. Ross, and others. At bhs other ext^e;;ie 
are some writers of the behaviour!stic school who feel that 
social psychology might almost dispense with the term entirely. 
Between these extremes, however, are many authorities who, 
while differing somewhat in their definitions of the term, 
nevertheless maintain that imitation is a useful concept for 
the designation and description of certain interactions within 
the group. It is that velue which is attributed to it in this
1 Laws of Imitation, p. 159.
2 TBTd., p. 58.
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paper, and since there is no general uniformity of meaning, 
a more or less arbitrary definition must be given the term.
Definition of Imitation.
Accordingly, we may define imitation as the mental 
process by which the actions of one person, or group of per­ 
sons, are copied by another. The actions copied may be ac­ 
tually perceptible at the time of the copying, or they may 
be only imaginatively perceptible.
Imitation has been considered by some psychologists 
to be a specific instinct. By most psychologists to-day who 
make use of the term at all, however, it is not so regarded. 
The chief grounds for rejecting the instinctive theory of 
imitation have been summarized by Professor McDougall as fol­ 
lows: "(1) the very high generality of the object or situation 
which must be assumed to evoke such an instinctive impulse; 
(2) the extreme diversity of its alleged manifestations; (3) 
the absence of any clear evidence of such an instinct in ani­ 
mals; (4) the possibility of explaining all outwardly imita­ 
tive behaviour in other ways. Murphy and Murphy have report­ 
ed some experiments of M. Guernsey and G. W. Valentine which 
seem to indicate some specific forms of imitation in very 
young children, but it is the judgment of the authors that 
these experiments require confirmation, and even then the re­
sults might very well be explained by other means than that of
p imitation as an instinct. But the fact of imitation, as it
Psychology, p. 173. 
2 Experimental Social Psychology, pp. 266-267.
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has been defined above, remains a fact which can be observed 
in the affairs of every day life. With McDougall and Drever 
it may be regarded as an innate general tendency; or, with 
Allport and Bernard it may be regarded as the name of a sys­ 
tem of habits; but in either case the concept is a useful and 
valid one for the description of a significant aspect of group 
behaviour.
Kinds of Imitation.
Imitation may be of either of two general kinds. 
The first is involuntary, or unconscious, imitation. D. Starch 
has made a laboratory study of unconscious imitation in hand­ 
writing. One hundred and six subjects were asked to give sam­ 
ples of their handwriting in their usual manner, copying phra­ 
ses from models submitted to them. One of the models was type­ 
written, the other three were written with varying degrees of 
slant and width of letter. Very few of the subjects had any 
idea as to the purpose of the experiment. Starch found that 
of the 103 subjects who stated that they had written in their 
usual manner, every single one had, as a matter of fact, adapt­ 
ed his handwriting to conform in some degree to the model. 
Most of them showed this tendency to conformity in changing the 
slant of their writing to make it like that of the model; and 
those who did not show it in the slant showed it in the change 
in the width of letters. Some showed it in both.^
Unconscious imitation is of unusual social signifi­ 
cance because it is so undiscriminating. Some time ago the 
1 Murphy and Murphy, Op. cit., p. 178.
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writer observed at lunch that a six-year-old daughter was 
flinging her mop of bobbed red hair from side to side period­ 
ically during the meal. Inquiry revealed that she had been 
playing all morning with an older child who had this nervous 
habit, which the younger child obviously had acquired by un­ 
conscious imitation. An illustration of the same kind of 
imitation, but one of more significance for this paper, comes 
from our student days in the theological seminary. The 'prof­ 
essor who taught homiletics was an unusually dramatic and pop­ 
ular preacher, and seminary students availed themselves of 
every opportunity to hear him preach. He had two characteris­ 
tic mannerisms of delivery which were quite noticeable, but 
which harmonized with his personality to such an extent that 
they did not mar the effectiveness of his preaching. At some 
time in his sermon, he would spread his feet far apart, rock 
his body from side to side, in a pendulum motion, a few times, 
and then bring his heels together with a military click, like 
a private soldier drawing to attention in the presence of an 
officer. At other times, apparently he would be groping for 
a word, and in the interval of the pause, he would pucker his 
lips and stick them out, somewhat as if he were about to begin 
whistling. And our class had not been long in the seminary, 
when in a sermon delivered before the whole class one of the 
students was observed imitating with astonishing exactness 
these two unusual mannerisms of the professor. Needless to 
say, he was quite chagrined when told in the class in criti-
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clsm what he had been doing, for he was entirely unconscious
of it. Doubtless these two instances are but types which could 
be reproduced in their essential characteristics from the ob­ 
servations of almost anyone. Their commonplace character, 
however, in no way impairs their significance as indicating 
quite clearly that in the process of personality development, 
vices, as well as virtues, are acquired through unconscious 
imitation. And it may very well be that in such unconscious 
imitation is to be found a partial explanation, at least, of 
the persistent spread of the various speech tones and inflec­ 
tions which are to be heard in the prayers, the Scripture read­ 
ings, the sermons, and sometimes even in the intimations, of 
ministers, and which are commonly described as "the pulpit 
tone", or "the holy tone".
A second kind of imitation may be designated as con­ 
scious, or voluntary. It, in turn, may be divided into two 
sub-types on the basis of the degree of intelligence involv­ 
ed in the process. The first is conformity imitation, in which 
the primary end is merely to conform to the behaviour of the 
group. Tarde distinguishes between "custom imitation", which 
is conformity to the traditional behaviour of the group, and 
"fashion imitation", which is conformity to novel behaviour 
of the group.^ In either case, however, the phenomenon is a 
manifestation of gregariousness, as we are using that term. 
Conformity imitation may be. on a relatively low level, both as 
to intelligence and consciousness. For example, A may lift 
his hat in imitation of B, who has recognized a friend on a 
1 Laws of Imitation, pp. 245-251.
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busy street. A may not have seen the friend at all, and may 
have been so busily engaged in conversation that he was scarce­ 
ly aware of his imitative action. He is simply conforming to 
custom at the level of a habit which has become practically 
automatic. In fact, there is no very clear line of demarca­ 
tion between imitation at this level and what has been desig­ 
nated as unconscious imitation. At a very much higher level 
of consciousness, but still relatively low in intelligence, 
would be the imitative conduct of an individual who attends 
a church service for the first time, and who copies the actions 
of the congregation with a very high degree of consciousness 
that he is imitating, but with a meagre intellectual apprehen­ 
sion of the significance of those actions. It is within this 
fluctuating range of intelligence and consciousness that a 
large proportion of religious ritual, folkways, customs, and 
other mores are diffused through the group and passed on as 
tradition, some of them being continued long after the condi­ 
tions which originally gave rise to them have changed. It was 
the recognition of this fact that led Professor J. B. Pratt 
to assert that
"the authoritative nature of religion and its con­ 
servative and traditional elements must be put 
down to the score of society rather than to that 
of the individual. But between different kinds 
of religious tradition there are differences in 
the strength of conservatism. Especially is this 
seen to be the case if one compares religious be­ 
liefs with rites or customs. Approved ways of act­ 
ing have been historically much more tenacious of 
life than approved ways of thinking. A curious ex­ 
ample of this is the following instance related by 
Hoffding; »In a Danish village church the custom of 
bowing when passing a certain spot in the church
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wall was maintained into the nineteenth cen­ 
tury, but no one knew the reason for this un­ 
til, on the whitewash being scraped away, a
picture of the Madonna was found on the wall; 
thus the custom had outlived the Catholicism 
which prompted it by three hundred years; it 
was a part of the old cult which had main­ 
tained itself ," 1
This instance points up what is perhaps the chief 
liability of conformity imitation; namely, that it may be the 
means of perpetuating religious rites and customs which have 
ceased to have real meaning and value to the group. It is a 
danger of group life against which periodically the prophets
4
of religion have cried out. As was pointed out earlier, the 
religious audience as a group is a mixture of both the tra- 
diti onal and the purposive. It is obvious, therefore, in 
view of the tendency of conformity imitation, that if the pur­ 
posive aspects of religious group life are not to be obscured 
by the mere externals of traditional customs and ceremonies, 
the minister must repeatedly interpret to his changing congre­ 
gation the ethical and religious significance of forms and 
rites, lest they be perpetuated as meaningless activities.^
A second sub-type of conscious, or voluntary, imi­ 
tation may be designated as rational imitation. Attention 
has already been directed to the fact that there is not a clear 
line of demarcation between it and conformity imitation, In-
1 Religious Consciousness, pp. 82-83.
2 Cf. the instructions received in an ancient prophet 1 s 
vision: "Thou son of man, shew the house to the house of Is­ 
rael,---- shew them the form of the house, and the fashion 
thereof, and the goings out thereof, and the comings in there­ 
of, and all the forms thereof, and all the ordinances thereof, 
and all the forms thereof, and all the laws thereof: and write 
it in their sight, that they may keep the whole form thereof 
and all the ordinances thereof, and do them." Ezekiel 45:10-11.
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deed, it may even have in common with the latter the purpose 
of conformity to the behaviour of the group, but with the dif­ 
ference that there is a more intelligent apprehension of the 
rational purpose of the behaviour which is Imitated. For 
example, an individual in a religious audience may imitate 
the group in the bowing of the head and in the repetition of 
the Lord's Prayer, not merely in order to conform to the be­ 
haviour of the group, although that is a factor, but also in 
order to further the rational purpose of participating active­ 
ly in that phase of common worship. There has been, in other 
words, a rational consideration of the significance of posture 
in prayer, the meaning of the phrases in the Lord ! s Prayer has 
been studied, and reflective thought has been given to the 
value of corporate worship. This process of critical weigh­ 
ing and evaluating gives to the imitative action the quality 
of rationality which raises the action to a distinctly higher 
level than that of mere conformity imitation. For that mat­ 
ter, the factor of a desire for conformity need not necessari­ 
ly enter into rational imitation at all. An example would be 
a Protestant minister who crosses himself, after the manner of 
Roman Catholics, at the end of a prayer. To do so is not only 
not an act of conformity to his group, but decidedly the con­ 
trary; and in realization of that fact, he does so as unosten­ 
tatiously as possible. In this case he is not blindly imita­ 
ting a Romish custom, but, having given the matter considerable 
reflective thought, he has reached a rational conviction that 
such an imitation serves the purpose of a frequent reminder
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of the sufferings of Jesus and is of value to him in his Chris­ 
tian life.
In this connection, one of the homiletical tasks 
of the preacher is clearly indicated--that of helping people 
to lift their moral and religious conduct from the lower level 
of mere conformity imitation to the higher level of rational 
imitation. This he can do, in part, by preaching sermons which 
are directed in their application primarily to the two spheres 
of life in which mere conformity imitation is most deadly in 
its effects on character—the sphere which is usually designat­ 
ed as the devotional life, and that which may be described as 
the sphere of social relationships in the more restricted sense 
in which that term is used in ordinary conversation. What was 
said above, with regard to the preacher's task of helping people 
to lift their activities of public worship from the level of 
mere conformity imitation to the higher level of more ration­ 
al imitation, is equally applicable to the activities of pri­ 
vate devotional life. Otherwise prayer is likely to descend 
to the low level of the "vain repetitions" which Jesus so se­ 
verely condemned. But a word needs to be said about lifting 
the level of conformity imitation to that of rational imita­ 
tion in social relationships--such relationships, for example, 
as those between master and servant, men and women, employer 
and employee, parents and children, members of one race and 
members of another, of one nationality and another, and of 
one social class and another. Many Christian groups have ac- 
1 Mathew 6:V.
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cepted in theory the lofty ideal of recognizing in all such 
relationships the sacredness of human personality as the foun­ 
dation upon which the structure of social intercourse cwht to 
be built. And, while it must be granted that it is not al­ 
ways exactly clear what course of action in a particular sit­ 
uation is in accord with that ideal, the more acute problem 
which confronts the minister as the leader of a Christian group 
is that of elevating practice more nearly to the level of ac­ 
cepted theory. In the form of a question, it is: How are cus­ 
tomary modes of social conduct, which have been acquired large­ 
ly by a process of conformity imitation within the larger group 
(the nation, race, class, etc.), and which may be pagan or 
semi-pagan, to be transformed into modes of conduct which are 
in accord with Christian standards which have been accepted 
in theory by the smaller group? That question is not merely 
an academic one. It is a practical one which confronts the 
minister as he endeavours to build a group of people who are 
heterogeneous socially, intellectually, economically, and in 
other significant ways, into the kind of Christian fellowship 
which the New Testament calls a koinonia, the broad outlines 
of which the Sermon on the Mount describes. As it pertains 
to intercourse between races, it is judged by many mission­ 
aries to be among the most crucial questions confronting the 
whole missionary enterprise. It is exactly this problem 
which Dr. Charles E. Jefferson made the central theme of his 
Yale lectures on preaching, and which he describes as fol­ 
lows:
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"Let preachers, then, create In their 
churches by their preaching the spirit of love, 
and the churches will pass it on. The world 
will never listen to sermons on sympathy and 
good-will until these exist in heavenly abun­ 
dance inside the church. What is the use of 
preachers trying to give the world a theory of 
something which the church itself does not prac­ 
tice? No man can preach love effectively over 
the body of a loveless church. Our immediate 
task is not to Christianize the world, but to 
Christianize the church. The church progress­ 
ively Christianized will gradually Christianize 
society. God cuts our piece of work small in 
order that we may do it well. The task, though 
limited, is dynamic and far-reaching. The church, 
if leaven, will leaven the whole lump. Our first 
business is not with the lump, but with the leav­ 
en. He is the greatest preacher who so frames 
and utters the thoughts of God as to bind to­ 
gether the largest number of Christian hearts 
in closest fellowship for Christlike service." 1
The answer to the question involved requires a discussion of 
the motives to imitation, but before taking up that subject, 
it will be well for us to consider more thoroughly than has 
been done in the preceding paragraphs the religious values 
of imitation.
Religious Values of Imitation.
The religious values of imitation are as numerous 
as the elements of religious culture which are capable and 
worthy of being reproduced imitatively, together with the 
values which are inherent in a general uniformity of behav­ 
iour within religious groups. There are liabilities, too, 
some of which have already been noted.
But the chief value with which we are concerned is 
that Christian personality may be developed, in part at least 
1 The Building of the Church, pp. 77-78.
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through the process of imitation. This value has three as­ 
pects which should be noted. First, there is the individual 
aspect, by which is meant simply that the values of imitation 
are viewed from the standpoint of the development of Christ­ 
ian personality in the individual. Of course, it must be 
frankly recognized that overt behaviour, whether the product 
of imitation or not, is not an infallible index to Christian 
personality. But, on the other hand, Christian personality 
apart from overt behaviour is a fiction. There is, therefore, 
valid concern for the development in the individual of modes 
of conduct which may be both expressive of Christian person­ 
ality and productive of Christian personality. And the fact 
that the perceptible aspects of such modes of conduct can be 
imitated by the individual constitutes what we have called the 
individual aspect of the chief religious value of imitation.
A second aspect of this chief religious value of 
imitation may be called the group aspect. Perhaps the dis­ 
tinction between the two may be made clear by means of an 
illustration. Suppose we let M represent a model mode of 
conduct which is a stimulus to imitation in an individual, 
who is represented by I. That much of the illustration would 
represent the individual aspect of imitation. But suppose 
now that M is presented to a group of individuals—I, Ia , 
Ic ,........In . By virtue of the group situation, M ceases
to be the only model-stimulus, and each individual in the 
group who responds imitatively to M becomes a reinforcing 
model-stimulus to every other individual. In other words,
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the relation of imitators to an act imitated is generally 
what mathematicians would call a "many-one" relation. The 
spread tends to be by geometrical progression, rather than by 
arithmetical progression. This was Tarde ! s fundamental thesis 
in The Laws of Imitation, 1 and while it is doubtful whether 
the spread of currents of imitation can be reduced to such 
a rigorously mathematical formula, at least there is indicated 
in such a statement a significant general tendency. For by 
this process of mutual imitation, a mode of conduct is dif­ 
fused in the group, not in the mechanical manner or to the 
uniform extent that the simplicity of the illustration we have 
used might suggest, but in a dynamic manner, and with a de­ 
cided tendency towards approximate uniformity. Perhaps it is 
not too fanciful for the preacher to trust that by this pro­ 
cess, in part at least, some of the seeds which he sows from 
the pulpit may fall into good ground and bring forth fruit, 
"some an hundredfold, some sixtyfold, some thirtyfold".^
Again, there is an inter-group aspect to the relig­ 
ious value of imitation. The modes of conduct which have been 
diffused through the group by the process of imitation may 
cross the boundary of that group and spread to other groups 
by the same process. The diffusion of imitated modes of con­ 
duct across group boundaries is very obvious in such religious 
movements as the Wesleyan Revival in England, the Great Awaken­ 
ing along the Atlantic coast in America under Edwards and
1 Chapters V, VI, and VII.
2 Mathew 13:8.
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Whitefield, the revival in the Burnt District under Finney, 
and the Scotch-Irish Revival in Kentucky in 1800. And it 
has been observed more recently in connection with the acti­ 
vities of the "Oxford Groups", or "First Century Christian 
Fellowship".
Types of Models by Means of Which the Chief 
Value of Imitation May 
be Realized.
This chief value to religion of the process of imi­ 
tation may be realized in the three aspects just noted by the 
use of two general types of models. One is the personal mod­ 
el, which, in turn, may be either concrete or abstract. By 
a concrete personal model is meant a living human being who 
is immediately perceptible to the imitator. Imitation of 
such a model is imitation in its simplest form. A little child 
in a religious audience, alertly watching, out of the corner 
of her eye, the people about her while bowing her head as they 
do during a prayer, is a familiar illustration of the imita­ 
tion of concrete personal models. An abstract personal model 
is a person who is perceptible only mediately through memory 
or imagination. A three-year-old child was "playing Mamma 1 ' 
in putting her doll to bed one evening. "Now, baby", she said 
to the doll, "you go up stairs and wash your face and hands 
and get ready for bed. And don't you forget to wash your ears." 
After a brief interval, in which the "baby" was supoosed to 
have carried out those instructions, she was being tucked in­ 
to bed. "Now close your eyes", continued the would-be Mamma, 
"and when I go down stairs, don't you call me and say you
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want a drink of water, because you've already had a drink of 
waterl " That formula for putting a baby to bed was not be­ 
ing invented by that three-year-old child; she was imitating 
the memory-image of her own mother's actions in putting her 
to bed. Her model was thus personal, but abstract. And the 
individual's heroes of history and fiction belong in the same 
class of models.
But in addition to these two types of personal mod­ 
els, there are non-personal models, which are generalized con­ 
cepts of actions or principles of action. As symbols, words 
come to stand for classes of actions, or for principles of 
action, which serve as models for the individual. The child, 
out of concrete experiences in the play group, for example, 
builds up a concept of fairness. It is not far removed from 
the concrete imagery of playmates acting as individuals. But 
through more experiences with other groups, and through reading 
and conversation, there is a gradual depersonalization of the 
separate acts and an integration of them into a type for which 
the verbal symbol "fairness" stands. Many proverbs and maxims 
of conduct belong in this class of non-personal models, and 
by means of them behaviour patterns are diffused and trans­ 
mitted. Thus may the preacher use apothegms, proverbs, and 
other pithy sayings of the Scriptures as texts of sermons in 
which they are made vivid and memorable so that they become 
vital elements in the hearers' concepts of ideal behaviour.
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Motives to Imitation.
Returning now to a practical question which was 
raised as to how moral and religious conduct may be raised 
from the lower level of mere conformity imitation to the 
higher level of rational imitation, we may note that some of 
the motives to imitation have already been indicated incident­ 
ally, but the subject is of sufficient importance to warrant 
some further discussion. Of course, it is very difficult to 
isolate and designate the real motive of most human behaviour. 
If one speaks the language of the instinetivist school of psy­ 
chology, the ultimate motives of all conduct are the instincts. 
Yet most conduct is a product of such a complex combination 
of instincts and their modifications in the forms of habits, 
that the isolation of one instinct as the motive in the case 
of a particular reaction is likely to prove to be only a par­ 
tial designation of the motive. Rationalisation is a term 
which has come to have an important place in the psychology 
of motivation, and it lends much complication to the subject, 
although it is sometimes used in psychology to make very sim­ 
ple the explanation of otherwise mysterious conduct. While 
there are several forms of rationalisation, in its essence, 
as it involves motivation, it may be described as a process 
of ascribing to conduct a motive which is more acceptable to 
the individual, or the group, than the real motive. Thus, 
suppose that a student should decide to quit writing on his 
term paper for the afternoon and go to a football game. He
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says to himself, and perhaps to his family also, "l have been 
working too much lately, and I am mentally fatigued. I should 
be better prepared to continue my wilting after the exhilaration 
of watching the game." That, it might be said, is merely a 
fictitious substitute for the real motive, which is to escape 
the labour of difficult composition. And, conceivably, that 
might be a reasonably accurate explanation of the motivation 
in that particular case. Certainly it is true that the con­ 
cept of rationalisation is a very useful one. But in many 
cases of alleged rationalisation, it is pertinent to raise the 
question as to whether the so-called real motive is any more 
real than the motive of seeking social approval, or the ap­ 
proval of one*s own conscience, which contributed also to the 
making of the alleged rationalisation. The very fact that the 
rationalised motive is acceptable to the individual, or to the 
group, is a fact in which there is motive power, for without 
such an acceotable motive the conduct might be very different. 
All of which leads one to the conclusion that, since in normal 
behaviour the whole organism reacts to a total situation, when 
we select some part of the organism, or some part of the envir­ 
onment, or both, and assert that to be his motive to a parti­ 
cular course of action, we are not speaking with more than ap­ 
proximate accuracy. We are really just designating as the dom­ 
inant factor some one of the several factors which constitute 
the whole motive. Of course, in the case of some very simple 
behaviour, it is quite possible that the factor selected may 
be considered, for all practical purposes, to be the motive.
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But, as Professor G. A. Coe has clearly shown in his book on 
The Motives of Men, most human conduct is quite complex in 
its motivation, and if one is to interpret behaviour at all 
accurately, that fact must be kept in mind.
Fully recognizing, then, that in attempting to list 
some of the motives to imitation one is really listing what 
probably may be only the dominant factors in the motivation 
of imitation, the task is still not a simple one. For, if 
motivation be regarded from the standpoint of the "push" from 
within the organism towards a course of action, there are as 
many motives as there are needs, wants, instincts, or other 
drives in the organism. And the list of motives to imitation 
would be made up of those drives which are capable of being 
satisfied, or realized, through imitative action. On the other 
hand, if motivation be regarded from the standpoint of the 
"pull" from without the organism towards a course of action, 
then there are as many motives as there are different extern­ 
al stimuli to action. And the list of motives to imitation 
would be made up accordingly of those stimuli which are ca­ 
pable of producing imitative action. As a matter of fact, 
however, it is questionable whether there is ever a specific 
"push" from within the organism without a reference to some 
"pull" from without. An individual does not merely want; he 
wants something. He does not just hunger; he hungers for 
food. One suspects that, when the Gestalt psychology has been 
developed to more maturity, the concept of configuration may 
serve to obviate the confusion which now attends the dis-
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tinction between the "push" and the "pull" factors in moti­ 
vation.
In the meantime, practical purposes probably are 
served best by the use of quite ordinary, conversational 
terms which tend to blend these two elements in motivation. 
After this manner, Professor H. A. Overstreet has presented 
the following list of fundamental human wants: the satisfac­ 
tion of such appetites as hunger, thirst, and sex; comfort, 
affectionate devotion, play, security, ownership, efficiency, 
social esteem, aesthetic satisfactions, adventure, travel, 
leadership, novelty, propriety, constructive achievement, con­ 
quest, sympathy, help for the weaker, humour, harmony with 
one's fellows, and harmony with the universe. Such a list 
cannot pretend to be exhaustive, but only suggestive.
Probably in no field of applied psychology has mo­ 
tivation been more thoroughly studied, or employed on a wider 
scale, than in the field of advertising. And while some of 
the motives to which the advertiser appeals, and some of the 
techniques he uses, are on a low ethical plane which renders 
them of no value to the preacher in his task, at the same time 
discriminative use can be made in the field of homiletics of 
some of the work which has been done with advertising primari­ 
ly in view.
The following table was designed to show the rela­ 
tive strength of certain motives--that term being used in a 
loose and broad sense. The results were secured by asking 
1 Influencing Human Behaviour, pp. 34-42.
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74 men and women to take 44 motives and carry out the follow­ 
ing instructions:
"Consider the strength and importance of 
these motives or incentives to action from the 
standpoint of your own personal life and behav­ 
iour as a whole. Ask yourself in connection with 
each one how important it is in determining your 
own actions from day to day. Write 10 after the 
very strongest motives, and a number between 0 and 
10 after the others, according to their relative 
strength or importance. "1
Table I 2 
The Relative Strength of Motives
Motive Value
Appetite--hunger 9.2






















Respect for Deity 
Sympathy for others 
Protection of others 
Domesticity 
Social distinction 








































With regard to this table, Dr. Poffenberger notes:
"There is one source of error that is espec­ 
ially likely to creep into such studies as this; 
namely, that one's idea of what motives are prop­ 
er and commendable is likely to govern his choices 
rather than their real potency. This is a further 
illustration of social pressure or repression, as 
the Freudians call it. Still, there is no particu­ 
lar evidence of such an error in this table, for
1 Poffenberger, A. T., Psychology in Advertising, p. 84
2 Ibid., p. 85.
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the sex motive stands high, and that is the one 
which is usually most affected by social pres­ 
sure. It is to be noted that the motives that 
we have said are based on an insistent bodily 
need--namely, hunger and thirst, sex, and bodily 
comfort--stand at the top of the table, along 
with those that have great biological signifi­ 
cance --namely, health, love of offspring, parent­ 
al affection—and further, that all but two of 
the motives in the list, shyness and teasing, 
fall in the upper half of our scale from 0 to 10. 
Nineteen of them are in the highest quarter of 
the scale. This means that all the motives but 
two are at least strong enough to lustify their 
use when other conditions warrant."1
We may note further some very glaring defects in this table. 
The exact meaning of some of the so-called motives is not 
clear from the names used, so that apparently there is much 
ambiguity and overlapping. Warmth, coolness, and sleep, for 
example, are simply elements in bodily comfort. And, for our 
purpose, some confusion is produced by the listing of imita­ 
tion itself as a motive. Moreover, it is difficult to see 
how some of the "motives 11 could be appealed to in a sermon 
under any circumstances. Yet, in view of the way in which 
the data were secured and tabulated, a large portion of the 
list might simply be eliminated as irrelevant without serious­ 
ly impairing the value of the remainder as some indication 
of the relative strength of certain impelling motives to con­ 
duct, to which the preacher may appeal in his sermons.
Pew of the recognized text-books on homiletics have 
dealt with the question of motivation to any considerable ex­ 
tent, except to set forth the general principles of argumen­ 
tation. But at least one recognized authority, Professor 
1 Ibid., pp. 85-86.
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Alexander Vinet, has faced realistically the fact that the 
preacher, as well as the advertiser, must deal with man as he 
is, and not as one would like him to be. In a section devoted 
to motives, he says:
"Wherever our object is to determine the will, 
we must do one of two things: either address our­ 
selves to an affection already existing, appeal 
to it, and excite it by presenting to it the ob­ 
jects with which it is maintained; or create af­ 
fections in regard to the end we have in view. 
But the second case never occurs, at least in an 
absolute sense. We can awaken the affections; we 
cannot create them. The inclination...or the want 
exists; if it did not exist, in vain should we e- 
voke it....The business, then, in all cases, is 
to present to the soul what is capable of attract­ 
ing it....So long as you have done nothing but 
prove,--so long as your proof reaches nothing in 
the man but his intellect,--the hearer has not 
been touched,--he remains intact....Motive, in- 
clination, or affection, the name is of littTe" 
consequence--this is what is necessary for the 
determination of the will, and, consequently, es­ 
sential to eloquence."1
Vinet then asserts that "all the motives, of which we can make 
levers, may be reduced to these two--moral good (which he in-
o
terprets to be synonymous with duty), and happiness". And, 
as coming under one or the other of these two classes, or 
both, he enumerates self-love, in the sense of esteem for the 
dignity of human nature; sentiment of the beautiful, when prop­ 
erly linked to the good; and sympathetic affections, such as 
family affections, love of country, friendship, admiration,
•z
and gratitude.
Professor Vinet obviously speaks in terms of the old
1 Homiletics, pp. 175-177.
2 Ibid., p. 177.
3 TEToT., pp. 183-185.
93
"faculty" psychology, but his terms are easily translated into 
those of contemporary psychology, and when that is done, it is 
evident that he was reasoning in harmony with our contention 
that the preacher can lift behaviour which is on the lower 
level of mere conformity imitation (whether the behaviour it­ 
self be judged to be moral, immoral, or non-moral) to the high­ 
er level of ethically desirable rational imitation by three 
means which are embraced in the technique of persuasion.
The first is instruction. The distinction between 
the undesirable and the desirable modes of conduct must be 
made intelligible to the hearers by a process of exposition, 
or explanation, which involves the familiar rhetorical tech­ 
niques of analysis, description, narration, comparison, ex­ 
ample, anecdote, metaphor, simile, and the like. Thus are the 
alternatives presented which involve a choice. This technique 
must be supplemented (though it is not essential that the or­ 
der here presented be followed in every case) by what is u- 
sually designated as argument--the setting forth of the lo­ 
gical reasons for abandoning the undesirable course of con­ 
duct and embracing the desirable course. And, thirdly, the 
ethically, or religiously, desirable course must be associated 
in the minds of the hearers with such motives as are already 
operative in their lives; it must be clearly shown to be a 
means towards some end or goal which is already desirable to 
the hearers. As individuals mature in their religious ex-
1 Of. Macpherson, Wm., The Psychology of Persuasion; "Be­ 
fore a man will act he must be persuaded that the action will 
answer some end; and that which gratifies no emotion or senti­ 
ment in his nature can never be an end for him." p. 19.
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perience, and their ideals become more refined ethically, high­ 
er and higher motives may be appealed to by the preacher in his 
sermons. But if the preacher keeps in view the heterogeneous 
character of the religious audience, he is less likely to over­ 
shoot his target, so to speak, by aiming at motives that do not 
yet motivate a considerable portion of his audience. The con­ 
tribution of social psychology to homiletics at this point, then, 
is not a new technique, but an emphasis of the significance of 
a very old technique which seems to have been neglected, both 
in theory and in practice.
Imitation and Biographical Sermons. 
It is evident from this study of imitation in the 
religious audience that biographical materials should have a 
large place in preaching. This judgment is in accord with 
the classifications of types of sermons which have been made 
on the basis of the kinds of material which are predominant 
in them, by those homiletical authorities who have classified 
sermons at all on such a basis. Dr. John A. Broadus, for ex-
9
ample, whose text-book has probably been used more than any 
other in America for the past sixty years, classifies sermons 
on a material basis as being of four general types--or pos­ 
sibly five. 1 First, there are sermons primarily doctrinal in 
content, a type which he sub-divides into three groups — those 
which are "doctrinal proper", those which are apologetic, and 
those which are polemic. Secondly, sermons may be predominant­ 
ly moral, or ethical. Thirdly, there are historical sermons 
1 Preparation and Delivery of Sermons, pp. 59-83.
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of two sub-types--those which treat, for the most part, of 
God's dealings with families, tribes, nations, and other so­ 
cial groups in history, and those which are biographical, 
treating of God's dealings with individual characters of his­ 
tory. Fourthly, sermons which present the gospel largely in 
terms of man's experience of God's grace in the developing 
Christian life are called "experimental sermons". And, as a 
possible fifth class, he mentions sermons for special occa­ 
sions, such as funerals, church anniversaries, religious fes­ 
tivals, commencements, and the like. Thus, the biographical 
sermon is given recognition as a specific sub-type under his­ 
torical sermons. And, to some extent in all these types, un­ 
less the sermons are extremely abstract in their treatment, 
use must be made of biographical materials for illustrative 
purposes, if for no other. Moreover, a considerable number of 
the sermons one reads in -printed volumes, or hears preached 
from pulpits, are sermons which might be called biographical 
sermons. Especially in those churches which observe a church
1 An interesting variety of the biographical sermon, which 
might be called the "autobiographical sermon", has been used 
effectively by several American preachers. In this variety the 
preacher, throughout the sermon, impersonates some Biblical 
character, as if that character were alive and standing in the 
pulpit to interpret his own life and bring his own message to 
the congregation. The characters of Judas Iscariot, Zacchaeus 
the tax-gatherer, and Nicodemus the pharisee, have been thus 
treated, respectively, by Professor J. M. Vander Meulen, of the 
Louisville Presbyterian Seminary; Rev. Dr. J. W. G. Ward, pas­ 
tor of the First Presbyterian Church, Oak Park, Illinois; and 
Rev. Dr. Peter H. Pleune, pastor of the Highland Presbyterian 
Church, Louisville, Kentucky. It is a daring variety of ser­ 
mon, and requires unusual dramatic skill, but when done with 
sincerity and restraint, it is a most effective variety of 
preaching. Manuscript copies of the sermons mentioned above 
are in the library of the Louisville Presbyterian Seminary.
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calendar, but also in most of the other churches, the saints 
of history (particularly those whose lives are chronicled to 
some extent in the Bible) have their lives periodically pre­ 
sented in sermons as models to be imitated by contemporary 
men. Still more often are episodes in the life of Jesus por­ 
trayed, or aspects of His character interpreted, as the su­ 
preme example of godly living. Sometimes the biographical 
treatment in such sermons is well done, and sometimes bio­ 
graphical sermons are as dull and uninspiring as history which 
is merely the matter-of-fact narration of events in a rigor­ 
ously chronological order.
Now, these observations on biographical sermons, and 
on the use of biographical materials in sermons which may be 
predominantly of some other type, are perhaps quite common­ 
place in themselves. But they assume a new significance when 
associated with the fact that in no text-book on homiletics 
which we have examined is more than a paragraph or two devoted 
to the technique of preaching biographical sermons. Probably 
the heart of the existing published theory on this subject 
might be summed up in a few sentences from Dr. James Black's 
Sprunt Lectures on Preaching:
"Generally, I think this type of preaching 
should be done pictorially, with some imaginative 
treatment, and in a dramatic setting....Sketch your 
situation as if you were painting it.,..Do not let 
it (your moral comment) be too obvious. 11 !
These suggestions are then followed by a timely warning against 
the tendency to paint characters as if any of them were either 
1 The Mystery of Preaching, p. 141.
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all "white" or all "black". 1
Yet the treatment of biographical materials with 
homiletical aims in view is a task which requires no little 
skill. Such skill may be acquired by the preacher through 
the use of the "trial-and-error" method, to be sure, and many 
preachers have developed the art of biographical preaching to 
a high degree of perfection by that method. But what Dr. Black 
has said with regard to learning rules of homiletics in gen­ 
eral is particularly applicable to learning rules, or prin­ 
ciples, of biographical preaching, "in our profession", he 
writes, "it is needful to know the laws of our art: if they 
do nothing more, they will at least save us from crude and 
expensive mistakes. Roger Ascham remarks in The Scholemaster; 
! It is marvelous pain to find out a short way by long wander­ 
ing 1 . The one gain of learning the art of preaching is that 
it may save us from this 'long wandering'l" 2
The materials, in the form of numerous volumes of
2 admirable biographical sermons, are available which might
be carefully analysed, after which some guiding principles 
for biographical preaching might be formulated by a process 
of inductive study. Such a work would constitute a major
1 Op. cit., pp. 141-145.
2 Tfrid., p. 20.
3 Among these materials, for example, are the following: 
Black, Rogues of the Bible; Chappell, Sermons on Old Testament 
Characters, Sermons on New Testament Characters, Familiar Fail­ 
ures; Gulce, The FirsTf Friencfs of tlje Finest Friend; Macartney 
These Twelve; Mackay, pible Types oT~Modern Men, Bfble Types ' 
of Modern Women, Men Whom Jesus Macle; Ma the son, Representative 
H?n of thenSTETe, ""Representative Women of the Bible; Miller—— Women oT~"£he BibleT — —— ———— '
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contribution to homiletical literature. And, while a task of 
such scope and magnitude cannot be included as a detail in 
this paper, if imitation, in the forms which have been describ­ 
ed in this chapter, is of anything like the significance 
which we have assigned it in the mental processes of the re­ 
ligious audience, there is surely indicated here a deficiency 
in the literature of horailetics which ought to be remedied.
"Proof may be conveyed through the audience 
when it is worked up by the speech to an emotion­ 
al state. For there is a wide difference in our 
manner of pronouncing decisions, according as we 
feel pleasure or pain, affection or hatred; and 
indeed the power of working upon the emotions is, 
as we assert, the one end or object to which our 
present professors of the rhetorical art endea­ 
vour to direct their studies."--Aristotle.
CHAPTER VI. 
SYMPATHY IN THE RELIGIOUS AUDIENCE
According to Professor C. A. Ellwood, 1 the sym­ 
pathy theory of society is even older than the imitation 
theory, having been first explicitly formulated by Adam Smith 
in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, first published in 1759. 
Smith was, in turn, followed by Darwin, Sutherland, Ward, 
and Giddings in giving to sympathy a large place among the 
processes of social interaction. Such an estimate of the sig­ 
nificance of sympathy is not surprising when one considers the 
function of feeling in group life. For even more impressive 
than the spread of ideas through the process of suggestion, 
and the spread of actions by means of imitation, is the spread 
of emotion, with its affective qualities of pleasantness or 
unpleasantness, through the process of sympathy.
The Nature of Sympathy.
But, while sympathy has been assigned a place of 
primary importance in many works of social psychology, by no 
means has there been a uniform interpretation of the nature 
of sympathy by the various authorities. It becomes desirable, 
therefore, to inquire into the nature of sympathy, which we 
have already defined as a process by which feelings and emo­ 
tions are diffused in the group. Professor IViCDougall has ad­ 
vanced a theory, which is usually known as the theory of "sym­ 
pathetic induction of emotion", to explain how the instinctive 
1 The Psychology of Human Society, p. 578.
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behaviour of one animal directly excites similar behaviour on 
the part of his fellows. He observes, for example, how when 
two dogs within sound and sight begin to stiffen themselves 
and show every symptom of anger, and how when one beast in a 
herd stands arrested, gazing in curiosity on some unfamiliar 
object, presently his fellows also, even though the object be 
to them invisible, display curiosity and come up to join in 
the examination of it. And his explanation of these phenomena 
is
"that in the gregarious animals each of the prin­ 
cipal instincts has a special perceptual inlet 
(or recipient afferent part) that is adapted to 
receive and to elaborate the sense-impressions 
made by the expressions of the same instinct in 
other animals of the same species—that, £. £., 
the fear-instinct has, besides others, a special 
perceptual inlet that renders it excitable by 
the sound of the cry of fear, the instinct of 
pugnacity a perceptual inlet that renders it ex­ 
citable by the sound of the roar of anger."^
Elsewhere, in his interpretation of crowd psychology, Dr. 
McDougall indicates with an excellent illustration the sig­ 
nificance which he attaches to "primitive sympathy" in human 
groups.
"This principle of direct induction of e- 
motion by way of the primitive sympathetic response", 
he says, "enables us to understand the fact that 
a concourse of people (or animals) may be quickly 
turned into a panic-stricken crowd by some threat­ 
ening object which is perceptible by only a few 
of the individuals present. A few persons near 
the stage of a theatre see flames dart out among 
the wings; then, though the flames may be invisible 
to the rest of the house, the expressions of the 
startled few induce fear in their neighbours, and 
the excitement sweeps over the whole concourse 
like fire blown across the prairie." 2
1 Social Psychology, pp. 96-97.
2 The Group Mind, p. 3V.
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This theory is attractive in its simplicity of
statement and plausible in the illustrations presented in 
its support, but it is difficult to see how it can survive 
the objections which come from two sources. One is the re­ 
sults of certain experiments bearing upon the problem of the 
identification of emotions from their perceptible expressions 
in others. Murphy and Murphy, in their report on investiga­ 
tions with regard to innate patterns of facial expression of 
emotion, report experiments conducted by Peleky, Langfeld, 
Allport, and Guilford, concluding on the basis of these ex­ 
periments that "the evidence is strong that there is no ba­ 
sis upon which an innate capacity to interpret emotional pat­ 
terns can be predicated". These experiments, it should be 
noted, are restricted to the visual perception of facial ex­ 
pressions in selected pictures. Furthermore, it is assumed 
that subjects must be able to name (though with the aid of 
lists of emotional expressions which include the correct 
name) the emotion expressed in the picture, in order to share 
that emotion.
The experiments of Langfeld and of Allport are more 
fully recorded and interpreted in the letter's Social Psy­ 
chology.^ According to that record, the general accuracy of 
individuals in identifying facial expressions of emotion is 
less than fifty percent, and it seems evident that the pro­ 
ficiency of different individuals in this regard is due, not
1 Experimental Social Psychology, p. 70.
2 pp. 222-230.
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to Innate reaction to expression, but to the amount of train­ 
ing, or effort at learning, which they have experienced. 
The experiments of H. C. Harshbarger to discover the accuracy 
with which individuals identify expressions of emotion which 
include manual and postural gestures, as well as facial ex­ 
pressions, indicate a rather high decree of efficiency on the 
part of the subjects in their identifications. But a number 
of the subjects were students who had been drilled in the 
meanings of gesture, and the experiments do not throw any llgjit 
on the sympathetic induction of emotion.-^ Neither do the ex­ 
periments of G. S. Gates, M, Sherman, and P. L. Wells on the 
identification of vocal expressions of emotion. On what may 
be considered the response to the vocal expression of an atti­ 
tude, rather than of a single emotion, however, Murphy and 
Murphy present the following significant conclusions on the 
basis of studies made on the social behaviour of very young 
children.
"The smile, which eventually becomes a 
general reaction elicited by a wide range of stim­ 
uli, appears for a time (approximately the second 
to the fourth month) chiefly in response to the voice. 
To the casual observer the response is utterly un- 
discriminating--scolding will bring quite as joyful 
a smile to the child as affectionaTe taTlE, and an~
taTk as amiable an expression as a lullaby.... 
takes months of growing up before the children 
that the proper response to an angry voice 
is crying, and that scolding is goocT'cause for 
cTTsquietude and anxiety, while smiles are reserved 
for friendly, loving and playful tone's."5
1 Murphy and Murphy, Experimental Social Psychology, 
pp. 516-517. ~
2 Ibid., pp. 72-73.
5 Ibid., p. 260. Italics mine.
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It cannot fairly be contended that these experiments
are conclusive in the refutation of Dr. McDougall ! s theory. 
But at least it is valid to say that at points at which it 
would be reasonable to expect them to lend some support to the 
theory, if it is true, they fail to do so.
Moreover, the theory is at variance with some of the 
most common experiences of life. A little child in our fam­ 
ily is very much afraid of dogs, and frequently we witness her 
flight, accompanied by screams and facial expressions of ter­ 
ror, without sharing in the least degree her emotion of fear.
And, if two men are engaged in a fight, the witnesses do not
Q uniformly share their emotion of anger. Sometimes they are
merely amused. And even laughter, which is generally consider­ 
ed to be so "contagious", will sometimes evoke only disgust, 
or some other response, on the part of witnesses. Who has not
1 In his Social Psychology, 15th edition, footnote, p. 95, 
Dr. McDougall relates an incident in which he was holding a 
child in his arms, looking out of a window on a dark night. 
There came a blinding flash of lightning, followed by a crash 
of thunder, whereupon the child screamed in terror, "immed­ 
iately upon hearing the scream", says Dr. McDougall, "l ex­ 
perienced, during a fraction of a second, a pang of fear that 
could not have been more horrible had I been threatened with 
all the terrors of hell." This he considers to be an illus­ 
tration of two points;"first, the sympathetic induction of 
emotion by another; secondly, the specific character of loud 
noises as excitants of fear". It seems likely that the second 
of these two points covers the whole case. Dr. McDougall de­ 
clares that he is not at all disturbed by thunder when alone, 
and we should not like to be understood as questioning this 
statement. But even when we have learned usually to inhibit 
fear responses to certain familiar loud sounds like thunder, 
it is a matter of common experience that such sounds sometimes 
occur with such suddenness and intensity that we respond with 
a strong fear reaction, and it does not seem unreasonable to 
suppose that this may have been the case with Dr. McDougall on 
the occasion which he describes.
2 Of. Smith, Adam, Theory of Moral Sentiments, p. 6.
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seen a little child burst into tears on perceiving the hila­ 
rious laughter of parents, or other adults, which was evoked 
by some situation unnoticed by the child and apparently unre­ 
lated to him? It appears, therefore, that there is good ground 
for questioning the validity of Dr. McDougall's theory of the 
sympathetic induction of emotions.^
Much more in accord with the facts, it seems, is 
the principle of the "conditioned emotional response", which 
Professor Allport has described in terms of Dr. McDougall's 
illustration of the panic which may seize all the members of 
a throng when only a few of them have actually witnessed the 
cause for alarm. His explanation of the process of sympathy 
in such a case is as follows:
*We have been previously terrified in com­ 
pany with others and so have had our fear emotion 
transferred to characteristic attendant stimuli, 
such as the cries and visible expressions of the 
emotion in those about us. We now react at once 
to the sight of fear in others by a fear response 
of our own. Here the conception of sympathetic 
induction loses its force. We fear not merely be­ 
cause we see the expression of fear in others; but 
because we have learned to read these expressions 
as signs that there is something to be afraid of. 
It is not fear inducecT from others tEat we exped­ 
ience, but our own fear of dangerous situations 
which has been conditioned by social stimuli."2
But whatever be the theory which correctly inter­ 
prets the way in which sympathy functions, the fact of the 
spread of feelings in the group by a process which we may 
call sympathy remains. Moreover, even if it be granted that 
a sympathetic reaction is an innate general tendency, there is
1 Of. Ginsberg, M., The Psychology of Society, pp. 31-32.
2 Social Psychology, p. 235.
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no question that learning is a factor of primary significance
in the sympathetic reactions of a group of people. So that, 
without interpreting "the conditioned response" as being syn­ 
onymous with the narrower concept of "the conditioned reflex", 
we shall employ that term to describe the nature of sympathy 
in the religious audience.
Two Types of Sympathy.
With this conception of the nature of sympathy, we 
may distinguish two general types of sympathetic responses 
with which the minister is concerned as a preacher. The more 
fundamental of the two types may be designated as primary sym­ 
pathy. It is the type which is in accord with the etymologi­ 
cal meaning of the word--feeling with others, or sharing with 
others their emotions, or emotions which are approximately 
like theirs. For example, A receives news of a serious ac­ 
cident in which his friend, B, has been crippled. Having gone 
through the shock of an accident himself, and having undergone 
the painful experience of having broken bones set, and remem­ 
bering the loneliness of long days and sleepless nights in a 
hospital permeated with the sickening odor of ether, A shares 
the emotions of B. Such primary sympathy would probably be 
in its most vivid and intense form. It is not necessary, how­ 
ever,that A must have had so nearly the same experience as B 
in order to share his feelings, for imagination will suffice 
to construct a situation which is sufficiently similar to arouse 
quite similar feelings. But usage sanctions another meaning
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of sympathy, which may be regarded as secondary sympathy. It 
is a feeling for others, rather than merely a feeling with 
others. In the case just cited, this secondary sympathy may 
be evident, as well as the primary. Let us suppose, for ex­ 
ample, that the doctor has informed A, but not B, that there 
is little likelihood of B's recovery from his injury. A then 
sympathizes with B in the sense that he has a feeling of pity 
or compassion for him. These two types of sympathetic response 
are not fundamentally unlike, but the distinction is useful 
in a study of the function of sympathy in group life.
Functions of Sympathy in the Religious Audience. 
Whether in primitive races, or in the most cultured 
civilization, feeling is a primary evaluator of ideas and ac­ 
tivities. It is no longer necessary to subscribe to the he­ 
donistic psychology, which made pleasure and pain the sole 
motives to behaviour, in order to recognize that the social 
life of man is not only embedded in feeling, but also largely 
controlled by feeling. It is not always the controlling fac­ 
tor in man 1 s evaluation of ideas and activities, but it is a 
factor, and one of such significance to the minister in his 
preaching that it cannot be disregarded without serious con­ 
sequences to the effectiveness of his ministry. Feeling is 
primarily a powerful conservative force in group life, because 
it reenforces those habitual activities which represent the 
modifications of instincts in the members who compose the 
group. This is true of any group, but it is especially evi­ 
dent in the religious group, where ideas and activities are
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saturated in feeling to such a high degree. The preacher may 
be able in his sermons to set forth novel doctrines or unfam­ 
iliar courses of action with irrefutable logic, but if they 
arouse strongly hostile feelings, in all probability his logic 
will be of no avail. The strength of feelings in the evalua­ 
tion of ideas and activities furnishes the pulpit demagogue 
with his most powerful weapon, for he may use it to maintain 
the status quo in the face of progressive changes in religious 
ideas, customs, and institutions which ought to be made. But 
the same weapon is also a means of defence against the innum­ 
erable innovations which are a constant threat to the stabi­ 
lity and efficiency of the religious group.
Probably the most significant bearing of this func­ 
tion of feeling on the work of the preacher is what may be 
described as a negative bearing on his delivery of sermons. 
It is obviously not always true that if the preacher, in the 
process of delivering his sermon, reveals through his posture, 
facial expressions, manual gestures, and the various expressive 
qualities of the voice, his feelings with regard to the ideas 
in his sermon, the audience will sympathetically share those 
feelings with him. Other things being equal, there may be a 
normal tendency for that to be the case. But certainly it is 
true that if, in the delivery of the sermon, the preacher fails 
to reveal, let us say, feelings of lively interest in what he 
is saying, the congregation will regard his ideas with his own 
apathetic evaluation of them. This is not to commend "tearing 
passions to tatters". Nor is it to suggest that vigour of de-
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livery can atone for thinness of thought. It is simply to 
say that if the preacher is not perceptibly animated with re­ 
gard to his own subject, and what he has to say about it, he 
is almost certain to find that his own emotional attitude will 
be sympathetically shared by the religious audience, with the 
usual consequences of inattention and the unpleasant feelings 
which are the emotional aspects of boredom.
A second function of feeling in group life is very 
similar to the first. Because feelings may be revealed through 
posture, gesture, and facial expressions, even without the aid 
of vocalization, they often furnish to the individual an index 
to the attitude of the group, or of portions of it, which serve 
as a guide to action. A child, for example, upon perceiving 
the attitude of disapproval revealed in the faces of his el­ 
ders in response to an embarrassing question he has asked at 
the dinner table in the presence of guests, may thus take his 
cue for relative silence during the rest of the meal. Like­ 
wise the preacher--if he be not too much enslaved to a manus­ 
cript in his delivery—may perceive the restlessness, or apathy, 
of his audience while he is engaged in abstruse, metaphysical 
discourse, and move on in his thought to a hsppy illustration 
before he has completely lost their attention. In fact, the 
inability of the preacher who reads closely from a manuscript 
to perceive such subtle expressions of feeling on the part of 
the audience, and to adapt his discourse to their changing re­ 
actions, is one of the strongest of all the arguments advanced
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against reading as a method of delivery.1
A third important function of sympathy in the reli­ 
gious audience is to diffuse the feeling elements in senti­ 
ments and ideals. Dr. McDougall has defined a sentiment as 
"an organized system of emotional dispositions centred about 
the idea of some object 11 . 2 And an ideal may be defined as an 
idea of a relatively perfect type of anything, together with 
a desire that therelatively perfect type may become actual.^ 
In other words, ideals are species of sentiments. Their sig­ 
nificance in relation to the development of character can hard­ 
ly be overestimated. Dr. Gardner has strikingly characterized 
the relations of sentiments and ideals to character by saying, 
"Sentiments other than ideals are indices of character as al­ 
ready organized; Ideals are sign boards which point the direc­ 
tion in which character is developing11 .^ And the social, as 
well as the individual, Importance of the growth of sentiments 
has been admirably stated by Dr. McDougall as follows:
"The growth of the sentiments is of the 
utmost importance for the character and conduct of 
individuals and of societies; it is the organiza­ 
tion of the affective and conative life. In the 
absence of sentiments our emotional life would be 
a mere chaos, without order, consistency, or con­ 
tinuity of any kind; and all our social relations 
and conduct, being based on the emotions and their 
Impulses, would be correspondingly chaotic, unpre­ 
dictable, and unstable. It is only through the 
systematic organization of the emotional disposi­ 
tions in sentiments that the volitional control of 
the immediate promptings of the emotions is render­ 
ed possible. Again, our judgments of value and of
1 For additional arguments against reading, see Broadus, 
Preparation and Delivery of Sermons, pp. 291-295; Johnson, The 
Ideal Ministry, pp. 228-23U"; Van Oosterzee, Practical Theology, 
p. 334.
2 Social Psychology, 15th edition, p. 159.
3 Gf» Oaraner, psychology and Preaching, pp. 105-106.
4 Ibid., p. 109.
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merit are rooted in our sentiments; and our moral 
principles have the same source, for they are form­ 
ed by our judgments of moral value. nl
In light of these statements, it is evident that 
one of the tasks of the minister, not only in his preaching, 
but also in his public prayers, his reading of the scriptures, 
and his conduct of other parts of the service of worship, is 
the building up of Christian sentiments. How this can be done 
may best be indicated by considering the process by which a 
child*s sentiment of love for his mother is developed. She 
feeds him, fondles him, and repeatedly does those things which 
bring to the child feelings of satisfaction and joy. By this 
process there grows up around the mother in the experience of 
the child a feeling-disposition of love. As the child grows 
older and observes similar reactions of other children towards 
their mothers, there develops the concept of motherhood, and 
out of his concrete sentiment for his own mother, together 
with his experience of other mothers, there develops the ab­ 
stract sentiment for motherhood. In other words, the senti­ 
ment is developed by "the repeated excitation of the appro­ 
priate feelings in connection with an object, or an idea, and 
the appropriate expression of those feelings".^ Now the preach­ 
er, in his pulpit ministry, is endeavouring, among other things, 
to build moral and religious sentiments. If he is to accom­ 
plish this part of his task in an intelligent manner, he needs 
to know how sentiments are developed in men. A. F. Shand
1 Op. cit., pp. 159-160.
2 Gardner, C. S., op. cit., p. ill.
Ill
has formulated what he calls the fundamental law of mental 
organization, which is as follows: "Mental activity tends, 
at first unconsciously, afterwards consciously, to produce 
and to sustain system and organization." Moreover, in such 
a system some one sentiment tends to become dominant, with 
all the other sentiments subordinately grouped about it. If 
the dominant sentiment in a given system is limited in its 
scope, or unworthy in its focal idea or object, the conse­ 
quence is inevitably an inferior character. The Christian 
minister, however, believes that there is one sentiment which 
is worthy of being the dominant sentiment in the mental sys­ 
tems of all men. It is the two-fold, or double-aspect, sen­ 
timent in terms of which Jesus summed up all the law and the 
prophets: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, 
and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all 
thy mind; and thy neighbour as thyself." All other worthy 
sentiments, we believe, may be correlated with, and subordi­ 
nated to, that as the dominant sentiment in the Christian 
character. But all the sentiments must be built into the char­ 
acters of men, and by the same fundamental process.
Like all the mental processes, sentiments have their 
cognitive, conative, and affective aspects. But in this 
chapter we are concerned primarily with the affective aspects 
and the ways in which they may be stimulated and diffused in 
the religious audience. As was indicated above in connection
1 The Foundations of Character, p. 21.
2 EuKe 10:27.
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with the development of the child's sentiment of love for his 
mother, it is only by the repeated stimulation of the appro­ 
priate feelings towards an object or idea that a sentiment is 
built up. This involves two things on the part of the preach­ 
er. First, in the composition of sermons and prayers, care 
should be given to the choice of words and phrases with emo­ 
tional connotations which are appropriate to the sentiment 
he is expressing, so that they may serve as effective secon­ 
dary stimuli in the sympathetic induction of feelings. Sec­ 
ondly, as the leader on whom the attention of the religious 
audience is centred, the preacher's own feelings, as revealed-- 
even to ever so slight an extent--in voice and gesture, should 
likewise serve as effective secondary stimuli to the sympa­ 
thetic induction of those feelings which are to be organized 
about some idea or object.-*- Thus, Sunday after Sunday, may 
the preacher build into the lives of his congregation those 
sentiments which, when progressively organized and correlated 
with the dominant Christian sentiment of whole-hearted love 
for God and one's fellowmen, constitute strong Christian char­ 
acter.
The fourth function of sympathy in the religious 
audience which should be noted is the part it plays in the 
creation and maintenance of group morale, or esprit de corps. 
In the case of a religious audience which has continuity of 
existence, such as the congregation, group morale is of vital
1 in this connection, one wonders why it should be the cus­ 
tom in so many churches to dim the lights just before the be­ 
ginning of the sermon with the result that the minister's face 
is in a shadow and its expressiveness completely lost to the 
larger portion of the audience.
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significance. Being a voluntary organization, the very life 
and effective functioning of the congregation depends largely 
on the loyalty and enthusiasm of its members. And, being a 
religious organization, its most distinctive characteristic 
is to be found in the two-fold fellowship of man with man and 
of man with God—a fellowship which it is the minister's res­ 
ponsibility to help to make real and dynamic in the lives of 
the members, both for the sake of the individuals as such, and 
for the sake of the function of the group as a group. The 
place of feeling in such a relationship is indicated by Prin­ 
cipal Hughes as follows:
"Now the essence of personal relation­ 
ship is in feeling. In this realm of emotion we 
become most at one with each other. In the sweep 
of a deep emotion a nation finds its most real u- 
nity, just as it is in the grip of intense feel­ 
ing that a congregation becomes a real spiritual 
fellowship with a higher unity of life and purpose 
that is a true communion of souls. Reason seems 
to some extent to be a divisive force, and here it 
Is that men fight for their opinions, and are ever 
ready to take up sides and emphasize their differ­ 
ences. Conation also seems to make more for in­ 
dividualism and separation. But feeling seems to 
fuse the many into one, as may be seen when a great 
orator or actor sways the thought and feeling of 
an audience as if it were one man. It is in this 
region of feeling that personal relationships 
touch the deepest note and find the most complete 
satisfaction." 1
This is a clear statement of the place of feeling in the crea­ 
tion of unified group fellowship which is the foundation of 
esprit de corps. If we were merely concerned with the psy­ 
chology of the religious audience, this statement, together 
with the reminder that feelings may be communicated by the
1 The New Psychology and Religious Experience, pp. 157-158.
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process of sympathy, would suffice. But in relation to preach­ 
ing, it is desirable that we consider also five specific means 
of creating and maintaining group morale, in each of which sym­ 
pathy is an important factor.
One means is the employment of interests which are 
common to the members of the group and which are clothed in 
the robes of the ideal. Such ideals as truth, beauty, honour, 
justice, freedom, or service may be vague in their denotation 
to the members of a group, but they are powerful in binding a 
group together and in furnishing impetus to collective acti­ 
vity. They are generalizations created in the long exper­ 
ience of the race, sanctioned almost universally, and power­ 
fully charged with emotion. E. D. Martin writes with scorn 
of the manner in which crowd orators employ such ideals, and 
he refers to them as terms "which have a meaning for every­ 
body and is a meaning for nobody" .-*• But let it be granted 
that they are frequently used in this way to lead crowds into 
irrational decisions and hasty actions; the essential truth 
is not that such tools may be perverted in their use, but that 
they are effective means of creating and communicating esprit 
de corps in a group. By such a means may the anarchist dif­ 
fuse a spirit of revolution among his followers; but by the 
same fundamental means may the preacher diffuse the spirit of 
Christianity through a religious audience which is very hetero­ 
geneous from the standpoint of the particular beliefs held by 
its members.
1 The Behaviour of Crowds, p. 30.
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Another way of securing and maintaining strong co­ 
hesion within the group is by means of conflict and rivalry. 
Patriotism of a predominantly emotional quality seldom rises 
to such heights of intensity in a nation in times of peace as 
in times of war. When the interest and loyalty of a Bible 
class begin to lag, at least temporary success in recovering 
group morale is almost certainly assured when a contest is 
started between it and another Bible class. Or, the same end 
may sometimes be accomplished by dividing the group into two 
sections, each of which is pitted against the other in friendly 
rivalry. Even abstractions will serve as effective "enemies" 
in welding the group together, and it is this fact which is of 
particular concern to the preacher. Reverend W. A. (Billy) 
Sunday, in his famous evangelistic campaigns, thus welded 
theologically and socially heterogeneous American audiences 
into cohesive groups by leading them into war against the 
Demon John Barleycorn. In a similar way "liberalism","higher 
criticism", "humanism", "naturalism", and many other such 
terms are often used by preachers primarily to designate 
"enemies" of Christianity against whom the soldiers of the 
cross must be mobilized to fight, and they serve their pur­ 
pose of generating and communicating group morale.
Discipline and self-sacrifice also may furnish an 
impetus to esprit de corps. If an individual, or a sub-group, 
voluntarily makes some sacrifice on behalf of the group, that 
sacrifice becomes an emotionally charged dramatization of the
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submission of the part to the whole. Thus a Communist, hav­ 
ing been refused permission by the municipal authorities to 
speak at a given time and place, and knowing full well the pen­ 
alty for doing so, attempts to make his speech, is arrested, 
and is thrown into jail by the police, but he has the satis­ 
faction of knowing that his sacrifice will serve to mould his 
comrades into a closer unity and to kindle anew their enthu­ 
siasm for their cause. Mahatma Gandhi, in his numerous im­ 
prisonments and periods of fasting, has thus welded his fol­ 
lowers into unity and rekindled their enthusiasm for his cause 
in India. It is this power of sacrifice to diffuse feelings in 
the group and to create esprit de corps that lends such enor­ 
mous value to the heroic incidents in the lives of martyrs, 
missionaries, and other crusaders of Christianity, and makes 
of such incidents among the best of illustrative material for 
sermons. On the other hand, discipline exercised by the group, 
as in the case of an army, exalts the common welfare and the 
common purpose, as over against the will of the individual, 
in a way which serves also to instil a spirit of loyalty and 
unity in the group, although such a procedure is dangerous 
because under some circumstances the sympathy of the group, 
or a considerable portion of it, may be enlisted on behalf of 
the member disciplined. Many a congregation suffering to-day 
from the bitterness of factionalism can trace that factional­ 
ism back to a case of congregational discipline.
It is, on the face of it, a curious fact that either
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secrecy or publicity may also create and maintain esprit de 
corps in the group. The organization known as the Ku Klux 
Klan, which spread through the United States during the years 
immediately following the World War, is an outstanding example 
of the effectiveness of secrecy in establishing group morale. 
And the widespread use of the blue eagle, as the official 
insignia of President Roosevelt's National Recovery Act of 
1933, which was printed in commercial advertisements in the 
newspapers, pasted on automobile windshields, store windows, 
and windows of private homes, is a conspicuous example of the 
power of publicity to accomplish the same end. However, these 
techniques probably are not as diverse as they appear on the 
surface to be. For, in addition to whatever factors there may 
be which are peculiar to each technique, there are some uni­ 
fying factors which are common to them both. One of these is 
the consciousness of a common purpose, which is made intense 
on the one hand by secrecy, and on the other by publicity. 
Another is the enlargement of the ego in both cases, so that 
the individual identifies himself with the group, whether 
through secret signs, "grips", and symbols of other types as­ 
sociated with secrecy, or through widely publicized slogans 
and insignia. But in either case common group emotions are 
shared through the process of sympathy.
To some extent in most of the means which have al­ 
ready been mentioned effective use is made of a fifth means 
which is most significant of all; that is, symbolism. As the
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life process of a group continues, there are certain common 
experiences, usually highly charged with emotion, which of 
themselves create esprit de corps. In order that the value 
of these experiences may be conserved in the life of the group, 
they are incorporated in symbols which may be regarded as a 
sort of group language. These symbols, like the parts of any 
language, perform different functions. Some are substantives, 
standing for different entities of particular significance to 
the group; others denote action; and still others qualify ei­ 
ther substantive or action, or else primarily convey some e- 
motion or feeling. Uniforms, badges, slogans, passwords, 
titles, colors, and banners are among the typical forms of 
symbols which are instruments for the creation and maintenance 
of group morale. The person of the leader himself may, in 
some organizations, come to have meaning which is symbolic of 
group loyalty and cohesion* Even leaders of the past may 
have such symbolic value. While listening over the radio to 
the proceedings of the national conventions of the two lead­ 
ing political parties in the United States during the summer 
of 1932, it was observed repeatedly that the Republicans 
might be stirred to frenzied heights of emotional expression 
by the mere mention in a speech of the name of Abraham Lin­ 
coln, and the Democrats would shout themselves hoarse if a 
speaker referred to Thomas Jefferson or Woodrow Wilson. And 
of course, when individual symbols of various types are com­ 
bined into systems, we have the ritual, the emotional effects
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of which have been vividly described by Miss Coyle as follows:
"The use of rhythmical motion, of music, 
incense, fire, processionals, large numbers in si­ 
multaneous action, repetition of ceremonial words 
or chants, of an exclusively ceremonial language, 
such as the Latin or the Masonic sign-language, 
have all proved themselves potent instruments of 
emotional transfer. The decreased sense of indi­ 
viduality produced by uniforms or by uniform action 
serves to augment the sense of oneness in the group. 
The lulling of the critical faculties and the height­ 
ening of suggestibility by the chants, incens^e, and 
candles have always contributed to the emotional fu­ 
sion of individuals, which, when directed to that 
end, creates cohesion in the organization. 11 !
In all these techniques it is evident that sympathy 
is an important factor in creating and maintaining what we 
have called esprit de corps, or group morale. It thus con­ 
tributes largely to the perpetuation and effective function­ 
ing of the organized group as such, making emotionally vivid 
those traditional elements which are the heritage of Christi­ 
anity from the past, and helping to make possible the construe 
tive achievements which are the program of Christianity for 
the future.
Some Conditions Which Favour the Sym­ 
pathetic Response.
In the discussion above, we have necessarily indi­ 
cated incidentally some of the conditions which favour the 
sympathetic response. Perhaps it will be well, however, at 
this point to make a brief summary of the more imDortant of 
those conditions and to indicate those which have the most 
direct bearing on homiletics. The first condition favouring 
the sympathetic response is familiarity, in terms of one's 
1 Social Process in Organized Groups, pp. 144-145.
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own experience, with the situation which evokes a sympathetic 
response. A brother-in-law of the writer was killed while 
piloting an airship a few years ago. Among the most under­ 
standing letters of condolence which came to the mother of 
that pilot were several which were written by mothers, pre­ 
viously unknown to her, who also had lost sons in aviation 
accidents and were moved by newspaper accounts to write to her. 
They were able to share her emotions more fully than were others 
because they were familiar with her situation in terms of 
similar experiences of their own. Secondly, love or very close 
friendship involves an attitude of readiness to react sympa­ 
thetically to the behaviour of the friend or loved one. This 
condition is known so universally in experience that illus­ 
tration or elaboration is unnecessary. Thirdly, uncoerced 
submissive attitudes render people susceptible to sympathetic 
responses. Because of his great prestige among his soldiers, 
it is said that General "Stonewall" Jackson was able in a con­ 
spicuous way, just by his confidence of manner, to instil 
courage in his men in the crisis of battle. Fourthly, the 
nearer and more vivid the emotional expression the more ready 
is the sympathetic response to it. The anxiety of the next 
door neighbour who has just lost his job enlists our sympathy 
more readily than the newspaper accounts of the plight of mil­ 
lions of other unemployed people throughout the country at
large.
Of these four conditions, the first and the last
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have the most direct bearing on homiletics. It is not enough 
in preaching that ideas shall be intelligible and logically 
convincing, though that is obviously fundamental. But if the 
whole organism is to react to preaching in anything like the 
Ideally desirable way, the affective side of consciousness, 
as well as the conative and cognitive aspects, must be stimu­ 
lated by the sermon. Otherwise the hearers are left under- 
standingly convinced, but coldly unmoved. And, in addition 
to those techniques which have been discussed above, the most 
effective means at the disposal of the preacher for stimulat­ 
ing the feelings of hi s audience is material which is emotion­ 
ally vivid and which is expressed in terms of emotional ex­ 
perience that is common to the members of the audience. An 
outstanding instance of this technique comes from Loud ! s ac­ 
count of Whitef ield' s preaching in America:
"in another visit to Charleston, White- 
field put the Last Judgment in nautical terms for 
an audience of seafaring men. His pulpit became 
deck of a ship overwhelmed by a tempest.
'Our masts are gonei 1 he shouted amid 
the storm he had stirred up. 'The ship is on her 
beam-ends I What next? What next?'
'The long -boat I » the mariners spontan­ 
eously replied. 'Take to the long-boat 1 » nl
This is an extreme instance, to be sure, but it serves all the 
better to make clear that, from the standpoint of the affec­ 
tive side of consciousness, as well as from the standpoint of 
the cognitive side, the content of sermons should be expressed 
in terms of experience which is common to the greater portion 
1 Loud, G. C., Evangelized America, p. 47. Italics mine.
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of the audience.
The Relation of Sympathy, Imitation, 
and Suggestion.
Having considered in the last three chapters the 
mental processes of suggestion, imitation and sympathy, it is 
desirable, before leaving them, to review briefly their rela­ 
tion to each other. It was evident that the conditions list­ 
ed above as favouring the sympathetic response are very sim­ 
ilar to some of the conditions noted in previous chapters as 
favouring suggestion and imitation. Moreover, there are o- 
ther relations between these three mental processes which are 
either reciprocal or parallel. Most of the ideas which may 
be diffused through the group by suggestion carry with them 
an emotional "colouring", or connotation, though it be some­ 
times strong and sometimes weak. Most, if not all, activities 
which may be imitated are accompanied by a feeling-tone of 
pleasantness or unpleasantness, and some by a specific emo­ 
tion of varying strength. And in the case of conformity imi­ 
tation of non-personal models, we saw that the border line of 
suggestion was aoproached, for non-personal models are ideas. 
As ideas, they may be communicated by the process of sugges­ 
tion. But as ideas of action, they are models, the action 
element of which may be imitated. Again, it is evident that 
the overt actions of personal models often include, or are, 
expressions of attitudes which have become habitually asso­ 
ciated with certain emotions. In such a case, the reproduction 
of the perceptible aspect of the attitude is imitation; while
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the emotion accompanying the imitation may be induced by
sympathy. Thus these processes are seen to be very intimate­ 
ly related to each other. In fact, they are simply aspects 
of a unified process which may be thus separated for the pur­ 
pose of analytical study.1
This underlying unified process has been variously 
described as the principle of M ideo-motor action", "ideo-re- 
flex process", and "dynamogenesis". Its exact nature is still 
a matter of dispute between recognized authorities. But while 
the psychologists are formulating a generally acceptable state­ 
ment of the process as a whole, at least it seems valid for 
those who are concerned primarily with the practical applica­ 
tion of social psychology to use suggestion, imitation, and 
sympathy as descriptive terms to designate the three aspects 
of a process which is of practical significance in the effort 
to interpret and control the behaviour of people in group sit­ 
uations such as that of the religious audience. And it has 
been in that sense that we have used those terms in this pa­ 
per.
1 Cf. Ginsberg, M., op. cit., p. 27.
"Sermonizing by ministers on social ques­ 
tions, no matter how excellent, is by itself 
inadequate, if there is not discussion of these 
sermons by the church members; for effective 
public opinion is always the co-operative pro­ 
duct of the interaction of many individual 
minds."—C. A. Ellwood.
CHAPTER VII. 
GROUP THINKING AND THE RELIGIOUS AUDIENCE
Group thinking is not at all a new phenomenon, but 
it is a social process the significance of which has become 
more evident with the development of democracy and with the 
advance of more recent theories of educational psychology. 
To be sure, the past few years have witnessed much misgiving 
as to the effectiveness of democracy in politics, and as a 
result there has been a swing towards dictatorship, such as 
that of Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in Germany, and Roosevelt 
in the United States. Likewise, in the spheres of education 
and of religion there has been a trend in certain circles to­ 
wards extreme authoritative control and the old sanctions. 
But these misgivings are not necessarily the fruit of an er­ 
roneous philosophy of democracy. Rather, it seems much more 
likely that they are the product of a faulty technique of de­ 
mocracy. Collective assent has been substituted for collective 
thinking. The contemporary situation in politics, education, 
and religion calls for renewed effort to perfect and extend 
the technique of group thinking in these spheres, so that the 
democratic ideal may accomplish its purpose in the full devel­ 
opment of the personalities of the members of the social group.
Six Patterns of Group Thinking.
Miss G. L. Coyle1 has distinguished six techniques 
1 Social Process in Organized Groups, pp. 173-174.
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as the most common of the several forms or structural patterns 
by which collective thinking is carried on. There is the lec­ 
ture, which represents the typical speaker-audience situation. 
The forum might be considered simply as a variety of the lec­ 
ture, but the addition of the opportunity for the members of the 
audience to question the speaker after his lecture is consider­ 
ed to be of sufficient significance to justify the classifi­ 
cation of the forum as a distinct structural form. A third 
form is the debate, which theoretically is an attempt to solve 
a problem, but which practically becomes an effort to win a 
battle, at least in the case of many formal debates. Closely 
akin to the debate, yet distinct from it in some respects, is 
parliamentary procedure, in which there may be more general 
participation on the part of the members of the group. This 
form is further distinguished from those already mentioned by 
the fact that the effort of the whole group is engaged in the 
attempt to solve a common problem and to reach a collective 
decision through a procedure which has been determined by a ra­ 
ther rigid set of rules. The fifth pattern is that of the 
problem-solving discussion, which shares with parliamentary 
procedure its aim and the general participation of the members 
of the group, but which departs from the structure of parlia­ 
mentary procedure in ways which will be indicated presently. 
Finally, there is the informal conversation, the structure of 
which is very loose and may be a combination of parts of the 
structures of several forms already mentioned.
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While most of these patterns do not obtain in a 
typical form in the kind of group which is the subject of this
paper, at least the patterns of the lecture and the forum are 
relevant to the religious audience situation, and there are 
certain elements of the problem-solving discussion and the 
informal conversation which deserve recognition also.
The Ideal Pattern of Group Thinking.
The pattern of collective thinking which is consider­ 
ed by many to be the most nearly ideal in terms of its effects 
on the development of personality is that of the problem-solv­ 
ing discussion. According to Miss Coyle, it was developed in 
the course of a movement interested in the improvement of the 
technique of discussion, and it is based chiefly on the edu­ 
cational philosophy of Professor John Dewey, the group theory 
of Miss Mary Pollett, and certain aspects of the Gestalt psy­ 
chology. In its basic structure, it follows Dewey 1 s five 
steps in thinking: "(1) a felt difficulty, (2) its location 
and definition, (3) suggestions of possible solutions, (4) de­ 
velopment by reasoning of the bearings of the suggestions, 
(5) further observation and experiment leading to acceptance 
or rejection". 2
An outstanding exponent of this technique of group 
discussion is Professor H. S. Elliott. According to his ex­ 
position, 5 the first step in group thinking is to get the
1 Social Process in Organized Groups, footnote, p. 179.
2 How We Think, pT"V%^
3 TOe Process of Group Thinking, Ch. IV.
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situation, its central problem and relevant factors, into the 
open. If common interest in the problem cannot be assumed, 
then it must be so stated in relation to the various members 
of the group as to enlist their interest in its solution. In 
any case, the problem is not to be stated in a merely formal 
way, but analytically, so that it is seen against a larger 
background and in terms of its bearing on various situations. 
Then, having enlisted the interest of the group, and having 
clarified the significant factors in the problem, the second 
stage is the examination of the possible courses of action 
which seem to be real options to the group. In the process 
of considering the grounds for each of the proposed possible 
solutions, certain underlying agreements between proposals 
will become evident. They may be agreements in purpose, goal, 
values, loyalties, facts, or opinions; but whatever they are 
in essence, they constitute bonds of unity within the group, 
and the clear perception of them by the group tends decidedly 
to facilitate the progress of group thinking. But, along with 
the discovery of these bonds of agreement, it is almost certain 
that a number of disagreements will also be revealed. In some 
cases, the process of real group thinking will cease at this 
point, for the group will be split into two or more factions, 
each clinging tenaciously to its own point of disagreement and 
merely rationalising its own prejudices. However, if the 
analysis of the problem has been made carefully and thoroughly, 
and if the group is sufficiently like-minded in its desire to
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discover the best possible solution, it is quit* possible that
the recognition of the points of agreement between the proposed 
solutions will hold the group together while the differences 
are explored, clarified, and evaluated. If they prove to be 
differences of fact, the only thing the group can do is to 
examine the evidence and reach the best possible conclusions 
as to what are the facts* More often, however, there are dif­ 
ferences of value, or of what is desirable. In the course of 
the discussion, there is likely to be a modification of the 
values held by members of the group, or else a new conception 
of the relative significance of certain values, so that the 
group as a whole can then agree on a course of action—whether 
it be one of the proposals originally made or a new proposal 
which has emerged out of the process of discussing and evalua­ 
ting agreements and differences. As Professor Elliott has 
put it, MA conclusion is not necessarily an T either or 1 ; it 
may be a •both and 1 , or it may represent something new born 
which gathers up and conserves on a higher plane the contri­ 
bution of all. It is not self plus society, but «i develop­ 
ing self in a developing society. 111
Such, in bare outline, is the normal procedure in 
the problem-solving discussion. But the process is by no means 
as simple as such an outline of the procedure might seem to 
indicate. Among the factors which operate within such a struc­ 
ture and help to determine the issues of group thinking there 
are at least four which throw further light on the psychology 
1 Op. cit., p. 59. Italics mine.
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of the process.
The one most immediately perceptible is the nature 
of the subject matter of the discussion and the relation of 
the members to it. In part, this factor has already been an­ 
ticipated in the previous outline of the procedure, when the 
importance of enlisting the interest of all the members of the 
group was indicated. The active interest of the group in the 
problem to be solved may be regarded as a sine qua non of real 
group thinking. But, in addition to an active interest in the 
subject, it is equally necessary for the members to have a 
reasonable amount of information about the subject if they are 
to contribute anything to the discussion. Otherwise, the so- 
called group-conclusion is likely to be a matter of assent 
through ignorance, rather than a progressive integration of 
thought•
A second factor is the mental and emotional habits 
of the members of the group. Often such habits will be mani­ 
fest in the form of conscious and deliberate efforts on the 
part of some members to confuse the issue or divert the argu­ 
ment. But more frequently the group process will be distorted 
unconsciously. Accidental associations of certain elements in 
an individual's experience, or emotionally charged words, may 
touch off tangents of thought. Certain members will react to 
people as types, as when all Chinese are thought of in terms 
of the typical Chinese laundryman in some obscure shop on a 
back street in an American city. Habits of deference, submis-
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slveness to authority, feelings of inferiority or superiority, 
or attitudes of contempt or loyalty, tend to determine the 
responses of various members to the discussion* Personal habits 
of participation affect the course of the discussion also, as 
in the case of the constant talkers, the silent members, or 
those who have hobbies which they insist on relating to every­ 
thing. The treasurer of a church often reacts to the discus­ 
sion of a particular measure in terms of its possible effect 
on the income of the church, while the director of religious 
education responds in terms of the effect on the relations of 
of the young people to the church. In a similar manner, the 
whole web of each member 1 s habitual interests in other organi­ 
zations, or in other parts of the same larger organization, 
tends to govern his participation in the thinking of the group. 
And among the means of communication, not only do the various 
denotations and connotations of words among the members often 
divert the direction of the discussion, or otherwise influence 
it, but also modulations of the voice, peculiarities of pro­ 
nunciation, and gestures have their influence. These and other 
mental and emotional habits must be reckoned with in any pro­ 
cess of group thinking.
The composition of the group will also prove to be 
a factor in the discussion. If the membership is heterogeneous 
to a considerable degree, diverse thought forms and symbols 
may make communication relatively difficult. On the other hand, 
if there is much common experience within the group, there is
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likely to be a sort of group language which greatly facilitates 
the discussion. Established sub-group loyalties may produce 
factions, or cliqies, which interfere with whole-hearted and 
open-minded participation. A smaller group is likely to feel 
the pressure of the larger group of which it is a part, as 
when the attitude of the congregation as a whole obviously 
colours the judgments expressed by officers in a session meet­ 
ing.
Closely related to the characteristics of the organ­ 
ization itself is the factor of its interaction with the com­ 
munity in which it functions. Perhaps this factor exerts its 
strongest influence in a discussion of group policies which 
will affect the activities of other groups and individuals. 
A clear example would be the case of a church group discussing 
a petition to municipal authorities to enforce rigidly an un­ 
popular law with regard to Sabbath observance. The expression 
of group opinions through resolutions is another form of 
group-community interaction which may enter into a discussion 
and determine its course, for usually some members of the group 
have a fairly accurate idea of what the reaction of the com­ 
munity to certain pronouncements is likely to be. And in a 
similar manner, of course, the pronouncements of other organi­ 
zations have their influence in the discussion of group de­ 
cisions which are related to such pronouncements.
With the vision before us of such factors in constant 
operation in a group discussion, it is evident that the leader
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of such a discussion is in a position of strategic importance. 
The success of the discussion as a process of real group think­ 
ing depends more upon him than upon any other factor. His is 
the responsibility of seeing that an effective group thinking 
procedure is followed, that the issues are clearly defined and 
understood, that possibilities are stated and the real reasons 
for the consideration of each are felt, that the points of 
agreement are recognized and points of difference understood 
and explored, that discussion moves towards an integration of 
fact and opinion in as united conclusion as possible, that the 
discussion does not go round in circles but makes genuine 
progress, that the necessary data for the discussion are sup­ 
plied in some way, that the progress of the discussion is 
clearly summarized as the various steps are made, and that the 
conclusion—if one be possible—is a group conclusion and not 
the mere surrender of the minority to the majority. Detailed 
techniques by which these responsibilities may be discharged 
effectively do not fall within the scope of this paper,^ but 
the outline which has been given, both of the factors operat­ 
ing within the structure of the problem-solving discussion and 
of the responsibilities of the leader of such a discussion, 
furnishes a desirable background for a briefer description of 
the structures of the lecture and the forum, and a necessary 
basis for the consideration of the sermon as a pattern of 
group thinking.
1 These are treated fully by Elliott, opus cit., Ch. V.
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The Lecture and Forum as Patterns 
of Group Thinking.
On first thought, it might not appear that the lec­ 
ture could be legitimately called a pattern of group think­ 
ing. Yet it is quite possible for the development of the thought 
in the lecture to follow the five steps which were outlined as 
the steps characterizing the problem-solving discussion. More­ 
over, if the lecturer is familiar with his audience, and if 
in the preparation of the lecture he fairly presents the ques­ 
tions and the diverse points of view which would be expressed 
by members of the audience in a discussion group, the lecture 
still further partakes of the nature of group discussion. And 
if to such a lecture there is added the forum element, so 
that there is an opportunity for the members of the audience 
to ask questions of the lecturer, then assuredly we have a 
pattern of group thinking of a relatively high order.
Now, so far as the participation of the group In the 
thinking process is concerned, there is no essential differ­ 
ence between the lecture and the sermon. Prom that standpoint, 
the lecture and the sermon may be regarded as synonymous. Like­ 
wise, the essential idea of the forum can be carried over 
from the lecture-forum to the sermon-forum. The sermon-fo­ 
rum would then be a discussion period following the preach­ 
ing of the sermon, in which the members of the audience 
would have an opportunity to ask questions of the preacher 
concerning the theme upon which he had preached.
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Group Thinking as Applied 
to the Sermon.
To what extent may these structures of the sermon 
and of the sermon-forum be considered patterns of group 
thinking? In the case of the sermon, at least, it appears 
on first thought that the term group thinking must be stretch­ 
ed considerably in order that it may apply to the sermon at 
all. For in the sermon situation the preacher has a monopoly 
on the oral expression of thought. He is in a position of 
recognized authority. In a large measure he directs the at­ 
tention of the rest of the group. There is no opportunity 
for interruption, for questions, for the expression of diverse 
opinions, for the presentation of any relevant data which he 
does not possess, but which is in the hands of other members 
of the group. In other words, the audience performs a com­ 
paratively passive function. All these obvious facts must be 
admitted, and the conclusion is justified that group thinking 
does not reach the high plane in the sermon situation that it 
reaches in the problem-solving discussion.
But it must also be remembered that the mind of man 
is not to be thought of as a mere tabula rasa. No audience 
is entirely passive. Its members may not be able to ask 
questions orally, but questions are nevertheless raised in 
their minds. Moreover, if the group is composed of members 
who know each other well, one individual may even anticipate 
with considerable accuracy some of the questions which are 
being raised in the minds of other individuals, and those
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questions become a part of his thinking response to the ser­ 
mon. Furthermore, words in oral form are not the only means 
of communication. The raised eyebrow, the nod of agreement, 
the nod of disagreement, the frown of perplexity—these, and 
other gestures among the audience, modify the responses of 
the audience to the speaker. And, if the speaker is not too 
engrossed in the mechanics of reading a manuscript, or of re­ 
calling what has been memorized verbatim, it is not likely 
that he will fail in some way to respond to these communica­ 
tions from the audience--here by clarifying an ambiguous 
statement, there by answering a question; here by elaborating 
an argument, there by noting an exception.
But, in addition to these factors of group thinking 
which operate in the sermon situation at the point of the de­ 
livery of the sermon, there are also factors which operate 
at the point of the preparation of the sermon. The position 
of the preacher who is preparing a sermon is not entirely un­ 
like that of the leader who is preparing to act as chairman 
of a problem-solving discussion. The preacher is not only a 
spokesman to the group; he is also a spokesman of the group. 
As such, he must give recognition to his representative capa­ 
city in the preparation of the sermon. There is nothing to 
prevent his use of the same structural pattern that is used 
by the leader who is outlining the procedure for a problem- 
solving discussion. And to the extent that the preacher 
knows the members of his group and approaches the problem of
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the sermon fairly, clearly, and sympathetically from their 
various points of view--to that extent, at least, the sermon, 
even in its prepared form, is a piece of group thinking.
The more usual homiletical procedure, especially 
in the preaching of topical sermons, is one which is funda­ 
mentally deductive in its treatment, and therefore somewhat 
far removed from the pattern which would seem to be best 
adapted to group thinking. A text is first chosen from the 
Bible, The central thought of that text is described or sug­ 
gested in the "subject 11 , or "title", which is given the ser­ 
mon. The theme, or thesis, of the sermon is stated in a con­ 
cise declarative sentence which is usually called the "propo­ 
sition". Then that proposition is supported by several lines 
of argument, or else its practical applications to various 
phases of life are made, in the several divisions which con­ 
stitute the "body", or "discussion", of the sermon. In the 
conclusion, the various points of the discussion are summa­ 
rized, and perhaps an appeal, based on the discussion of the 
proposition, is made to the audience.
However, while it is perhaps valid to say that this 
deductive procedure is the more typical one, the inductive 
approach which characterizes the procedure of the problem- 
solving discussion is not entirely novel to homiletics. The 
five steps outlined by Elliott as the stages in the technique 
of group thinking may be used, and have been used for a long 
time, by preachers as one of several methods of arranging and
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presenting the material in sermons—especially sermons which 
are topical, rather than textual, in their arrangement, and 
more particularly in the case of those topical sermons which 
are apologetic and those which are ethical in their material.
In such a case, the subject of the sermon might 
most appropriately be indicated in the form of a question. 
The text might be read, but no weight would be put upon it 
at first. Likewise, no declarative statement of a proposition 
would be made at the beginning of the sermon. Rather, the 
preacher would begin by describing as interestingly as possible 
some aspects of contemporary life which indicate very clearly 
that there is a keenly felt difficulty confronting men and 
women. As a second step, he would locate and define that dif­ 
ficulty, probably citing some typical examples of it. In the 
third place, he would enumerate the possible solutions of 
the problem, or at any rate the several possible ways in which 
men may respond to the problem. Among those ways, of course, 
would be that one which the preacher believes to be the Chris­ 
tian way. When, among these possible ways, the Christian way 
has been shown to be the most desirable, it is stated in the 
form of a proposition, which is shown to be the essential 
thought of the text of the sermon, and its adoption, as a work­ 
ing basis of life, is then advocated in a concluding appeal.
Certain details in this procedure might be varied 
somewhat, of course, but fundamentally the steps in the 
thought process would be the same as those indicated by Elliott
138
for the problem-solving discussion. And to the extent that 
the preacher, in his development of the sermon, presented the 
thoughts and various points of view of different members of 
the audience; to the extent that he presented his reasoning 
in terms which the audience could appreciate, so that they 
were really thinking with him, and not just passively accept­ 
ing his conclusions; to that extent such a sermon might legi­ 
timately be called a piece of group thinking.
It is the contention of some contemporary writers 
in the field of homiletics that such an inductive approach 
in preaching is necessary in order to reach the "modern mind". 
Dr. Joseph Port Newton, for example, has stated the case for 
it at some length, as follows:
"As a matter of strategy, if for no other 
reason, the new preaching must be inductive in its 
emphasis and approach. Inevitably so, because the 
whole spirit and method of thought in our day is in­ 
ductive, and if we are to win the men of to-day to 
the truths of faith we must use the method by which 
they find truth in other fields. In the old days 
the text was a truth assumed to be true, and the 
preacher only needed to expound its meaning, deduce 
its lessons, and apply them. Often enough a text 
was a tiny peg from which a vast weight of theology 
depended, and so long as men accepted both the text 
and the theology all went well....But in an age of 
inquiry, when the authority of the Bible and the 
Church is questioned by so many, such an appeal does 
not carry conviction. We may wish it otherwise, but 
we must face the facts and be wise enough to win men 
on their own terms, remembering that we are persuad­ 
ers, not soldiers, fishers of men and not mere crit­ 
ics. Also, if by appeal to the facts of life we 
can show the truths of faith to be real, we have 
reestablished the authority of the Bible and the 
Church.
The inductive method is indispensable in 
teaching the genetic truths of faith, doubly so in 
an age when a spongy texture of mind deplores all 
dogma and loves disembodied ideas that float in va-
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pory phrases in the air, binding us to nothing 
positive* None the less....we must have a theo­ 
logy....else our faith will evaporate in a misty 
sentiment....But it asks for a fine strategy to 
make such a deep truth as the Trinity real to the 
mind of our day....If stated as sheer dogma, it 
wears the aspect of an arid formula, a queer mix­ 
ture of mysticism, metaphysics, and mathematics, 
as empty as it is unreal. But if treated induc­ 
tively, it is unveiled as one of the basic thought- 
forms of the mind of man in its attempt to Inter­ 
pret the life of God....
For some time I have been discussing 
the matter of inductive preaching with my English 
friends in letters....One of them sent me an ex­ 
ample of an inductive sermon so admirable that I 
venture to pass it along. The preacher wished to 
make a plea for single-heartedness in the service 
of God, taking for his text the words of Jesus, 
! Ye cannot serve God and mammon 1 . Had he used the 
old method, he would have stated the truth of the 
text as a proposition and gone straight to his de­ 
ductions, but he would not have carried his hear­ 
ers with him. Many men to-day, as all will agree, 
are unconvinced that such a double service is im­ 
possible.. . .The preacher may have the tongue of 
an angel, but he will not win men in that way who 
question the truth of his text at the outset.
By the inductive approach it is differ­ 
ent; it puts no weight on the text at first, but 
begins with near-by facts familiar to all, using 
popular illustrations. Is it not true that in fac­ 
tory life fatigue and weariness are common? Why? 
The mind is divided. In the same way, hours spent 
in pursuing a hobby--growing roses, say—even pro­ 
duces freshness of mind. Why? There is single- 
hearted enjoyment in the work. ! Why, this is truel 1 
is the unspoken verdict; the truth of the text is 
approved, not only as upon divine authority, but as 
a truth of experience. Having led his hearers on 
a tour of exploration, the preacher may now skill­ 
fully use a sense of Intellectual satisfaction as 
an opportunity to create a deep sense of spiritual 
dissatisfaction. Such a method seems to be the 
best in an age which has a peculiar bent toward 
discovery; and for the presentation of difficult 
or unpopular truth it is invaluable. It is a flank 
attack on the fortifications of prejudice, its most 
striking virtue being its element of surprise."^
1 The New Preaching, pp. 139-143.
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Dr. Newton follows this exposition of the inductive 
approach in preaching with the observation that Jesus himself 
was inductive in his approach, especially in speaking to the 
stranger, the doubter, and the sinner, and that the modern 
preacher cannot do better than adopt this strategy.•*•
With regard to this inductive approach in preaching, 
three observations may be made. First, to the extent that it 
is desirable for the thought process of sermons to conform 
as nearly as possible to the group-thinking pattern of the 
problem-solving discussion, it seems valid to say that this 
method of arranging and presenting the materials in sermons 
is the best. Secondly, there is little doubt that a large 
portion of the people who constitute religious audiences to­ 
day are quite sceptical in their attitude towards the ortho­ 
dox tenets of the Christian religion. They are not willing 
to assume that because a text comes from the Bible, it is 
therefore true, and that the preacher's only task is to ex­ 
pound its meaning and apply its lessons. This is especially 
true of university students and of the upper classes of so­ 
ciety in general. And the preacher can ill afford to ignore 
a method of preaching which is calculated to enlist their 
Interest and to persuade them to Christian belief and conduct. 
But, thirdly, there still remain the multitudes of more 
simple folk who require primarily the explication and appli­ 
cation of Christian doctrine. And it is still true that the 
greater problem of the minister in his preaching is not to 
1 Op. cit., pp. 143-144.
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convince audiences of the truth of those Christian teachings 
towards which they are sceptical, but to move them to act 
upon those teachings the truth of which they admit, but to­ 
wards the practical implications of which they are passively 
Indifferent. And even among the sceptical and sophisticated 
there is good reason to believe that many would welcome in 
the sermons they hear the note of authority which is more 
characteristic of the deductive than of the inductive approach. 
As Professor Vinet has aptly expressed it,
"The tone of true authority....is welcome 
to almost all men. Favour is assured beforehand to 
the men, who, in this world of inconstancy and per­ 
plexity, express themselves on a grave subject with 
conviction, and authority. This is even the first 
thing that strikes in an orator, and conciliates 
attention to him, especially when we see that he 
draws all his authority from his message, and not 
from himself, and that he is as modest as he is 
convinced. What was it that astonished the Jewish 
people in the doctrine of Jesus Christ? was it this 
doctrine itself? It was especially the authority 
with which Jesus Christ professed it: 'For He taught 1 , 
says St. Mathew, *as one having authority, and not 
as the scribes'. f| l
And so we conclude that, while this inductive ap­ 
proach in preaching undoubtedly offers the contemporary min­ 
ister a very useful variety, it by no means merits the en­ 
thusiasm which would incline one to displace with it all other 
methods of preaching.
Group Thinking and the 
Sermon-Forum.
We have seen that, without doing violence to the 
meaning of group thinking, the sermon, under certain clrcum- 
1 Homiletics, pp. 197-198.
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stances, may be legitimately considered to be one structural 
form of that social process, though as a form of group think­ 
ing it does not normally approach the high plane of the well- 
conducted problem-solving discussion. Something in that di­ 
rection is gained, however, when to the structure of the in­ 
ductive sermon situation there is added that of the forum. 
Perhaps the term "added" is somewhat misleading, for in this 
case there is not merely an addition of something without a 
significant modification of that towhich an addition is made. 
It is not unreasonable to assume that the response of members 
of an audience to a sermon would be more critical and reflec­ 
tive when they knew there was to be an opportunity for ask­ 
ing questions later, than when there was no such anticipation. 
And it is not improbable that the preacher 1 s care and thor­ 
oughness in the preparation of sermons, as well as his alert­ 
ness to subtle responses in the course of delivery, would be 
increased by the forum-factor.
Besides these effects, however, the forum structure 
facilitates group thinking by affording the opportunity for 
asking questions which could not be communicated either to 
the speaker or to other members of the audience by mere fa­ 
cial expressions. And, as one question or its answer raises 
another, the whole course of the thinking of the group may 
be turned in a new direction, lifted to a higher level, or 
otherwise guided towards a different conclusion. Of course, 
primarily the forum affords an opportunity for the elucidation
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of what has already been said in the sermon. Yet when it is 
remembered how easily new data may be introduced through a 
question, or how readily a whole train of positive argument 
may be implied by a question, it is evident that the forum 
makes possible a type of thinking which at least approaches 
in value the group thinking of the problem-solving discussion.
In his book entitled What is Christian Education?, 
Professor G. A. Coe implies that present techniques of preach­ 
ing, from the standpoint of Christian education, are practi­ 
cally a failure. As he visualizes the preaching of the fu­ 
ture,-1- it will be very much after the form of the sermon- 
forum, or the problem-solving discussion. The sermon itself 
will be designed primarily to present facts and clarify is­ 
sues with regard to moral and religious problems. The period 
which follows the sermon will then be devoted to a free dis­ 
cussion of the possible solutions of the problem, with a view 
to reaching some collective belief or course of action which 
will represent, not mere passive assent, and not the unwil­ 
ling surrender of the minority, but a sort of synthetic con­ 
clusion which is the product of the interactions of the va­ 
rious minds in the group as they think together.
It must be granted that the normal sermon situation 
is not calculated to produce in the group the vigorous think­ 
ing, the clear understanding, and the strong volition that 
may be produced in the forum or the group discussion. What 
Professor Drever has said of collective teaching in the class- 
1 Pp. 214-225.
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room is equally true of preaching in the usual way, when view­ 
ed from an educational standpoint; it "tends to produce the 
type of mind which we call »flabby*, with a lack of initiative 
and independence of thought. 11 ^- The chief reason for this re­ 
sult, as Dr. Drever points out, is that the group functions 
largely at the perceptive level.
It seems, therefore, highly desirable that, with 
certain types of topics, the forum element, if not also the 
problem-solving discussion, be added to the sermon. This 
technique might be of inestimable value in considering Chris­ 
tian attitudes, policies, and practices in relation to such 
subjects as war and peace between nations, the race question, 
certain industrial problems, and the like. It has been found 
to be very profitable by a number of ministers who have tried 
it with their congregations on certain occasions. But that 
this procedure should entirely displace the normal technique, 
so that the minister becomes just a glorified chairman of an 
ecclesiastical seminar, is well nigh inconceivable. As an 
integral part of an order of worship, and not merely an in­ 
strument for the education of the religious audience, there 
is still room for sermons which are neither inductive in 
their treatment nor of the nature of introductory lectures to 
forums or group discussions.
1 Op. cit., p. 219.
"Mind is an organic whole made up of coop­ 
erating individualities, in somewhat the same 
way that the music of an orchestra is made up 
of divergent but related sounds. No one would 
think it necessary or reasonable to divide the 
music into two kinds, that made by the whole 
and that of particular instruments, and no more 
are there two kinds of mind, the social mind 
and the individual mind. When we study the so­ 
cial mind we merely fix our attention on larg­ 
er aspects and relations rather than on the 
narrower ones of ordinary psychology."--G. H. 
Cooley.
CHAPTER VIII.
THE GROUP MIND AND THE RE­ 
LIGIOUS AUDIENCE
In his Yale lectures on preaching, Dr. Charles E. 
Jefferson makes a protest that embodies a view of the reli­ 
gious audience which we are to consider in this chapter. He 
says,
"Some ministers take hold of a church 
as though it were a lump of putty or a piece of 
wood to be shaped at their will. They do not 
give it credit for having a soul of its own. 
They begin at once to reorganize IT.. ..The new 
minister does not know that the church has a 
disposition and temperament of its own, that 
Its personality is as distincT and solid as his, 
that it is an organl^n with traditions which are 
sacrecPand" customs which are hallowed, with no­ 
tions and whims that must be respected, and with 
idiosyncrasies which cannot safely be ignored."1
What Dr. Jefferson and many others have noted with 
regard to a religious congregation has been observed also 
with regard to many other varieties of groups* We speak 
frequently of such groups as families, universities, clubs, 
tribes, nations, and races as if they were organisms with 
capacities of thinking, feeling, and willing as units. Car­ 
toonists portray Great Britain as "John Bull", and America 
as "Uncle Sam", and both of them have rather definite mental 
characteristics which personify the respective groups they 
represent.
The Place of the Group Mind in 
Social Psychology.
While such popular ways of regarding groups have 
1 The Building of the Church, p. 13. Italics mine.
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been condemned by some social psychologists1 as mere "glit­ 
tering generalities" which are of no scientific value, by 
others they have been taken seriously as a cue to a valid 
approach to the psychological study of social groups. Such 
studies have made familiar the concept of the "group mind", 
although the meaning of that concept is by no means standard­ 
ized, and the validity of it can hardly be considered estab­ 
lished among the majority of reputable psychologists. Prof­ 
essor E. D. Martin contends that if the concept of a group 
mind is valid, then social psychology should give its whole 
attention to the analysis and description of the mind of the 
particular group being studied. But, after a scathing criti­ 
cism of the concept in one of its interpretations,^ he con­ 
cludes that
"this group mind either means that there is a 
psychological entity which is exclusive of in­ 
dividual psyches and yet includes them, or it 
means that for certain purposes individual dif­ 
ferences may be ignored and we may speak of col­ 
lective behaviour as the behaviour of the col­ 
lectivity. In the first case, the group mind 
is a mystical concept, and in the second it is 
tautological." 3
Of course, if the concept is not valid, it should 
be dismissed, though one feels that it deserves a more sym­ 
pathetic consideration than Dr. Martin has given it. But 
if it is valid, Dr. Martin's conclusion does not necessarily 
follow, that "social psychology should give its whole atten­ 
tion to the analysis and description of the mind of the par-
1 Dunlap, K., in Psychologies of 1925, p. 363, for example.
2 That of McDougall, in The Group Mind.
3 Psychology, p. 182.
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ticular group being studied". There is value in the study 
of the social aspects of individual behaviour in the group 
situation, and there is value in the study of the behaviour 
of the group viewed as a unit. The two approaches are not 
mutually exclusive; the one supplements the other.^ And, 
while for some purposes it may be desirable to take one ap­ 
proach rather than the other, for our purpose it has seemed 
most profitable to emphasize the first approach, as we have 
done in the foregoing chapters, but also to consider briefly 
in this chapter the religious audience from the point of view 
of the group mind.
Representative Meanings of the Group Mind.
As was intimated above, even among the writers who 
consider the group mind to be a valid concept for social psy­ 
chology, the meanings of the term and the methods of its 
study are not uniform. It will, therefore, clear the ground 
for our use of the term if we consider briefly three repre­ 
sentative meanings and methods of studyS—those of Durkheim, 
Wundt, and McDougall.
M. &iile Durkheim and M. Le'vy-Bruhl are the out­ 
standing representatives of an important French school of
1 Of. McDougall, Op. cit«, Preface to the second American 
edition, pp. x-xi.
2 S. Freud, in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the 
Ego, presents a fourth interpretation which is distincTive~7 
but which we are omitting from consideration on two grounds:
(1) He has confused the normal group with the psychological 
crowd to such an extent that a very lengthy discussion would 
be required in order merely to clarify that confusion, and
(2) Criticism of his interpretation of the group mind would 
involve a criticism of the fundamental concepts of his whole 
system of psychology—a task of too wide a scope for us to 
undertake here, and one which has been recently done by Prin­ 
cipal Hughes in his book The New Psychology and Religious Ex­ 
perience. —
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social psychology, the chief organ of which is & Annee £o- 
ciologique* While they represent fundamentally the same point 
of view,1 we shall confine ourselves to a consideration of 
Durkheim f s treatment of the group mind. The key word in his 
system is "representations", which are of two kinds--indivi­ 
dual and collective. In the individual, sensations are the 
ultimate constituents of all mental states and mental struc­ 
tures. Sensations are compounded with other existing sensa­ 
tions to form images, which are purely psychic. Images, in 
turn, compound to form concepts, and concepts to form repre­ 
sentations, which are the most important constituents of the 
individual mind. But in the group, two or more of these in­ 
dividual representations are capable of combining into a syn­ 
thesis which he calls "collective representations". However, 
such a fusion of individual representations is not the most 
important means of creating collective representations. For 
once collective representations are thus formed, they oppose, 
destroy, or fuse with one another, producing a still higher 
type of purely collective representation. An organization 
of collective representations, then, would constitute the 
group mind, the importance of which is indicated by Durkheim 
when he writes:
"Collective representations are the 
result of an immense co-operation, which stretch-
1 Le'vy-Bruhl 1 s best known works in social psychology are 
Le_- Fonctions Mentales dans les Societes Infe'rieures and La 
MentaTlte' Primitive.' Excellent criticisms of his distinctive 
views are to be round in Webb, C. C. J., Group Theories of 
Religion and the Individual, especially Ch. II; and BartTett, 
F. cT, Psychology and Primitive Culture, pp. 282-287.
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es out not only into space but into time as well; 
to make them, a multitude of minds have associated, 
united and combined their ideas and sentiments; 
for them, long generations have accumulated their 
experience and their knowledge. A special intel­ 
lectual activity is therefore concentrated in them 
which is infinitely richer and complexer than that 
of the individual. From that one can understand 
how the reason has been able to go beyond the li­ 
mits of empirical knowledge. It does not owe this 
to any vague mysterious virtue but simply to the 
fact that according to the well-known formula, man 
is double. There are two beings in him; an indi­ 
vidual being which has its foundation in the or­ 
ganism and the circle of whose activities is there­ 
fore strictly limited, and a social being which rep­ 
resents the highest reality in the intellectual 
and moral order that we can know by observation— 
I mean society....In so far as he belongs to so­ 
ciety, the individual transcends himself, both 
when he thinks and when he acts. n l
Thus it appears that, in Durkheim ! s view, mind is 
not so much a substance, or structure, as rather a body of 
impressions, ideas, or "representations". The individual 
mind consists of two areas, one of which comprises the rep­ 
resentations of the individual as such, the other being com­ 
posed of the individuals knowledge of collective represen­ 
tations. Because of their wider scope in time and space, and 
because of their position at the top of the psychic hierarchy, 
these collective representations are greatly superior to in-
n
dividual representations,* and in their organized form, as
1 The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, pp. 16-17.
2 In the extreme place gTven to the group in the deter­ 
mination of the behaviour of the individual, Durkheim 1 s po­ 
sition is comparable to that set forth by R. H. Wheeler in 
his eight "organismic laws": (1) Law of field properties: The 
whole is more than the sum of its parts; it possesses prop­ 
erties and exhibits behaviour which its parts, taken alone, do 
not exhibit. (2) Law of derived properties: Parts derive their 
properties from the whole. (3) Law of determined action: The 
whole governs the activities of its parts. (4) Law of indi-
150
the group mind, they are the primary material of social psy­ 
chology.
Professor Wilhelm Wundt's magnum opus on the group 
mind was his five-volume work, Polk Psychology. The fundamen­ 
tal differences between it and his later work, Elements of 
Polk Psychology, are two. The first work is a more exhaustive 
and analytical study in which he has taken what he calls "lon­ 
gitudinal sections" of community life, such as language, art, 
religion, etc., and traced the development of each in turn 
from its earliest appearance. The second work is not only 
less exhaustive, but it is also developed by a different method 
of study, based on the first work. Instead of taking "longi­ 
tudinal sections" of community life and tracing them in their 
historical development as if each had developed in isolation 
from the others, he takes "transverse sections" and traces the
development of such social phenomena as language, art and re-
2 ligion, in their inter-relations. Thus he finds four such
"transverse sections", or periods, which he studies—"primitive 
man", "the totemic age", "the age of heroes and gods", and 
the "development to humanity".
viduation: Parts emerge from wholes through a process of indi- 
vlduation. (5) Law of field genesis: In the process of evolu­ 
tion wholes evolve as wholes. (6) Law of least action: A body 
moves toward its remote end over the shortest route in time 
when energy is multiplied by time. (7) Law of maximum work: 
An energy system resists the disturbing Influences of outside 
forces. (8) Law of configuration: Any reaction of the human 
organism as a whole is a unified response to a total situation 
of some kind. If the response is directed specifically toward 
a detail of the total situation it is always made to that de­ 
tail in its relation to other details. Readings in Psychology, pp. 7-22. —!——————
1 Elements of Folk Psychology, p. 6.
2 Ibid., p. 7.
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Wundt seems to agree with Durkheim in considering 
mind in general as an aggregation, or combination, of psychic 
processes and psychic states, rather than as a substance in 
which psychic states inhere. But when he speaks of a group 
mind, he does not mean that the word "mind 11 is being used in 
exactly the same sense as in the expression "the individual 
mind". It is a conception which is looser in some respects, 
and more detailed in others. It leaves out of account all the 
individual conscious states which reflect the condition of in­ 
dividual bodies; but it includes the special conditions and 
properties which result from the collective living of many 
individuals. The conception of the group mind is especially 
characterized by the fact that it envisages the psychic con­ 
tinuity of the group without reference to the continual perish­ 
ing and replacement of the individual persons whose psychic 
states and processes supply the volume of the collective psy­ 
chic stream.
But, while Wundt and Durkheim agree in defining mind 
as a sum, or combination, of psychic processes and products, 
Durkheim 1 s conception is achieved by a more abstract develop­ 
ment than Wundt 1 s. As we saw, Durkheim 1 s group mind is an 
organization of representations—primarily an intellectual con­ 
cept. In Wandt»s conception, however, there is no exclusive 
emphasis on ideation as the process or product constituting 
the group mind. He concentrates on speech, myth, and custom 
as the chief external deposits and products of the collective
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mind's representations, feelings, and will, respectively. To
him these are the proper materials for the study of the group 
mind of a community of any kind.
In his conception of the relation between the psy­ 
chology of the group and the psychology of the individual, we 
may let Wundt speak for himself:
"Thus, then, in the analysis of the high­ 
er mental processes, folk psychology is an indis­ 
pensable supplement to the psychology of individual 
consciousness. Indeed, in the case of some ques­ 
tions the latter already finds itself obliged to 
fall back on the principles of folk psychology. 
Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that just 
as there can be no folk community apart from in­ 
dividuals who enter into reciprocal relations with­ 
in it, so also does folk psychology, in turn, pre­ 
suppose individual psychology, or, as it is usually 
called, general psychology. The former, however, 
is an important supplement to the latter, providing 
principles for the interpretation of the more com­ 
plicated processes of individual consciousness. !! ^
Professor McDougall protests against the procedure 
of attempting to arrive at an understanding of the individu­ 
al by studying first the nature of society and then the In­ 
fluence of society upon him, as if the human organism were 
at birth the tabula rasa which Locke postulated. Rather, he 
contends that man is "an organism with strong inborn tenden­ 
cies which lead him not only to conform to social pressures, 
but also to react against them, to struggle to preserve his 
unique individuality in spite of all they can do 11 . 2 Dr. 
McDougall 1 s Introduction to Social Psychology was the prac­ 
tical expression of this conviction, for in that work he des-
1 Op. cit., p. 3.
2 TEe Group Mind, preface to second Amer. ed., p.
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cribes the innate constitution of man as a foundation for his 
later work, The Group Mind* But he recognizes that the group 
cannot be fully and accurately interpreted in terms only of the 
psychology of the individuals composing it. For, by virtue of 
its past history, the group as such has positive qualities 
which it does not derive from the units which compose it at 
any one time, and it therefore acts upon its units in a way 
that is very different from the way in which the units them­ 
selves interact with one another. Moreover, by becoming a mem­ 
ber of the group, each unit displays modes of reaction which 
it does not display as long as it remains outside that group. 
As he himself expresses it,
"The society has a mental life which is 
not the mere sum of the mental lives of its units 
existing as independent units; and a complete know­ 
ledge of the units, if and in so far as they could 
be known as isolated units, would not enable us to 
deduce the nature of the life of the whole, in the 
way that is implied by Spencer's analogies." 1
Thus Dr. McDougall would avoid the two extremes of attempting 
either to interpret the individual entirely in terms of soci­ 
ety, or to interpret society entirely in terms of the indivi­ 
dual. 2
Mind is defined by him as "an organized system of 
mental or purposive forces; and, in the sense so defined ev-
1 Ibid., p. 10.
2 "We must study society, and also the individual in ab­ 
straction from society; and then we must study the interplay 
between society and individual; in that way, and in that way 
only, can we hope to arrive at an understanding of group life 
as a constant interplay between the group mind and the minds 
of the individual." Ibid., preface to second Amer. ed., p.
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ery highly organized human society may properly be said to 
possess a collective mind." 1
McDougall agrees with both Wimdt and Durkheim. in de­ 
nying independent substantiality to the group mind, although 
each of them speaks of the group mind at times as if it were 
some tertium quid, some mystical entity, which exists apart 
from, and independent of, the minds of the individuals compos­ 
ing the group. But that McDougall 1 s concept is not that of a 
separate and independent entity could not be made clearer than 
when he writes:
"The group mind and the developed indi­ 
vidual mind are correlatives; neither can exist 
without the other; and the group mind exists only 
within the various individual mTnds and is in each 
one in so far as the structure of each one has been 
moulded by the life of the group. Each member of 
the group so moulded bears within him some part of 
the group mind, some socially moulded mental struc­ 
ture which is a part of the total structure of the 
group mind. And the total activity of the group 
mind is the interplay of all these mutually adjust­ 
ed parts." 2
Evaluation of These Representative Mean­ 
ings in Relation to the Purpose of 
this Paper.
The chief difference between the three conceptions 
of the group mind which we have thus briefly summarized is 
a difference of emphasis which leads each author to a dif­ 
ferent method of study. In Durkheim 1 s view, we have seen that 
the chief emphasis is on the cognitive aspect of group life--
1 op. cit«, p. 13. This definition of mind has been severe* 
ly criticized by R. M. Maciver, E. D. Martin, and others. The 
more serious of these criticisms, we think, are quite adequate­ 
ly answered by Dr. McDougall in a lengthy discussion on pages 
13-28 of the second American edition of his book.
2 Ibid,, preface to second Amer. ed., p. xi. Italics mine.
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ideation. Hence, his method is to study the origin and devel­ 
opment of "collective representations" in group life. In Dr. 
McDougall»s view, the emphasis is primarily on the conative 
aspect. Consequently, in his study more attention is given 
to the ways in which groups act.^ in Wundt's view, cognitive, 
affective, and conative aspects of group life seem to receive 
about equal emphasis, but because he restricts himself to the 
study of the products, or deposits, of collective life, his 
method is adapted only to the study of groups which have had 
a long existence, such as tribes or nations, or to the study of 
very sharply differentiated contemporary groups on the basis 
of relatively meagre mental products as materials.
Prom the point of view, then, of our study of the 
typical religious audience, it would be necessary for a spe­ 
cific audience, or congregation, to be designated before any 
profitable study could be made of its group mind. In that case, 
the method of Durkheim would yield valuable clues as to the 
ideas, the beliefs, the concepts of a particular congregation, 
most of which it would be found to share with other congrega­ 
tions of the same denomination, nationality, and race. The 
method of Wundt would be profitable in studying the culture 
of the race, the nationality, the sect, and perhaps certain 
aspects of the culture of the particular community in which 
the congregation was located. But, on the whole, Dr. McDougall»s
1 It should be stated explicitly that neither Durkheim nor 
McDougall entirely omits from consideration in his study of the 
group mind the other aspects of psychological processes, it 
is intended here only to Indicate their respective points of 
emphasis.
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method appears to be decidedly the most valuable one for the 
preacher to attempt to use In the study of the group mind of 
a particular congregation, for, though it be valid to say 
that he emphasizes the conative aspects of the group mind, 
he certainly recognizes the significance of group sentiments, 
symbols, customs, and traditions.
Since our purpose in studying the group mind is 
primarily pragmatic, we may join Dr. McDougall in his prag­ 
matic justification of his concept of the group mind^ and in­ 
dicate somewhat more in detail the significance of the group 
mind of a religious congregation to the preacher, the more 
important aspects of it which he needs to study, and some 
further bearings of the group mind on his preaching.
Conditions of the Formation of 
a Group Mind.
While it is probably true that the rudiments of a 
group mind are present in any human group whose members have 
anything at all in common which could be called mental, for 
a group mind to be formed which is of much practical signifi­ 
cance, three conditions must be fulfilled. There must be a 
common object of mental activity, a common mode of feeling,
and some degree of reciprocal influence between the members
Q 
of the group. These conditions, as we shall see in the next
chapter, are necessary even for the formation of a psycholog­ 
ical crowd.
1 "in this book it will be maintained that the conception 
of a group mind is useful and therefore valid." Op. cit., 
pp. 11-12. ——
2 Ibid., p. 33.
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In addition to those essential conditions of any 
collective mental activity, there are at least five other con­ 
ditions which are of great importance in raising collective 
mental action above the level of the unorganized crowd, and 
which make possible the formation of a group mind which is of 
real significance. The basic condition is some degree of con­ 
tinuity of existence. It may be material continuity, with 
the same individuals constituting the group during a relative­ 
ly long period of time; or, it may be formal continuity, with 
the various positions in the organization of the group contin­ 
uing while the membership in the group is changing. In most 
highly organized groups both forms will be present to a high 
degree. Both are present in the congregation as a group, but 
the extent to which they vary in different congregations has 
an observable effect on the group minds of those congregations 
which is of concern to the minister. A congregation in a rel­ 
atively stable community is most likely to have a group mind 
which is decidedly conservative and resistant to changes of 
doctrine or custom, because it is a group with a high degree 
of both material and formal continuity. On the other hand, 
a congregation in an industrial centre, such as an American 
railroad town, while it will have formal continuity, is likely 
not to have a high degree of material continuity. The lay 
membership of the group is transient. The personnel of the 
group is constantly changing. And there may even be a differ­ 
ent minister every two or three years. 
1 Op. cit., p. 69.
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The significance of these varying degrees of formal
and material continuity becomes still more evident in its re­ 
lation to the second condition--"that in the minds of the mass 
of the members of the group there shall be formed some adequate 
idea of the group, of its nature, composition, functions, and 
capacities, and of the relations of the individuals to the 
group11 . It is the fulfilment of this condition which chief­ 
ly fosters the development of a strong sentiment for the 
group, without which the group itself cannot function most 
efficiently. In the case of a congregation, however, not only 
must the efficiency of the group be kept in mind as an end to 
be ac>i eved, but also the effect of the group sentiments on 
the characters of the individual members. It does not always 
mean the same thing, in terms of the building of Christian 
character, to say that the members of a certain congregation 
have a strong sentiment of loyalty to the church* Much depends 
upon the idea of the church which is the object of that senti­ 
ment of loyalty. And, in view of the relatively large number 
of sermons which the minister preaches, or should preach, with 
a view to building up in the members of the congregation Chris­ 
tian sentiments for the group (the koinonia), it behoves him 
to have regard, not merely for the efficiency of the group as 
such (in the amount of contributions, regularity of attendance 
on services, etc.), but also for the effect of such group sen­ 
timents on the developing Christian characters of the members.
1 Op. cit., p. 69.
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A third condition favourable to the development of 
a group mind is "the interaction (especially in the form of 
conflict and rivalry) of the group with other similar groups 
animated by different traditions and customs".1 It is doubt­ 
ful whether this should be considered as a separate condition, 
coordinate with the others, or whether it is merely one spe­ 
cific means of fulfilling the second condition mentioned a- 
bove, for its chief significance in relation to the group mind 
is that it produces in the group a more sharply defined self- 
knowledge and a stronger self-sentiment. Nevertheless, it is 
a condition which is worthy of being noted.
The preaching of polemic sermons immediately appears 
to be one of the most effective means at the disposal of the 
preacher for fulfilling this condition. But, while this is 
not the place for a general discussion of polemic sermons,^ 
it may be said that usually the values which controversial 
preaching contributes to the group mind of a congregation are 
neutralized by the distorted conceptions of, and the ill feel­ 
ings towards, the rival group, or groups, against which such 
sermons are preached. Ideals, purposes, customs, and tradi­ 
tions which the rival groups have in common are frequently neg­ 
lected in such sermons, and relatively minor differences are 
magnified out of their due proportion. By this means a more 
vigorous and wilful group mind may be formed, to be sure, but
1 Op. clt., p. 70.
2 Very sane general discussions of polemic sermons are to 
be found in Broadus, Preparation and Delivery of Sermons, pp. 
65-67; Johnson, Ideal~linistry,~pp. 555-554; Vinet, Homi'letics, 
pp. 57-59; and Hardman, 0. (Ed.), Psychology and the 
pp. 169-172.
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there is real danger that it may not be such as could be cal­ 
led "the mind of Christ".
The fourth and fifth conditions may best be treated 
together in their relation to preaching. They are, first, "the 
existence of a body of traditions and customs and habits in the 
minds of the members of the group determining their relations 
to one another and to the group as a whole", and secondly, "the 
organization of the group, consisting in the differentiation 
and specialization of the functions of its constituents—the 
individuals and classes or groups of individuals within the 
group." 1
It will be recalled that in Chapter II the religious 
audience was classified as a "mixed group", there being in it 
elements both purposive and traditional. Whether these two ele­ 
ments are proportionately represented in the group mind of a 
particular congregation will depend largely upon three factors.
To some extent, the nature of the organization it­ 
self will tend to determine the character of the group mind in 
this respect. One has but to observe the contrasts between a 
Roman Catholic congregation and an American "left-wing" Unita­ 
rian congregation to realize the significance of this factor. 
In the one case every provision is made in the organization 
for the perpetuation of traditional customs, while in the other 
the organization Is designed primarily for the emphasis of the 
purposive elements in religion, with little concern for the 
traditional.
1 Op. cit., p. 70.
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But even within the same type of formal organization, 
one congregation may be predominantly traditional in its men­ 
tal characteristics, while another is primarily purposive, be­ 
cause of the differences between the individual lay leaders 
who hold positions of influence in the respective organizations. 
In this manner, it is quite possible, and frequently observa­ 
ble, that two congregations in the same community, and of the 
same denomination, may have very different group minds, while 
functioning through practically identical formal organizations.
Of more influence, perhaps, than either of these fac­ 
tors is the minister himself. By his choice and treatment of 
sermon subjects, by his conduct of public worship, by his ad­ 
ministration of sacraments, and by his influence in the admin­ 
istration of the affairs of the congregation, in countless ways 
he helps to determine whether the mind of the group shall be 
one which is primarily traditional, primarily purposive, or a 
proportionately blended mixture of the two.
Thus is linked up with the ministers part in the 
formation of a group mind in the congregation a tendency which 
was pointed out at the end of Chapter III--the tendency of min­ 
isters to conform either to the prophetic or to the priestly 
type. And all the more evident, in light of our discussion a- 
bove, should be the desirability of a minister 1 s combining, 
not only in his sermons, but also in his whole personality and 
in every aspect of his ministerial leadership, the spirit and 
functions of both prophet and priest.
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The Affective Aspect of the Group Mind.
In discussing the place of sympathy in the religious 
audience (Chapter VI), we considered briefly the significance 
of the group spirit in the religious audience and indicated 
five means of creating and maintaining esprit de corps—the 
employment of common interests clothed in the robes of the 
ideal, conflict and rivalry, discipline and self-sacrifice, se­ 
crecy or publicity, and symbolism. We saw then what are some 
of the effects of the group spirit on the character of the in­ 
dividual, and how, through the process of sympathy, the affec­ 
tive aspect of the experience of group members is diffused 
through the group.
Viewing the religious audience as a unit, and thinking 
in terms of the group mind, it becomes evident now that these 
diffused feelings constitute the affective aspect of the group 
mind. When these common feelings are organized about some ob­ 
ject, or idea, we then have what we may call a collective sen­ 
timent. And when the object of such a sentiment is the group 
itself, there is formed that part of the group mind which is 
of paramount importance both to the group as a unit, and to 
the individuals composing it. For it is no mere fanciful ana­ 
logy to say that what sentiments are to the character and be­ 
haviour of the individual, collective sentiments are to the 
character and behaviour of the group. When there is an emotion­ 
ally charged idea of the whole which is present to the mind of 
each member, there is created a "we" feeling which is product-
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tive of loyalty to the group. McDougall has described its sig­ 
nificance to an army1 and to savage life. 2 Canon Raven has in­ 
dicated its effect on a battalion on the eve of action. On its 
relation to the religious congregation, Jefferson has devoted 
the larger part of his Yale lectures on preaching. 4
As Dr. McDougall has so clearly pointed out, the 
group spirit is the great socializing agency which raises the 
conduct of the individual above the plane of pure egoism and 
motivates him to "think and care and work for others as well 
as for himself".5 The self-regarding sentiment of the individu­ 
al becomes extended to the group and the same motives which 
prompt him to seek his own welfare, prompt him also to seek the 
welfare of the group for which he has a sentiment of loyalty.
Another characteristic of the group sentiment should 
be noted because of its place in the life of a congregation and 
its relation to the minister's work as a preacher. It is pos­ 
sible for an individual to share the sentiments of more than 
one group, if their natures and aims do not bring them into 
conflict, and it is even possible that a sort of hierarchy of 
group sentiments may be formed for a system of groups in which 
each larger group includes the lesser. Each group is thus made 
the object of the extended self-sentiment in a way which in­ 
cludes the sentiment for the lesser group in that for the lar­ 
ger. 6 It seems to be the contention of some that such an ex-
1 Op. cit., pp. 87-92.
2 lTDld~PP. 93-97.
3 The Creator Spirit, p. 180.
4 fEe Building of the Church, especially Chap. II.
5 Up7 cit., pT TTO.
6 C7. Jefferson, op. cit., pp, 59-63; McDougall, op. cit 
pp. 112-115. — ——"
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tension of group sentiments is normal, if not Inevitable, and
that it constitutes the dynamic of the Christian fellowship of 
the church. Thus, Dr. Jefferson protests that when the min­ 
ister accepts it as his primary task to train a congregation 
in the love of Christian fellowship, he is not dwarfing their 
affections or curtailing the range of their sympathies. For, 
he continues,
"Affections are most surely enriched and 
strengthened only when cultivated in narrow fields. 
It is the man who loves his own wife as he loves no 
other woman, who comes to take a chivalric attitude 
to all women everywhere. By his love for one woman 
he grows into a widening appreciation of the dignity 
and beauty of womanhood. It is the father who loves 
his own children as he loves no others, whose af­ 
fections go out farthest toward all boys and girls . 
. . • It is the man who has come into fellowship 
with his brother men in his own Church who is most 
likely to come into right relations with men who 
have no connection with organized Christianity. . . 
. The church of Jesus is established for the express 
purpose of kindling the fire of love. Sermons are a 
part of the fuel by which the fire is nourished."!
Thus love which is strong in the smaller group reaches out to 
embrace successively larger groups until it finally embraces 
the whole human race. Now, it may or may not be true that 
the formation of such a hierarchy of group sentiments is In­ 
evitable, but certainly it is possible, and its possibility 
brings into bold relief one of the visions which should be a 
challenge and an inspiration to the minister in his work as a
preacher.
Summary of Practical Applications.
Without making a detailed recapitulation of all the 
1 Op. cit., pp. 59-60.
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specific applications of this brief study of the group mind 
which have been indicated in the discussion, we may summarize 
them under three heads.
Since knowing the audience is almost as Important 
in the speech situation as knowing one*s subject, it is highly 
desirable that the preacher endeavour to know his audience, 
not only in terms of the individuals who compose it (though 
that certainly is essential), but also in terms of the organ­ 
ized system of mental forces which is the product of the men­ 
tal interactions of group life. That is to say, he needs a 
telescopic, as well as a microscopic, knowledge of the audience, 
Undoubtedly most thoughtful ministers, in the course of their 
pulpit, pastoral, and administrative work in a congregation, 
generalize their observations with regard to the "mind", "char­ 
acter", or "personality" of that congregation. Such generali­ 
zations describe for the preacher the group mind to which he 
must address his sermons, and to the extent that his generali­ 
zations are accurate, they must surely serve as a guiding in­ 
fluence to him in the preparation and delivery of sermons—• 
unless he has failed to cultivate the homiletical habit of au­ 
dience-consciousness1 in his preaching. But it seems valid, 
in light of our study of the group mind in this chapter, to 
say that more accurate and more practically useful knowledge 
of the group mind of a particular congregation could be acquir­ 
ed by the preacher if he set about the task of studying it in 
1 Of. Black, J., Mystery of Preaching, pp. 39-41.
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a more thorough and systematic way than by merely generaliz­ 
ing his casual observations.
If he knows to relate them to the group mind of the 
congregation, some of the disciplines prescribed in the courses 
of study for the ministerial student In his formal education 
should give him certain insights into the group mind of the 
religious audience—disciplines, for example, like national 
history, ecclesiastical history, the history of literature, 
historical dogmatics, Biblical history, and the psychology of 
religion. Such studies as Professor H. E. Luccock f s Jesus 
and the American Mind, Dr. Neibuhr's Social Origin of Denomi­ 
nations, and Professor Gardner 1 s The Modern Mind^ would help 
one in the understanding of the group mind of a particular 
congregation. And, while surveys are sometimes exceedingly 
barren, it seems not unlikely that a survey might be devised 
which would supply the minister with information about certain 
aspects of the mind of a congregation. But, whatever the means 
employed, for the most effective preparation and delivery of 
sermons the minister would profit by the knowledge of his au­ 
dience which is to be gained from viewing it as a group mind.
However, the minister does not seek to know his au­ 
dience as an end in itself. Rather, such knowledge is a means
•
to the end that, in his preaching, as in other phases of his 
ministry, the preacher may develop in his people a Christian 
group mind. In a chapter on "Building Moods and Tempers", Dr. 
Jefferson writes:
1 Chap. XIV in his book, Psychology and Preaching.
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"A congregation possesses a disposition as pro­ 
nounced and characteristic as that of any of its 
members. This disposition must be moulded by the 
preacher. The moulding process passes through 
its most critical stages in the hours of public 
worship. The preacher is not simply an instruct­ 
or, he is a fashioner of character, a maker of 
those moods and tempers which give character its 
bent and sinew. He is a builder, and his busi­ 
ness is to construct a frame of mind."l
This involves the persuasion of the group to accept Christian 
beliefs and to practice Christian acts, but especially does 
it involve the formation and development of Christian senti­ 
ments. The technique by means of which sentiments are devel­ 
oped was described in Chapter IV. It suffices at this point, 
therefore, merely to note its relation to the group mind.
In this process of developing the Christian group 
mind, the minister does not grasp the ideal function of preach­ 
ing if he thinks of his relation to the congregation in terms 
of that of the potter who moulds the clay, or even that of the 
gardener who cultivates the flower. The sermon is more than 
a tool in the hands of the preacher by means of which he may 
do something to the congregation. At its best, preaching is 
a function of the group mind--the preacher's voice being the 
mechanism through which the sermon becomes audible. His place 
in the group is strategic, to be sure, and his contribution 
to the product is proportionately large. But the product is 
still a synthetic one, emerging from the interaction of all 
the minds in the group. What Aristotle has said of speech in 
general is all the more true of the sermon—that it is "com- 
1 Op. cit., pp. 119-120.
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posed of three elements, viz. the speaker, the subject of the 
speech, and the persons addressed", 1 We have seen no better 
description of this ideal than that of Canon Raven, when he 
writes of the preacher:
"For his work, like all others, he must prepare him­ 
self, collecting, arranging, digesting the material 
for his sermon; but his medium is not merely argu­ 
ment or gesture; it is his own whole personality. 
He must not talk about his subject, so much as live 
it; an objective presentation, as in a lecture or 
statement, is insufficient; for he is not aiming 
at the information of his hearers 1 minds so much 
as at the more subtle and permeating transmission 
of his personal experience to them. Words and phra­ 
ses, emphasis and delivery, are only the technique; 
even the scheme and contents of his discourse are 
only the means to its central purpose: he is to 
impart a sharing of the Spirit, and that cannot be 
done except by the activity of his whole and inte­ 
grated self in contact with their selves. He must 
for the time be his sermon, giving himself, as grip­ 
ped and saturated by his ideal, to his audience, 
giving not merely ideas to their minds or emotions 
to their feelings, but person to person. To attain 
this, his study of his subject-matter and method 
must be succeeded by a period of collectedness and 
concentration, when he deliberately ceases to be 
concerned with technical matters and fixes his at­ 
tention solely upon his theme, upon God and God's 
people, shedding his self-consciousness and surren­ 
dering his critical detachment, throwing himself, 
as we say, into his subject unreservedly. When 
this is accomplished, he can liberate and make a- 
vailable a real creative power, welding together 
the members of his congregation and enabling them 
with himself to apprehend their common ideal. The 
analogy of the conductor of an orchestra is perhaps 
the simplest and closest, though all representative 
activity will supply a parallel. The conductor has 
his score, which, like the preacher's knowledge of 
God, is an approximate rendering of the reality: 
he has to convey his Interpretation to his fellows 
that they may together, each in his own function, 
realize the master's purpose and express it in his
music or worship. If a perfect result is to be at­ 
tained, each must be inspired by the task to which
1 Rhetoric of Aristotle, p. 22.
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each contributes, and the band must act as one in its 
execution. 11 ^
In the practical experience of the minister, such a high ideal 
as that which Canon Raven has described may not be reached 
very often, but when it is even approximated, there is the 
consciousness that the group mind of a congregation has aspir­ 
ed once again to a more complete fellowship with God in a more 
complete and enriched brotherhood of man.
1 Op. cit., pp. 175-174.
"Each new convert is sometimes vulgarly 
called by revivalists another star in the 
crowns which they will wear in the future 
life. If there were only power of discrim­ 
ination, they would see that their success 
in dragging many so-called converts into 
the whirl of excitement, hypnotising them, 
and leaving them empty afterward, is more 
fitly likened to the triumph of a man of 
prowess who wears scalps of victims as tro­ 
phies. fl --E. D. Starbuck.
CHAPTER IX.
THE ABNORMAL RELIGIOUS AUDIENCE: 
CROWD PSYCHOLOGY AND RE­ 
LIGIOUS REVIVALS.
Following the conviction expressed in Chapter II 
that in social psychology the crowd should be regarded as 
an abnormal social group, we have thus far been dealing only 
with the psychology of the normal religious audience. For 
it is almost inevitable that a distorted conception of au­ 
dience psychology is formed when it is approached from the 
standpoint of the psychology of the crowd. One would not ex­ 
pect to gain from the observation and study of the behaviour 
of a hypnotic a valid interpretation of the way in which 
people behave under normal conditions. Neither should we ex­ 
pect from the study of crowds to gain a valid interpretation 
of the psychology of a normal audience. Inhibitions play an 
important part in the conduct of man, and when his normal in­ 
hibitions are blocked, or broken down, he becomes decidedly a 
different man. This difference is very similar to the differ­ 
ence between the normal group and the psychological crowd.
When we were classifying the typical religious au­ 
dience (Chapter II), it was noted that in the case of certain 
Intense types of religious revivals, the preacher's audience 
belonged to a classification different from its usual one. 
Such an observation might seem to indicate that the study of 
religious revivals does not fall within the scope of this pa-
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per. However, in view of the importance of preaching in re­ 
vivalism, and in light of the influence which the technique 
of revival preaching has sometimes exerted on general homi- 
letical practice, if not on the theory as expounded in recog­ 
nized text-books on the subject, it is felt that a study of the 
abnormal religious audience, as it is found in the more intense 
revivalism, should be made, and its bearing on homiletics in­ 
dicated.
Outstanding Works on Crowd Psychology.
Considerable careful study has been made of the psy­ 
chology of crowds. Among the outstanding major works are 
those already mentioned^- by Le Bon, Trotter, Conway, McDougall, 
and Martin. In addition to these major works, there are brief­ 
er treatments in most of the text-books on social psychology, 
in works on public speaking and preaching (Scott, Psychology of 
Public Speaking; and Gardner, Psychology and Preaching, for 
example), works on the psychology of religion (Davenport, 
Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals; Pratt, Religious Con­ 
sciousness; Cutten, Psychological Phenomena of Christianity; 
Dimond, The Psychology of the Methodist Revival; Grimshaw, 
The Psychology of Revivals2 ), and works on advertising (such 
as Bernays, Propaganda; Poffenberger, Psychology in Advertis­ 
ing; and Scott, The Psychology of Advertising).
In general, these expositions of crowd psychology 
differ in four respects. In view of the different schools of 
psychology represented among the authors, it is inevitable 
that there should be a difference in the terminology used and
1 Chapter II.
2 A Ph. D. thesis. 1933, University of Edinburgh.
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the psychological mechanisms employed to explain the various
crowd phenomena. Le Bon, for example, employs the mechanisms 
of the "unconscious 11 , the "collective mind", "contagion", and 
"suggestion". Martin agrees with Le Bon on the significance 
of the "unconscious", but rejects the concepts of "the collec­ 
tive mind", "contagion", and "suggestion", employing for ex­ 
planatory purposes such terms as "complex", "compulsion neu­ 
rosis", "fixations". McDougall relies mostly on certain"in­ 
stincts", "emotions", "sentiments", "suggestion", "imitation", 
and "primitive sympathy" as his explanatory concepts. And 
writers like Bernard and Allport, of the behaviour!stic school, 
while they may use such terms as suggestion, imitation, and 
sympathy, depend primarily on their fundamental mechanism, the 
"conditioned response".
There is observable also certain differences of em­ 
phasis among the interpreters of crowd psychology. Trotter, 
for example, gives to "the herd instinct" an emphasis which 
is comparable to that placed on "imitation" by Tarde. Le Bon 
and McDougall lay great stress on the communication of ideas 
and emotions in the crowd, while Martin dismisses suggestion, 
imitation, and sympathy, as being of very little significance 
in the psychology of the crowd.
While all these writers contend explicitly that the 
crowd is not a mere aggregation of people, but that a peculiar 
psychic change must happen to a group of people before they 
become a crowd, nevertheless, McDougall seems to be the only
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one who is carefully consistent in the restricted use of the 
term "crowd". Le Bon makes the crowd practically synonymous 
with the masses before he has finished his treatise. Martin 
implies by his treatment that almost any organized group hav­ 
ing a "cause" to advance or an "ideal" to propagate, such as 
a sect, a political party, or a labour union, or even the 
readers of one newspaper, is a crowd. Trotter is interested 
in tracing his thesis through all kinds of groups, and so 
has no particular occasion to feel constrained to use the 
term crowd in its restricted sense; his interest is in the 
"herd", which includes crowds and other kinds of groups. But 
Conway uses the term with reference to almost every imaginable 
variety of group, so long as it is too large to assemble a- 
round one dining table. Prom the study of these authors 1 
works, probably more confusion arises from their injudicious 
use of the term "crowd" than from any source.
A fourth difference is in some of the mental char­ 
acteristics which are observable in the psychological crowd, 
but this difference is of such minor significance in relation 
to our purpose in studying crowd psychology that it may be dis­ 
regarded.
Much more impressive than these differences among the 
writers mentioned is the fundamental unity of the pictures they 
draw of the crowd. Without subscribing wholly to any one school 
of psychology represented, and without accepting in its entire­ 
ty the interpretation of one author, it is quite possible to 
set forth a broad outline of the psychology of the crowd which
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will be useful in the study of the abnormal religious audi­ 
ence.
Mental Characteristics of the Crowd.
In the crowd, even the most cultured and intelli­ 
gent members become, for the time being, primitive men. 
Thinking is of a very low order, tending to be quite stereo­ 
typed. The coarser emotions are dominant, and seem to drown 
all others. A sense of invincible power drives the crowd to 
attempt even the impossible. It is tolerant of nobody who 
threatens to thwart its purposes. It is capable of the most 
savage cruelty and of ruthless destruction, but it may also 
rise to the heights of moral splendour in deeds of heroic self- 
sacrifice. It is credulous, hasty in judgment, highly imagi­ 
native, and suggestible to an extreme degree. It is blindly 
obedient to its leader, but very fickle and likely at any mo­ 
ment to crucify the leader whom, a moment before, it was wil­ 
ling to worship almost as a god.
Conditions of Crowd Formation.
Under what conditions is an aggregation of people 
transformed into a psychological crowd? The writer witnessed 
such a transformation during the period of the numerous bank 
failures in America in November, 1930. Several large banks 
in Louisville, Kentucky, had closed following the crash of a 
large Investment company having holdings throughout the south. 
Uneasiness with regard to the safety of other banks was felt, 
of course. Two or three days after the failure of these banks, 
about the usual number of shoppers were walking in both direc-
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tions on Fourth Avenue, in the block in which were located
a department store and a bank, when suddenly the number of 
people entering the bank began to increase noticeably. Lines 
of unusual proportions formed at the tellers 1 windows in the 
bank. The attention of passersby was attracted, and they stop­ 
ped to peer in at the windows, if not to join the lines that 
jammed the entrance to the bank. Presently policemen arrived 
on their motorcycles, with sirens screaming, and in less than 
ten minutes a normal street aggregation of people was trans­ 
formed into a panic-stricken crowd intent on one purpose-- 
to draw their money out of the bank before it closed. After 
the run was finally stopped, it was reported that the depart­ 
ment store next door to the bank had paid a number of employ­ 
ees that morning with cheques on that bank. When the hour for 
lunch came, these employees had gone in a group, with cheques 
in hand, to get them cashed. When the passing shoppers noticed 
this unusually large number of people entering the bank with 
cheques and leaving with cash, that scene immediately suggest­ 
ed to them that there was a run on this bank which might cause 
it to close, as other banks in the city had done so recently, 
and that if they had money in that bank, they had better go 
and draw it out immediately.
This incident exhibits quite clearly what Dr. McDougall 
and others consider to be the fundamental conditions of collect­ 
ive mental activity; namely, "a common object of mental acti­ 
vity, a common mode of feeling in regard to it, and some de­ 
gree of reciprocal influence between members of the group".1 
1 The Group Mind, p. 33.
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Given those three conditions in a group, and that group is 
not necessarily transformed into a crowd, but without those 
conditions, it is doubtful whether a group can be transform­ 
ed into a psychological crowd. In the bank run described 
above, we have the common object of mental activity—the bank. 
There is not merely a_ common mode of some kind of feeling, 
but a very strong emotion of fear for the safety of the mo­ 
ney in that bank, and very obvious reciprocal influence a- 
mong the members of the group—the fear of each stimulating 
and intensifying the fear in the other.
In such a case, no leader for the crowd is neces­ 
sary. However, crowd leaders play a significant part, not 
merely in directing the activities of a crowd already form­ 
ed, but also in the formation of crowds—especially in the 
audience situation. Because it serves also to show very ac­ 
curately the stages by which an audience becomes a crowd, we 
quote at some length Professor E. D. Martin's description of 
a typical crowd orator and his technique.
"Preferably", he says, "the speaker should be an 
'old war horse', a victor in many battles. . . . 
When on rare occasions the spirit of the crowd be­ 
gins to manifest itself .... I have noticed that 
discussion instantly ceases and people begin mere­ 
ly to repeat their creeds and hurl cant phrases 
at one another. All then is changed, though subtly. 
There may be laughter as at first; but it is differ­ 
ent. . . . It is laughter at someone or something. 
Even the applause is changed. It is more frequent. 
It is more vigorous, and instead of showing the
1 W. D. Scott, Psychology of Public Speaking, p. 175, fol­ 
lows Le Bon in asserting that ^Tt is impossible "for a crowd 
to exist without a leader." Undoubtedly it is usually the 
case with crowds that someone becomes the recognized leader, 
but Scott's statement seems to be entirely too broad.
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mere approval of some sentiment, it becomes a means 
of showing the numerical strength of a group of 
believers of some sort. ... So long as the matter 
discussed requires close and sustained effort of 
attention, and the method of treatment is kept free 
from anything which savours of ritual, even the 
favourite dogmas of popular belief may be discus­ 
sed, and though the interest be intense, it will 
remain critical and the audience does not become 
a crowd. But let the most trivial bit of bathos 
be expressed in rhythmical cadences and in plati­ 
tudinous terms, and the most intelligent audience 
will react as a crowd. Crowd-making oratory is 
almost invariably platitudinous. In fact, we 
think as a crowd only in platitudes, propaganda, 
ritual, dogma, and symbol. Crowd-ideas are ready- 
made, they possess finality and universality. 
They are fixed. They do not develop. They are 
ends in themselves. Like obsessions of the in­ 
sane, there is a deadly inevitability in the lo­ 
gic of them. They are 'compulsions'. . . . The 
orators who commonly hold forth at such gather­ 
ings (political conventions, mass meetH ngs, and 
revivals) know intuitively the functional value 
of bathos, ridicule^, and platitude, and it is 
upon such knowledge that they base the success of 
their careers in 'getting the crowd'2. ... As 
the audience becomes crowd, the speaker's cadence 
becomes more marked, his voice more oracular, his 
gestures more emphatic. His message becomes a 
recital of great abstract 'principles'. The pure­ 
ly obvious is held up as transcendental. Inter­ 
est is kept upon just those aspects of things which 
can be grasped with least effort by all. Emphasis 
is laid upon those thought processes in which there 
is greatest natural uniformity. The general, ab­ 
stract, and superficial come to be exalted at the 
expense of that which is unique and personal. 
Forms of thought are made to stand as objects 
of thinking. . . . Popular orators deal only with 
the greatest common denominator of the meaning of 
these terms. . . . Now if attention can be direct­ 
ed to this imaginary and vague 'meaning for every­ 
body '--which is really the meaning for nobody--and 
so directed that the associations with the unique 
in personal experience are blocked, these abstrac­ 
tions will occupy the whole field of consciousness. 
The mind will yield to any connection which is made 
among them almost automatically."3
1 Cf. Grimshaw, Psychology o_f Revivals, pp. 100 and 219.
2 Cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric, pp. 190-191.
3 Martin, E. D., The Behaviour of Crowds, pp. 24-30.
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"Bathos .... rhythmical cadences.. . . . plati­ 
tudes .... propaganda .... ritual, dogma .... sym­ 
bol .... voice more oracular .... gestures more emphat­ 
ic .... abstract 'principles 1 .... the purely obvious." 
Here we have the fundamental technique of crowd oratory, and 
for the most part it is the familiar technique of suggestion 
which is commonly employed in inducing the hypnotic state in 
individuals.
Thus it becomes apparent that in the crowd there is 
a general breaking down of the normal inhibitions to belief, 
action and emotion, which is but another way of saying that 
in the crowd conditions are conducive to the extreme opera­ 
tion of the processes of suggestion, imitation, and sympathy. 
For in addition to the conditions already noted, there is in 
the crowd situation a restriction of bodily movements, of 
which Sldls says: "if anything gives us a strong sense of 
our individuality, it is surely our voluntary movements. . . 
Conversely the life of the individual self sinks, shrinks 
with the decrease of variety and intensity of voluntary move­ 
ments." 1 And along with this decided decrease in the indi­ 
vidual's self-consciousness, there is a reduction of his 
sense of personal responsibility and a corresponding increase 
in his sense of power, because of his unity with the crowd. 
As has been intimated earlier in this paper, with 
regard to the psychology of the normal religious audience, 
suggestion, imitation, and sympathy are not ultimate factors 
1 psychology of Suggestion, p. 299.
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in social psychology. In the case of crowd phenomena in­ 
volving motor activity, the more ultimate explanation is 
probably to be found in some statement of the principle of 
ideo-motor action, or dynamogenesis. This principle, as 
stated by James, has been discredited by Professor E. L. 
Thorndike and others, but the conclusion seems still to be 
warranted that there is a "tendency for any mental content 
upon which spontaneous attention is fixed, to gain control 
of the motor centres apart from the will, and thus to work 
itself out into the activity of the muscular system".•*•
For the sake of clarity, it should be stated ex­ 
plicitly that in the crowd no new mental processes are oper­ 
ative that are not to be found in the normal group. No 
subtle fluid or ethereal substance passes from one to another 
and envelops the crowd. There is no possession of the indi­ 
vidual by a mysterious collective mind of the kind postulated 
by Le Bon. 2 The individual is still an individual, but his 
behaviour is modified in those respects, and by those means 
which we have indicated above, so that he behaves in a primi­ 
tive, rather than in a normal, manner.
Examples of Crowd Phenomena in Revivals. 
Prom the accounts of the more spectacular revivals 
of history it is evident that many revival phenomena which 
have been variously ascribed to Satan, the Holy Spirit, or 
Mesmerism, are really but typical crowd phenomena. One ex­ 
ample of a religious audience which had been transformed in-
1 Dimond, S. G., The Psychology of the Methodist Revival,
p. 135.
2 The Crowd, p.
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to a crowd at the Cane Ridge Camp Meeting in Kentucky was
cited in Chapter II. Rev. Jonathon Parsons describes a re­ 
vival which he conducted in the West Parish of Lyme, Connec­ 
ticut, during the Great Awakening in New England, which also 
manifests typical crowd phenomena. He says of that remark­ 
able revival,
"Many had their countenances changed; 
their thoughts seemed to trouble them, so that 
their loins were loosed, and their knees smote 
one against another. Great numbers cried out 
aloud in the anguish of their souls. Several 
stout men fell as though a cannon had been dis­ 
charged, and a ball had made its way through 
their hearts. Some young women were thrown in­ 
to hysteric fits. . . .1 was commonly obliged 
to make several stops of considerable length, 
and entreat them, if possible, to restrain the 
flood of affection, that so they might attend 
to further truths which were to be offered, and 
others might not be disaffected. Some would 
after a while recover themselves, and others, 
I am satisfied, could not."l
G. B. Cutten reports still another particularly 
interesting account of a revival in which crowd phenomena 
were quite evident.
"in 1893", he writes, "l attended a 
meeting of a sect called T McDonaldites', on 
Prince Edward Island, Canada. The process of 
conversion extended over some weeks or months, 
and there were two young people then 'going 
through the works 1 .... As soon as the pastor 
commenced to preach the candidates began to 
twitch and jerk. One of the candidates, a 
young woman, was particularly susceptible. She 
twitched and moved her head so violently that 
her hat was thrown off, her hair pins scatter­ 
ed, her long hair waved and finally snapped. 
This was continued for over an hour, reminding 
one of a severe attack of chorea. The inter­ 
esting part, in connection with our subject, 
was the difficulty experienced, after watch­ 
ing these people twitch, in controlling myself.
1 Tracy, The Great Awakening, p. 138 ff.
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It seemed that it would have required but lit­ 
tle longer to put me in the candidate class. 
The very fear of the on-looker that he may be si­ 
milarly attacked acts as a powerful suggestion, 
and the more suggestible soon realize their 
fears. In accordance with the law of suggestion, 
every new case adds power to the cause, and soon 
conditions are ripe for the rapid spread of the 
psychic disorder over a whole community."!
The Extent of Such Phenomena.
These are fair examples, not of what usually hap­ 
pens in the religious revival, but of the kind of crowd 
phenomena which have been observed at certain times during 
the more intense revivals of history. Similar descriptions 
are to be found in accounts of the revivals of Jonathon Ed­ 
wards in, and around, Northampton, of Whitefield all along 
the Atlantic coast in America and in many communities in 
Great Britain, of Wesley in England, of McGready, the McGee 
brothers, and others in the camp meetings of Kentucky in the 
early 1800 ! s, of Pinney in the "burnt district" of New York, 
and of many others of more remote and more recent times.•*•
Of course, it must be kept in mind that, just as 
the individual "sinks" by degrees into a state of hypnotism, 
so also does the group sink by degrees into the state of the 
crowd. There is no clear line of demarcation. All degrees 
of crowd-mindedness are to be found in the various revivals, 
according as all, or only some, of the conditions of crowd- 
formation exist at a particular time.
Conditions in Revivals Conducive to 
Crowd-formation.
Let us, then, note some of the conditions existing
1 in Grimshaw, op. cit., Chs. I and in, there are excellent 
accounts. Also his bibliography is very inclusive.
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In the more intense forms of religious revival which are con­ 
ducive to crowd-formation. In the period preparatory to a 
revival, usually there is to be found a condition of subdued 
excitement, of mental strain and expectancy. This condition 
is sometimes brought about quite spontaneously, and sometimes 
it is produced deliberately by means of a technique involving 
very elaborate organization.
At Cambuslang, Scotland, in 1742, the Rev. Mr. 
McCulloch had been preaching for nearly a year, "in the or­ 
dinary course of his sermons", on "those subjects which tend 
most directly to explain the nature and prove the necessity 
of regeneration."
". . . . and for some months before the remarkable 
events now about to be mentioned," continues the 
narrator, "a more than ordinary concern about re­ 
ligion appeared among his flock. ... At this pe­ 
riod, though several persons had come to the min­ 
ister under deep concern about their salvation, 
there had been no great number; but on Thursday, 
the 18th, after sermon, about fifty persons came 
to him under alarming apprehensions about the state 
of their souls; and such was their anxiety, that he 
had to pass the night in conversing with them."l
The revival at Northampton under Jonathon Edwards, and many 
others in history, started in just such a spontaneous way 
as did the revival at Cambuslang.
In the more recent revivals, however—especially 
the highly organized ones under men like Sunday, Chapman, 
"Gypsy" Smith, Sam Jones, B. Pay Mills, and their many dis­ 
ciples in America--prayer bands and skilful newspaper pub-
1 Narratives of Revivals of Religion, pp. 6-7.
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licity have been the means of most frequent use in creating
the "atmosphere" for revival. 1
This like-mindedness has been called by Pratt "the 
sine qua non of a successful revival". 2 When people thus 
prepared are brought together in one place, McDougall's 
three essential conditions of collective mental action, which 
were noted above, are fulfilled. There is "a common object 
of mental activity, a common mode of feeling in regard to it, 
and some degree of reciprocal influence between members of 
the group".
Being "with one accord in one place", other factors 
are then brought to bear in the direction of crowd formation. 
Usually the group is isolated in one building, or other marked- 
off area, so that distractions are reduced and each person is 
conscious of his unity with the group. Through close seating, 
or standing, voluntary activity is restricted. There is con­ 
certed action in the postures assumed in prayer or in the 
singing.
In the writer 1 s childhood days, he attended a series 
of "protracted meetings" in a Methodist chapel in Mississippi, 
during which, if the minister himself failed by means of his 
sermon to break down the inhibitions of the congregation, he 
could nearly always depend on a certain Brother Dllworth, a 
pious but emotionally unstable layman, to pray in such a way 
as to succeed in fanning the flames of emotion so that there
1 For a detailed description of the organizations and tech­ 
niques used by Mills and Sunday, see Grimshaw, op. cit., 
pp. 320-323. — ——
2 Religious Consciousness, p. 174.
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was shouting, weeping, embracing, and occasionally fainting, 
throughout the congregation. And, as recently as the sum­ 
mer of 1933, we witnessed the induction of a similar crowd 
state, primarily by means of prayer, in a revival of the 
Holiness sect at Corinth, Mississippi.
But the singing of hymns is usually more effective 
in inducing the crowd state than is prayer. In congregation­ 
al singing there is not only concerted action, but also the 
source of potent suggestion and autosuggestion, as well as 
the means of stimulating and communicating emotion. Loud has 
written a valuable interpretation of the historical develop­ 
ment and psy<h ological significance of hymns in American 
revivalism. In Interpreting the contribution of the Wesleys 
he says:
"Both Charles and John tried to translate their ad­ 
venture in faith into verse, and this autobiograph­ 
ical element contributed to the emotional power of 
their hymns. Their conception of instantaneous re­ 
lease through conversion was individualized. Ev­ 
ery singer felt that the call was indeed to ! Even 
Me 1 . And the hymns themselves mirrored the unrest, 
agony, groping and struggle of the soul; the grace, 
hope, light and peace held out by faith; the sym­ 
pathy and guidance toward the goal; the bursting 
of the bonds and the rejoicing in redemption. No 
one sang to himself alone. That first evangel 
melody was created for hundreds and thousands to 
join with their voices and their hearts. All be­ 
came one voice and one heart. As the rhythmic lines 
swelled in the unison, the spirit touched every one. 
Belief was instilled. The impulse to consecration 
was infused. The response was inevitable." 2
Of such significance is the music to the technique of revival-
1 Cf. Grimshaw, op. cit., Chap. V, for another good account 
of revival music.
2 Evangelized America, p. 113. For an interesting interpre- 
tation of the nymn "Just As I Am", in terms of the psychology of 
autosuggestion, see Pratt, op. cit., pp. 179-180.
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ism that one does not think of Moody without Sankey, of "Billy" 
Sunday without Homer Rodeheaver, or of John Wesley without
Charles.
Sometimes the conditions which have been mentioned 
above prove to be sufficient of themselves to induce the crowd 
mind in a revival, even when the speaker is a man of not an 
unusual degree of prestige, or when he does not follow the u- 
sual technique of a crowd orator.
For example, Mr. John Livingstone, under whose 
preaching a congregation was evidently transformed into a re­ 
vival crowd at Shotts, Scotland, on Monday, June 21, 1630, was 
a reserved young man, only twenty-seven years of age, and not 
yet ordained. However, a very impressive communion service on 
Sunday morning, together with an extended period of prayer and 
conference Sunday night, had produced a most appropriate state 
of mind among fche people. Furthermore, an unanticipated inci­ 
dent in the service on Monday afforded him an opportunity which 
he used with consummate skill to stimulate fear and impress the 
urgency of immediate action on the congregation. The incident, 
with a brief exerpt from the sermon, has been related as follows:
"As he was about to close the discourse, a heavy 
shower came suddenly on, which made the people 
hastily take to their cloaks and mantles, and he 
proceeded to speak to the following purpose:— 
t If a few drops of rain so discompose you, how 
discomposed would you be--how full of horror and 
despair, if God should deal with you as you de­ 
serve? And thus he will deal with all the fi­ 
nally impenitent. God might justly rain fire 
and brimstone upon you, as he did upon Sodom and 
Gomorrah, and the other cities of the plain. But, 
forever blessed be his name I the door of mercy 
still stands open for such as you are. The Lord 
Jesus Christ, by tabernacling in our nature, and
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obeying that law which we have wickedly and wil­ 
fully broken, and suffering that punishment we 
have so richly deserved, has now become a refuge 
from the storm, and a covert from the tempest 
of divine wrath, due to us for sin. His merits 
and mediation are the alone defence from that 
storm, and none but those who come to Christ just 
as they are, empty of everything, and take the 
offered mercy at his hand, will have the benefit 
of this shelter. 1 In such expressions, and many 
others, was he led on for about an hour, (after 
he had finished what he had premeditated,) in 
a strain of exhortation and warning, with great 
enlargement and melting of heart, and with such 
visible impressions on his audience, as made it 
evident that the power of God was present with 
them. And, indeed, so great was the power of 
God manifested on the occasion, that about five 
hundred persons were converted, principally by 
means of this sermon."^
In the case of Mr. Livingstone, there was certainly 
the technique of crowd oratory, if not the prestige of "an 
old war horse"--to revert to Dr. Martin 1 s epithet. And in 
many other instances, notably in the American Revival of 
1857, when the other conditions of crowd formation have been 
present in the proper degree, it has been quite possible for 
men of relatively little ability, reputation, or other kinds 
of prestige, to convert a group into a psychological crowd of 
the revival type.
In most cases, however, the prestige of the speaker 
has been a factor of prime significance in the psychology of 
revivalism. It is difficult, of course, to separate the pres­ 
tige that a speaker attains through his reputation from the 
prestige that is inherent in his personality. But the repu­ 
tation which preceded men like Wesley, Whitefield, Edwards,
1 Narratives of Revivals of Religion, pp. 85-86.
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Moody, "Gypsy" Smith, and "Billy" Sunday into the communities
in which they preached had much to do with their effectiveness 
as revivalists.
An experience in a cotton factory at New York Mills, 
as related by Finney, indicates in a striking way the extent 
to which his reputation combined with his personality to ac­ 
complish hypnotic effects. As he went through the factory, to 
which his reputation had preceded him, he says:
"l observed there was a good deal of agitation 
among those who were busy at their looms, and 
their mules, and other implements of work. On 
passing through one of the apartments, where a 
great number of young women were attending to 
their weaving, I observed a couple of them eye­ 
ing me, and speaking very earnestly to each other; 
and I could see that they were a good deal agi­ 
tated, although they both laughed. I went slow­ 
ly toward them. They saw me coming, and were 
evidently much excited. One of them was trying 
to mend a broken thread, and I observed that her 
hands trembled so that she could not mend it. 
I approached slowly, looking on each side, at 
the machinery, as I passed; but observed that 
this girl grew more and more agitated, and could 
not proceed with her work. When I came within 
eight or ten feet of her, I looked solemnly at 
her. She observed it, and was quite overcome, 
and sunk down, and burst into tears. The im­ 
pression caught almost like powder, and in a 
few moments nearly all the room were in tears. 
This feeling spread through the factory. . . . 
The revival went through the mill with astonish­ 
ing power, and in the course of a few days near­ 
ly all in the mill were hopefully converted."!
Loud's description of Rev. James McGready, who was 
one of the leaders in that amazing Scotch-Irish Revival of 
1800, in Kentucky, shows very clearly the combination of the 
crowd-leader personality with the crowd-orator technique. 
1 Autobiography, p. 183 f.
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He says of McGready:
"His Calvinism was of the Edwardean 
temper and temperature. He would reach out 
with a mighty swing of his arm and in panto­ 
mimic parallel would pluck out a figurative 
sinner and dangle him over the brimstone 
brink. Then to those quailing under his in­ 
vective and imagery he would offer a Wesley- 
an way of escape leading through conversion 
to rebirth. It was said that his glowering 
visage, compelling eyes, and thunderous voice 
augmented the terrors of his composite Cal- 
vinistic hell and Method!stic regeneration."1
In light of these descriptions of revivalists and 
their techniques, one has but to recall the descriptions of 
crowd leaders and their techniques, as given by Martin, 
McDougall, and Le Bon, to perceive that they are fundamen­ 
tally the same. And chief among the crowd speaker 1 s tech­ 
niques are three—bold affirmation, frequent repetition, and 
vivid emotional imagery.
Rhythm in Revivals.
But, while crowd psychology goes far towards afford­ 
ing an explanation of many revival phenomena, such a study is 
by no means complete without a recognition of the significance 
of rhythm to revivalism. Pratt, after calling attention to 
the innumerable rhythms which are observable in inorganic 
life, as well as in the organic functions of the bodies of 
animals and man, says:
"Our mental life not only is deeply affected by all 
of these physiological processes, but carries the 
principle of rhythm (with or without bodily corre­ 
late) still farther, imitating constantly the swing
1 Op. cit., p. 97. For other instances of the effects of 
revivalists 1 prestige, see Underwood, A. C., Conversion; Chris- 
tian and Non-Christian, pp. 202-204. ————
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and return of the pendulum as long as life lasts. 
Hunger and satiety, sleep and waking, exertion 
and repose . . . .follow each other with almost 
the certainty, if without the exact regularity, 
of day and night and the revolving seasons. It 
would be odd, therefore, if so fundamental a hu­ 
man characteristic as religion should fail to be 
influenced by this deep-seated human character­ 
istic; and as a fact, the religious conscious­ 
ness is as rhythmic in its action as any other 
aspect of the human
Pratt shows that the recurring rhythm of intense re­ 
ligious consciousness is characteristic not only of the lives 
of isolated individuals, but also of groups. And G. B. Cut- 
ten has presented a table of religious revivals from the 
Great Awakening of 1734 to the Welsh Revival of 1905 to jus­ 
tify the conclusion that revivals occur periodically. The 
table is as follows :^
The Great Awakening 1734-1750
Wesley 1740-1790
Kentucky 1796-1815
Nettleton and Pinney 1828-1840
Miller 1840-1844
American, Irish, and Welsh 1857-1859
Moody 1873-1880
Welsh 1905-1906
A careful study of this table leads one to question 
the accuracy of Cutten's conclusion, for there is no regulari­ 
ty in the intervals of time between the revivals listed. 
Furthermore, I. G. Grimshaw reports that in his study of 127 
different revivals in 23 different countries, he could dis­ 
cover no evidence of periodicity when those revivals were rang­ 
ed chronologically regardless of the country in which they oc­ 
curred, when ranged chronologically according to the countries
1 Religious Consciousness, pp. 165-166.
2 Psychological Phenomena of Christianity, p. 186.
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in which revivals have been most frequent, or when ranged 
according to revival "peaks", or in terms of the intervals 
between the end of one revival and the beginning of another. 1 
This is what one would expect, rather than a recurrence at 
regular intervals, for too many variable factors enter into 
the origin and development of revivals for us to expect pe­ 
riodicity. To say this, however, is not to deny the signi­ 
ficance of rhythm as a factor among the conditions under which 
revivals occur. It is possible that the rhythm of intense 
religious consciousness is an irregular rhythm. Or, it may 
be that the rhythm itself is quite regular, but that other 
factors combine with it in such a way as to interfere with 
the strict periodicity of religious revivals. At any rate, 
more accurate than Cutters observation is Professor W. P. 
Paterson 1 s statement in his Gifford Lectures:
"But the most that can be affirmed on the basis 
of long views of history is that religion has 
been subject to the law of ebb and flow. In 
the late eighteenth century the cultured popu­ 
lation of Edinburgh was classified as Pagan and 
Christian, and thereafter it was so strongly ap­ 
prehended by the Evangelical Revival as to for­ 
get that it had ever been anything but serious 
and orthodox—a fact which may be cited as evi­ 
dence and symbol of the law of the recurring 
re-awakening and resurrection to which the re­ 
ligious spirit has been made subject."2
But of greater importance to our study are some of 
the rhythms to be found in the revival of a single community, 
or even within a single revival service.
Each revival in a community is wave-like in its
1 Op. cit., p. 356.
2 The NaTure of Religion, p. 27.
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intensity. Usually there is a preparatory period of relative­ 
ly mild emotional excitement which gradually reaches a cli­ 
max of intensity and then subsides. Of course, these waves 
are of unequal height and length, and within such a "primary" 
wave are "secondary11 waves of emotional action and reaction. 
Each service is calculated to build cumulatively the primary 
wave of the revival in the community, and each successive 
part of the particular service is planned and executed in such 
a way as to build up an emotional climax at the end of the 
sermon, or during the "invitation hymn" immediately following 
the sermon. For this purpose, the rhythm of the music, the 
rhythm of prayers, and the rhythmical cadences in the delivery 
of the sermon are the most important means«1
Closely linked with the rhythm of emotion is the 
wave-like nature of attention. What Scott has shown by the 
application of experimental results to the technique of pub­ 
lic speaking^ the great revivalists have perceived intuitive-
»
ly, or have learned by trial-and-error, without fohe benefit 
of modern psychology. They have known that attention is sub­ 
ject to fatigue and that a single idea cannot be held in the 
focus of attention continuously for a very long period of 
time, probably not more than a few seconds.3 They have learn­ 
ed, therefore, to use the anecdote, or some other familiar 
means, to relax attention temporarily, but always to lead 
back periodically to the text, the proposition, the appeal for
1 For an elaborate treatment of rhythm in relation to writ­ 
ten and oral discourse, see Scott, op. cit., Chap. IX.
2 Ibid., Chap. VII.
3 Ibid., p, 110.
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action, or whatever is most vital to the accomplishment of
their purpose with the audience. 1 Thus it is evident that 
rhythm is an important factor in the technique of artful re­ 
petition, which in turn is one of the standard tools of the 
crowd orator--of the revivalist no less than of the labour 
union agitator who would lead men to walk out in a strike, 
or of the American radio advertiser who would induce his lis­ 
teners to smoke a particular "brand of "toasted" cigarettes 
by repeating with rhythmic periodicity that "nature in the 
raw is seldom mild".
Thus it seems justifiable to conclude that, from 
a psychological point of view, the phenomena of revivals are 
to be explained largely in terms of the "laws" of rhythm, on 
the one hand, and the principles of crowd psychology on the 
other. The revival audience of the most intense type is an 
abnormal group in which the usual inhibitions to belief, e- 
motion, and action are so completely blocked, or broken down, 
that suggestion, sympathy, and imitation operate in the mem­ 
bers of the audience with practically no restrictions.
Evaluation of Revivals.
To state such a conclusion is not, however, to im-
1 An interesting variation of the time-honoured technique 
of repeating, at intervals in the sermon, the text or propo­ 
sition is Dr. W. L. Stidger's "Symphonic Sermon Theme". He 
finds a striking couplet of poetry which expresses clearly 
and vividly the thought or the mood of the text, associates 
the couplet with the text in the minds of the audience in the 
early part of the sermon, and then periodically repeats the 
couplet, somewhat as the musical theme of a symphony is re­ 
peated at intervals by the orchestra, first by this group of 
instruments, then by that. For fuller exposition of the tech­ 
nique, see Stidger, Symphonic Sermon Themes.
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ply that revivals—even those of the most intense form—are
wholly evil. The facts do not justify such a sweeping con­ 
demnation. Too many men have been rescued from gutters of 
drunkenness through the acrobatic preaching of "Billy" Sun­ 
day; too many disintegrated personalities have been integrat­ 
ed through a vital assurance of the love of God which is as­ 
sociated with the preaching of Moody and the singing of San- 
key; too many churches, once existing on the low plane of 
mechanical formality, have been revitalized and raised to 
heights of Christian fellowship through the sermons of Wesley; 
too many communities have been purged of gross social evils 
and infused with strong moral passions through the preaching 
of Finney to warrant the judgment that revivals are of no 
value.
Nor can the evils, weaknesses, and limitations of 
the more extreme forms of revivals be overlooked, or be con­ 
sidered of no consequence. Insanity, nervous disorders, sex­ 
ual misconduct, bigotted intolerance, and other evils have 
been attributed with well-established evidence to some of the 
more extravagantly emotional revivals. Backslidings have 
been numerous, and in many cases the last state was far worse 
than the first.
The effects, then, of intense revivalism reveal a 
mixture of both good and evil. In his evaluation of revivals, 
Professor Pratt asserts that the positive elements in revival 
constitute its real value, the negative elements its harmful
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limitations. Then, in explaining more specifically what he
means, he says:
"The inhibition of reason, the inhibition of free 
and responsible individual action, the forcing of 
emotions and convictions and physical reactions 
upon relatively passive recipients through the use 
of semi-hypnotic methods, these things dwarf the 
personality and belittle the man, these things 
bring about few if any results of real and perma­ 
nent value. It is from the recruits of these hyp­ 
notic methods that the subsequent Backsliders 1 
come. On the other hand, a revival adds to the 
values of life when it emphasizes the positive 
things, leaving the individual in full command of 
his reason and free to choose and to act, but giv­ 
ing him new insights and wider glimpses of the 
truth, opening up to him undreamed-of worlds of 
possible experience, revelations of new value, a- 
rousing in him larger inspirations, purer emotions, 
and higher aspirations and ideals. These things 
cannot be given by the methods of hypnotic sug­ 
gestion and emotionalism. But neither are they 
to be brought about by conventional morality or 
! cold ! logic. And the church which understands 
human psychology and wishes for lasting results, 
will both refrain from the methods of the reli­ 
gious hypnotist and also make some special efforts 
to obtain 'seasons of refreshment from the hand 
of the Lord'."1
In view of Pratt ! s avowed purpose--to indicate only 
"in a very general way" which part of revivalism are good and 
which are evil--this is an admirable statement. But while it 
is true that the positive values which he names "cannot be 
given by methods of hypnotic suggestion and emotionalism" of 
themselves, at the same time, one must keep in mind that even 
these methods frequently have produced an experience, or have 
led to the making of an allegiance, which, in turn, has made 
possible the wholesome development of Christian personality
1 Op. cit., p. 194.
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by more commendable methods. What we mean, specifically, is 
this: Under the influence of mass suggestion, an individual 
may have an experience which, rightly or wrongly, is interpret­ 
ed to be conversion. Following the usual course, presently he 
finds himself an accepted member of the church. But in the 
fellowship of that church, he develops attitudes, sentiments, 
ideals, and convictions which are productive of genuine Chris­ 
tian character. It cannot be said that such a character is the 
direct and immediate fruit of "hypnotic suggestion and emotion­ 
alism", to be sure, but to "hypnotic suggestion and emotional­ 
ism" must be given the credit for the first and decisive step 
in a direction which was productive of Christian character.
That such a result is the exception, rather than the 
rule, in revivalism must be admitted. Probably the most fre­ 
quent criticism of revivals made by pastors--especially of the 
highly organized "union" revival which is conducted by a pro­ 
fessional revivalist--is that so many of the "converts" do not 
identify themselves with a congregation, or if they do, they 
soon cease to attend services and thus fail to receive the 
Christian training which is necessary in order to stabilize 
the individual in a consistent Christian life. This criticism 
is supported by some "statistics of the results, in a single 
community, of revivals which were conducted by an imported evan­ 
gelist", and which are presented in a table in Starbuck's 
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While it is dangerous to place too much weight on such statis­ 
tics, they are confirmed by the judgments most frequently ex­ 
pressed by ministers who are in a position to judge most accu­ 
rately in such matters, and they are in accord with what is to 
be expected in view of the psychology of revivalism.
The most significant implication of such a table is 
not the negative one--that professional evangelism is of rela­ 
tively little value because a large per cent of the conversions 
resulting are impermanent. There is always room for the criti­ 
cism that the conventional church services, sermons, and Sun­ 
day School work of the churches into which these new "converts" 
go, are not adequate to meet their needs. The more significant 
implication is that which is coming to be taken more seriously 
just at the present time in America, which has been in the past 
the "happy hunting ground" of professional revivalism,! but
1 For an interpretation of characteristics of American life
which partly account for this fact, see Grimshaw, OD
pp. 318-320. —
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which is now experiencing a reaction to it. This implication
is aptly described in the slogan: "Every minister his own e-
vangelist".
What, then, may the minister who would be his own
evangelist, learn about preaching from the psychology of re­ 
vivalism?
Applications to Homiletics.
Before discussing certain characteristics of the 
revivalist's technique more specifically in relation to homi- 
letics, it should be noted that, apart from other conditions 
which we have found to be conducive to crowd-formation, the 
extreme homiletical techniques of the revivalist are most like­ 
ly to be Ineffective in producing crowd phenomena. The three 
factors of audience-attitude, speaker-personality, and speech- 
technique must be combined before crowd phenomena are mani­ 
fested in the religious audience. Those factors are of such 
a nature that we cannot regard them quantitatively and suppose 
that they must combine in exactly equal proportions. And they 
react upon one another in such a mutually stimulating way that 
it seems impossible to discover any regular order of their 
appearance. But, in the absence of the appropriate audience- 
attitude, and lacking the glamour and prestige of the crowd- 
speaker personality, it is safe to say that "bathos, platitudes, 
abstract principles, and the purely obvious" might be present­ 
ed to a religious audience in "rhythmical cadences", and with 
an "oracular voice", accompanied by the most "emphatic ges­ 
tures," the net result being only that the preacher would have
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made himself utterly ridiculous in the eyes of his audience. 
In other words, merely because these techniques are character­ 
istic of the revivalistic crowd-orator T s speech, it does not 
follow that they invariably produce crowd phenomena.
Moreover, a careful examination of the techniques 
of the revivalist and of the teachings of recognized author­ 
ities on homiletics leads one to the conclusion that they 
are not different in kind, but rather in degree.
We have seen, for example, that simplicity, both 
of content and of language, is characteristic of revival ser­ 
mons* So simple are they, as a rule, that in printed form 
they are almost unreadable. Evidently Whitefield recognized 
to some extent the contrast between his sermons in oral and 
in printed form, for James Burns, after commenting that White- 
field 1 s printed sermons give little indication of their tre­ 
mendous power, relates that on one occasion when permission 
was asked of him to print a sermon which had created a pro­ 
found impression on his hearers, he answered, "I have no ob­ 
jection, if you will print the lightning, thunder, and rain­ 
bow with it." Then Burns adds the comment that "it was the 
13g htning, thunder, and rainbow which gave to the spoken 
words their spell, and held vast audiences in breathless still­ 
ness."1 Yet simplicity of thought, language, and style, is 
not in itself a homiletical defect. In most text-books on the 
subject,^ it is commended as a most desirable quality, and
1 Revivals; Their Laws and Leaders, p. 288.
2 Of. Van Oosterzee, Practical Theology, pp. 328-329; Vinet, 
Homiletics, pp. 348 f.; Kidder, D. P., Treatise on Homiletics, 
pp. 293-296; Ghristlieb, Homiletics, pp. 366-373; Broadus,—— 
Preparation and Delivery or sermons, pp. 301-302.
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it is characteristic of the sermons of great preachers who
would hardly be called crowd-orators of the pulpit. It is 
not the simplicity itself, then, which is to be condemned in 
revival sermons, but the extreme banality to which simplicity 
is sometimes reduced. In so far as he speaks in terms of au­ 
dience experience, rather than in "bookish" or theological 
language which has little,or no meaning to people, the revi­ 
valist has something to teach "the average minister" about 
simplicity in preaching.
Another characteristic which we find in the preach­ 
ing of most revivalists is sensationalism. Admittedly, "sen­ 
sational" is a relative term which is difficult to define 
satisfactorily. What is sensational to one person may be 
merely "dramatic", or "interesting", to another. But without 
attempting to draw a hard and fast line between what is to be 
regarded as sensational and what is not, it is safe to say that 
most revivalism of the intense form which we have been consider­ 
ing in this chapter is characterized by various forms of sen­ 
sationalism. Mrs. Amie Semple McPherson uses all the mechani­ 
cal devices of the theatre to support her histrionic talent 
in making "the four-square Gospel" sensationally impressive. 2
"Billy" Sunday 1 s acrobatic preaching would be sensational even
3 to an audience of deaf people. Burns presents the following
Incident as a typical example of the dramatic power of White-
1 Alexander Whyte, Alexander Maclaren, and Phillips Brooks, 
for example.
2 Loud, op. cit., Chapter on"Corybantic Christianity".
3 Cutten, op* cit., pp. 190-191, gives a vivid description 




"Lord Chesterfield was listening to him as in the 
course of his sermon he described the sinner as 
a blind beggar led by a dog. The dog leaving 
him he was forced to grope his way, guided only 
by a staff. 'Unconsciously he wanders to the 
edge of a precipice; his staff drops from his 
hand down the abyss, too far to send back an e- 
cho; he reaches forward cautiously to recover it; 
for a moment he poises on vacancy, and--'Good 
Grodl' shouted Chesterfield, as he sprang from his 
seat to avert the catastrophe, 'he is gone I'"1
In addition to such use of the extremely dramatic, sensation­ 
alism is often manifested in revival preaching by the use of 
slang, villification of opponents, "death-bed stories" and 
other remarkable anecdotes, and in attacking sins which have 
been traditionally associated with sensationalism.
For the sake of argument, we may grant that probably 
such sensationalism is often largely the self-expression of 
personalities which are lacking in the taste of culture and 
refinement, if. not in the grace of Christian humility. We 
may admit that such sensationalism makes its appeal to the 
lower elements in human nature. But, when the sensationalism 
of the revivalist has been condemned as thoroughly as it de­ 
serves to be condemned, we must recognize that psychologically, 
it performs one useful and valid function which is probably 
the underlying reason for its frequent use by revivalists; 
namely, it enlists the interest and maintains the spontaneous 
attention of the audience. It is a cheap and tawdry means, 
but it 3^£ a means.
Here again, then, we find that the revivalist has 
1 C)p. cit., p. 288.
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simply taken a standard homiletical technique and carried 
it to extremes. For whether in teaching in the classroom, 
or in preaching in the pulpit, psychologists are agreed that 
spontaneous, rather than voluntary, attention is most desir­ 
able, chiefly because it avoids fatigue and is accompanied by 
a pleasant, rather than an unpleasant, feeling-tone.^ And 
the recognized techniques for securing and maintaining at­ 
tention which are commended in the text-books on public speak­ 
ing and preaching are fundamentally the same as those employ­ 
ed by the revivalist. The difference, we repeat, is one of 
degree. But we agree heartily with Professor Gardner, when 
he says with regard to genuine dramatic action in the pulpit:
" . . . .in this respect most preaching errs by 
deficiency rather than by excess. The average 
preacher is sadly lacking in dramatic power. 
How many sermons, otherwise good, are wanting in 
power because the preacher utterly fails to make 
men, incidents, situations emobdying the truths 
he is seeking to impress, live before his hearersl 
Thrilling actions and events are related without 
appropriate—and perhaps with quite inappropriate— 
dramatic action. At best, the imagination of the 
audience is not assisted in the emotional reali­ 
zation of the scene; and sometimes is actually 
hindered by the blundering, unsympathetic pre­ 
sentation. Such preaching may be "didactic", 
but is certainly not dynamic. It may be instruc­ 
tional in form, but is not instructive in fact."2
A third characteristic which the preaching of the 
revivalist shares with the speaking of the typical crowd-ora­ 
tor is the use of positive affirmation and frequent repetition.
1 Admirable expositions of the psychology of attention in 
relation to speaking are to be found in O'Neill and Weaver, 
Elements of Speech, Ch. XVIII; Williamson, Speaking in Public,XVI; 
Gardner, Psychology and Preaching, Ch. VIII; Scott, Psychology 
of Public Speaking7 Ch. VII; and Overstreet, Influencing Human 
Behaviour, Gh. I. ' ————
2 Psychology and Preaching, pp. 124-125.
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This is not merely the accidental or unconscious practice, but 
the avowed theory, of at least one noted American revivalist, 
who writes in his book on How to Promote and Conduct a_ Success­ 
ful Revival;
"Revival preaching to be effective must be positive. 
The doubter never has revivals. ... A revival is 
a revolution in many important respects, and revo­ 
lutions are never brought about by timid, fearful 
or deprecatory addresses. They are awakened by 
men who are cocksure of their ground, and who speak 
with authority. . . . Revival preaching must be di­ 
rected towards the heart and not the head. . . . 
Get hold of the heart and the head yields easily. **•
Against positive affirmation in preaching there is 
no legitimate objection from the point of view either of hom- 
iletics or of psychology, so long as the minister is affirm­ 
ing rational convictions, and is not merely repeating, parrot- 
like, the shibboleths of an outworn theology. It is the ten­ 
dency of most revivalists to affirm dogmatically those doctrines 
that are characteristic of a reactionary theology which is to 
be condemned.^ That the minister shall preach with conviction 
the faith that is in him is the desire even of those among the 
religious audience who do not share those convictions.^ And 
preaching with the authority of a vital assurance of the truth 
and value of the Christian Gospel is one of the outstanding 
topics of emphasis in most works on homiletics.^
As for repetition, it is one of the "laws of recall" 
in the psychology of memory that "an impression, if it is not
1 Torrey, R. A., p. 32.
2 Cf. Grimshaw, op. cit., pp. 199-215.
3 Cf. Black, J., Mystery of Preaching, p. 45.
4 For especially good treatments, see Mouzon, Preaching With 
Authority; Buttrick, G. A., Jesus Came Preaching, Ch. I; and 
Vinet, Homiletics, pp.
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reinforced by repeated experiences or by repeated revivals of 
the image, tends to fade with the lapse of time. 1* 1 Some repe­ 
tition is desirable even in written discourse, especially in 
those forms which are didactic in purpose. Yet it is not so 
necessary in that which is written as in that which is oral. 
The reader of a book is at liberty to pause and re-read at 
will, thus effecting repetition for himself. But if the mem­ 
bers of an audience fail, for any one of several reasons, to 
understand a statement of the speaker, or if some idea which 
is basic to the full understanding of succeeding ideas has fad­ 
ed from the memory of some of the hearers, unless the speaker 
repeats, those members of the audience are likely to lose a 
large part of his message. So that, far from being the exclu­ 
sive characteristic of hypnotic crowd-oratory, repetition is 
a didactic technique which has its proper place in preaching, 
no less than in other forms of discourse. In recognition of 
this fact, Dr. Joseph Port Newton, who certainly would not be
nclassified as a crowd-orator, has said:
"The preacher of to-day must win by other arts, one 
of which is the knack of 'artistic repetition', in 
obedience to the wisdom of 'Alice in Wonderland', 
where we are told, 'What I tell you three times is 
true' ."3
Still a fourth characteristic of revival preaching 
and other forms of crowd-oratory is the audience-centred method 
of delivery. In most text-books on homiletics which treat of 
delivery, three methods are distinguished- -reading from a manus-
1 Gardner, op. cit*> P» 2^. Gf. also Stout, Groundwork of 
Psychology, pp. 65-66. 
——— 2 Of. his volume of sermons, God and the Golden Rule.
3 The New Preaching, p. 117.
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cript, reciting verbatim from memory, and preaching extempo­ 
raneously, with or without notes, and with or without having 
previously written the sermon in full. A full discussion of 
the advantages and disadvantages of each of these methods of 
delivery lies without the scope of this paper. It may be ob­ 
served, however, that if any successful revivalist, or other 
type of crowd-orator, has used the method of reading closely 
from a manuscript, we have failed to discover that fact. More­ 
over, most of the text-books on homiletics estimate reading 
from a manuscript as the least effective method of delivery, 
and preaching extemporaneously (but not without careful prepa- 
ration--either written or unwritten) as the most effective meth­ 
od. And it would probably be true to say that most great preaoh- 
ers of the past and present have delivered their sermons with­ 
out manuscript, although there are many notable exceptions.2 
The major point of consideration, however, is not the method 
itself, but whether in any of the methods employed the preach­ 
ing is audience-centred and genuinely communicative. It is pos­ 
sible for a preacher to speak extemporaneously, but to be so 
introvertedly self-conscious that he looks at the ceiling, the 
wall, or the floor, or in some other way manifests a non-commu­ 
nicative attitude which gives no evidence of his consciousness 
of the presence of an audience or of his interest in it. Such 
preaching may be described as preaching before an audience,
1 Of. Kidder, op. cit., pp. 307-328 and Appendix C., pp. 464- 
489; Broadus, op. cit., pp. 288-317; Van Oosterzee, op. cit., 
pp. 330-338; and Christlieb, Homiletic, pp. 374-379. ——
2 Cf. Kidder, loc. cit., for a historical and critical ac­ 
count of methods, and Newton, If !_ Had Only One Sermon to Prepare 
and Pritchard, The Minister, the Method, and the MessageT "for——— 
accounts of metnoas or outstanding AmericarFana British "preachers.
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rather than preaching to an audience. On the other hand, it
is possible for a sermon to be read from a manuscript so commu­ 
nicatively that the audience is scarcely aware of the presence 
of the manuscript and that the rapport between preacher and 
audience is not seriously impaired by the mechanics of reading, 
although Van Oosterzee has hardly exaggerated when he says that 
"between the reading of a sermon and the preaching of the Word, 
there is a distance which may be lessened indeed, but never 
overcome".1
From the point of view of group thinking, as we con­ 
sidered it in Chapter VII, it is obvious that an audience-cen­ 
tred method of delivery is essential in the preaching situation. 
And from the point of view of attention and the memory of con­ 
tent, experimental evidence confirms the teaching of most of 
the authorities on public speaking and homiletics.
"The general depression," say Murphy and Murphy, "which 
so often seems to sweep through the hall as the speak­ 
er draws a manuscript from his pocket is the kind of 
clue that led H. T. Moore to attack the question of 
how well one listens when one may directly watch the 
face of the speaker, as compared with listening while 
the lecturer is bent over his notes. Moore present­ 
ed identical material to two very similar groups, us­ 
ing lecture notes when addressing one group, and 
speaking from memory to the other (the entire passage 
had been committed to memory and abundantly rehears­ 
ed) . After hearing the material, the students wrote 
out in detail all that they could remember. There 
were 39 subjects in one group, 61 in the other, and 
no significant differences in class standing between 
the two. In a preliminary experiment, the 'marble 
statue test 1 had been spoken (without notes) to the 
larger group, and read""aloud to the smaller. Since, 
however, both groups knew that this was a test and 
took definitely competitive attitudes, no differences 
as between the two methods appeared. In the final 
experiment, however, the purpose was disguised, the
1 Op. cit., p. 334,
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lecture material being given as part of the ordi­ 
nary classroom routine. It consisted of an 184- 
element statement of the life of Helmholtz, tak­ 
ing five minutes to cover. The difference in re­ 
tention under these conditions is very great, the 
score made by those who heard the reading being 
49.6, m.v. 14.4, and for the speaking 67.5, m.v. 15.7."1
A final characteristic of revival preaching which 
should be noted is its emotionalism. This has been the point 
of its severest condemnation, and the grounds for that condem­ 
nation were sufficiently indicated in our discussion of the 
value of revivals. It suffices here, therefore, to note that 
in this case, as in the case of the other characteristics which 
we have considered, our thesis holds, that the techniques of 
the revivalist differ from those commended by recognized homi- 
letical authorities in degree, rather than in kind.
Following Hocking's thesis that in religion feeling 
is basal, Principal Hughes points out most clearly the sig­ 
nificance of feeling in religion and the psychological weak­ 
ness of religion which is too exclusively a matter of feeling. 
In part, he says:
". . . . Although religion arises in feeling, it yet 
does not get its satisfaction in feeling only, but 
in an attainment. ... It does not get its satisfac­ 
tion until the whole personality in all the deepest 
ranges of its being is claimed. So it lays the rea­ 
son under tribute and forces it to formulate a be­ 
lief as an interpretation of the experience. It 
touches the springs of action and stirs the conative 
element to impel men to acts of worship, to prayers, 
and religious conduct. In this way does the unity of 
consciousness assert itself, for no one aspect of con­ 
scious life can function or express itself unduly with­ 
out detriment to the other aspects. For religion to 
remain as predominantly feeling is to end in weak sen-
1 Experimental Social Psychology, pp. 518-519.
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timentalism or unwholesome erotic mystical experiences. 
To be kept healthy the religious experience, which is 
at bottom feeling, must find articulation in thought 
and be interpreted in terms of truth and reason. . . . 
Religion, then, can never remain mere feeling, nor 
can the primacy and sway of feeling obscure the other 
aspects of consciousness without detriment to the 
whole. 111
Such a balanced view of the wholesome religious ex­ 
perience which it is the preacher's task to cultivate in the 
religious audience deserves to be emohasized. But if the re­ 
vivalist needs to learn better the place of cognition and co­ 
nation in the development of the religious consciousness, the 
settled pastor could often profit by recognizing the need for 
an emotionally warmer type of preaching than one frequently 
hears in the pulpits of our churches to-day.
Dr. James Reid has not put it too strongly when he 
says in his Warrack lectures on preaching:
"But we must not be afraid of letting our­ 
selves go. It is an indispensable part of the reve­ 
lation of truth, for truth only comes home to men 
through preaching in its proper emotional atmosphere. 
To make people feel the truth is an essential part 
of making them see it. If we come to the point where 
the truth ceases to move us in some healthy emotion, 
we may rightly suspect our own apprehension of it, 
and we will need to recover the vision, it may be, 
on our knees. M^
That professor was not far wrong who said to some 
students at Glasgow,
"A PREACHER IS A MAN WITH A MESSAGE, ON FIRE."3
1 The New Psychology and Religious Experience, pp. 159-160
2 In""guest of ReaTIEy, p. 100.
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